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The Congressional Oversight Manual was developed about 25 years ago
following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and
Investigations.  The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate
committee aides from both parties and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) at
the request of the bipartisan House leadership.  The Manual was produced by CRS
with the assistance of a number of House committee staffers.  In subsequent years,
CRS sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff
and updated the Manual as circumstances warranted.   The last revision occurred in
2002.  Worth noting is the bipartisan  recommendation of the House members of the
1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (Rept. No. 103-413, Vol. I):
[A]s a way to further enhance the oversight work of Congress, the Joint
Committee would encourage the Congressional Research Service to conduct on
a regular basis, as it has done in the past, oversight seminars for Members and
congressional staff and to update on a regular basis its Congressional Oversight
Manual.
Over the years, CRS has assisted Members, committees, party leaders, and staff
aides in the performance of various oversight functions.  Understandably, given the
size, reach, and cost of the modern executive establishment, Congress’s oversight
role is even more significant than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic
Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant
oversight of administration.”  Today’s lawmakers and congressional aides understand
that Congress’s work does not end when it passes laws.  They have to make sure that
the laws work and are being administered in an effective, efficient, and economical
manner. Oversight, then, seems certain to remain one of Congress’s principal
assignments as it grapples with the complexities of the 21st century.
To revise a document of this size and scope requires the contributions of many
people.  Four CRS specialists, listed on the title page, were responsible for organizing
and writing this version of the Manual.  In addition, numerous other CRS personnel
assisted in the preparation and publication of this report, as well as staff of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO).  Daphne Bigger of the Government and Finance Division assumed primary
responsibility in the secretarial production of this report.
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Congressional Oversight Manual
I.  Purposes, Authority, and Participants
Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight of the executive
branch — the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of public
policy.  The first several Congresses inaugurated such important oversight techniques
as special investigations, reporting requirements, resolutions of inquiry, and use of
the appropriations process to review executive activity. Contemporary developments,
moreover, have increased the legislature’s capacity and capabilities to check on and
check the Executive.  Public laws and congressional rules have measurably enhanced
Congress’s implied power under the Constitution to conduct oversight.
Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in
public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.  That act
required House and Senate standing committees to exercise “continuous
watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their jurisdiction.  
Since the late 1960s, according to such scholars as political scientist Joel
Aberbach, Congress has shown increasing interest in oversight for several major
reasons.  These include the expansion in number and complexity of federal programs
and agencies; increase in expenditures and personnel, including contract employees;
the rise of the budget deficit; and the frequency of divided government, with
Congress and the White House controlled by different parties.  Major partisan
disagreements over priorities and processes also heighten conflict between the
legislature and the executive.
Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide
variety of channels, organizations, and structures.  These range from formal
committee hearings to informal Member contacts with executive officials, from staff
studies to support agency reviews, and from casework conducted by Member offices
to studies prepared by noncongressional entities, such as statutory commissions and
offices of inspector general.
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Purposes
Congressional oversight of the Executive is designed to fulfill a number of
purposes:
A.  Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent
Congress, of necessity, must delegate discretionary authority to federal
administrators.  To make certain that these officers faithfully execute laws according
to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken and
regulations formulated by departments and agencies.
B.  Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy 
of Governmental Operations
A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and
secure efficient and effective program management, and to make every dollar count
toward the achievement of program goals.  A basic objective is strengthening federal
programs through better managerial operations and service delivery.  Such steps can
improve the accountability of agency managers to Congress and enhance program
performance.
C.  Evaluate Program Performance
Systematic program performance evaluation remains a relatively new and still-
evolving technique in oversight.  Modern program evaluation uses social science and
management methodologies, such as surveys, cost-benefit analyses, and efficiency
studies, to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs.
D.  Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative 
Prerogatives and Powers
Beginning in the late 1960s, many commentators, public policy analysts, and
legislators argued that Presidents and executive officials overstepped their authority
in various areas such as impoundment of funds, executive privilege, war powers, and
the dismantling of federal programs without congressional consent.  Increased
oversight — as part of the checks and balances system — was called for to redress
what many in the public and Congress saw to be an executive arrogation of
legislative prerogatives.
E.  Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration,
Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste,
Dishonesty, and Fraud
Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, the breakdown of federal
programs, incompetent management, and the subversion of governmental processes
arouse legislative and public interest in oversight.
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F.  Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Carry
out Program Objectives
Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out
program objectives can be accomplished in various ways.  For example, numerous
laws require agencies to submit reports to Congress; some of these are regular,
occurring annually or semi-annually, for instance, while others are activated by a
specific event, development, or set of conditions.  The report requirement may
promote self-evaluation by the agency.  Organizations outside of Congress, such as
offices of inspector general and study commissions, also advise Members and
committees on how well federal agencies are working.
G.  Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities
Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the
appropriations process, which provides the opportunity to review recent expenditures
in detail.  In addition, most federal agencies and programs are under regular and
frequent reauthorizations — on an annual, two-year, four-year, or other basis —
giving the authorizing committees the same opportunity.  As a consequence of these
oversight efforts, Congress can abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by
cutting off or reducing funds or it may enhance effective programs by increasing
funds.
H.  Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest
Congressional oversight can appraise whether the needs and interests of the
public are adequately served by federal programs, and thus lead to corrective action,
either through legislation or administrative changes.
I.  Protect Individual Rights and Liberties
Congressional oversight can help to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens
and others.  By revealing abuses of authority, for instance, oversight hearings can halt
executive misconduct and help to prevent its recurrence, either directly through new
legislation or indirectly by putting pressure on the offending agency.
J.  Other Specific Purposes
The general purposes of oversight — and what constitutes this function — can
be stated in more specific terms.  Like the general purposes, these unavoidably
overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight.  A brief
list includes:
1.  review the agency rulemaking process;
2.  monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services;
3.  encourage and promote mutual cooperation between the branches;
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4.  examine agency personnel procedures;
5.  acquire information useful in future policymaking;
6.  investigate constituent complaints and media critiques;
7.  assess whether program design and execution maximize the delivery of     
     services to beneficiaries;
8.  compare the effectiveness of one program with another;
9.  protect agencies and programs against unjustified criticisms; and
10.  study federal evaluation activities.
THOUGHTS ON OVERSIGHT AND ITS RATIONALE FROM . . . 
James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the
Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court:
The house of representatives . . . form the grand inquest of the state.  They will
diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things.
Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to  use
the term “oversight” to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government and to talk much about what it sees.  It is meant to be the eyes and the
voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative
function.
John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), British
utilitarian philosopher:
. . .  the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the
government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition
and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable . . . 
CRS-5
Authority to Conduct Oversight
A.  United States Constitution
The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate
executive branch activities.  The constitutional authority for Congress to conduct
oversight stems from such explicit and implicit provisions as:
1. The power of the purse.  The Constitution provides that “No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law.” Each year the Committees on Appropriations of the House and
Senate review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies.  The
appropriations process allows the Congress to exercise extensive control
over the activities of executive agencies.  Congress can define the precise
purposes for which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and
prohibit expenditures for certain purposes.
2. The power to organize the executive branch.  Congress has the authority
to create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies.
It has the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and
agencies, and grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators.
Congress, in short, exercises ultimate authority over executive branch
organization and generally over policy.
3. The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own
enumerated powers as well as those of the executive.  Article I grants
Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin
money; regulate foreign and interstate commerce; declare war; provide for
the creation and maintenance of armed forces; and establish post offices.
Augmenting these specific powers is the so-called “Elastic Clause,” which
gives Congress the authority “To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  Clearly, these provisions grant
broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established
by law.
4. The power of impeachment, removal, and confirmation.  Impeachment
offers Congress a powerful tool to investigate alleged executive (and
judicial) misbehavior, and to eliminate such behavior through the
conviction and removal from office of the offending individual.  The
confirmation process not only involves the determination of a nominee’s
suitability for an executive (or judicial) position, but also provides an
opportunity to examine the current policies and programs of an agency
along with those policies and programs that the nominee intends to pursue.
5. The power of investigation and inquiry.  A traditional method of exercising
the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and
inquiries into executive branch operations.  Legislators need to know how
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effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency officials
are responding to legislative directives, and how the public perceives the
programs.  The investigatory method helps to ensure a more responsible
bureaucracy, while supplying Congress with information needed to
formulate new legislation.
THE SUPREME COURT ON CONGRESS’S POWER 
TO OVERSEE AND INVESTIGATE
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, and 181-182 (1927):
Congress, investigating the administration of the Department of Justice during the Teapot Dome
scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation could be had or would be materially
aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.”  The “potential” for
legislation was sufficient.  The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of
inquiry — with the process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.”
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975):
Expanding on its holding in McGrain, the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry
there need be no predictable end result.”
B.  Principal Statutory Authority
A number of laws directly augment Congress’s authority, mandate, and
resources to conduct oversight, including assigning specific duties to committees.
Among the most important, listed chronologically, are
1. 1912 Anti-Gag Legislation and Whistleblower Protection Laws for
Federal Employees.
a. The 1912 act countered executive orders, issued by Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, which prohibited civil
service employees from communicating directly with Congress.
b. It also guaranteed that “the right of any persons employed in the civil
service . . . to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish
information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or
member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.”  37 Stat. 555
(1912) codified at 5 U.S.C. 7211 (1994).
c. The Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1978, as amended, makes it a
prohibited personnel practice for an agency employee to take (or not
take) any action against an employee that is in retaliation for
disclosure of information that the employee believes relates to
violation of law, rule or regulation or which evidences gross
mismanagement, waste, fraud or abuse of authority (5 U.S.C. 2302
(b) (8)).  The prohibition is explicitly intended to protect disclosures
to Congress:  “This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the
withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any
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personnel action against an employee who disclosures information to
the Congress.”
d. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 105-272)
establishes special procedures for personnel in the Intelligence
Community, to transmit urgent concerns involving classified
information to inspectors generals and the House and Senate Select
Committees on Intelligence.
e. Section 618 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, P.L.
108-199, 118 Stat. 354, prohibits the payment of the salary of any
officer or employee of the Federal Government who prohibits or
prevents or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, any other
Federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written
communication or contact with any Member, committee or
subcommittee.  This prohibition applies irrespective of whether such
communication was initiated by such officer or employee or in
response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee or
subcommittee.  Further, any punishment or threat of punishment
because of any contact or communication by an officer or employee
with a Member, committee, or subcommittee is prohibited under the
provisions of this act.
f.  Section 620 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, P.L.
108-199, 118 Stat. 355, prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated
funds for use in implementing or enforcing agreement in Standard
Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government or any other nondisclosure
policy form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement that does
not contain a provision that states that the restrictions are consistent
with and do not supercede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the
employee obligation, rights and liabilities created by E.O. 12958; 5
U.S.C. 7211 (Lloyd-LaFollette Act); 10 U.S.C. 1034 (Military
Whistleblower Act); 5 U.S.C. 2303 (b)(8) (Whistleblower Protection
Act); 50 U.S.C. 421 et seq. (Intelligence Identities Protection Act);
and 18 U.S.C. 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 and 50 U.S.C. (783)(b).
2. 1921 Budget and Accounting Act Establishing the General Accounting
Office (GAO), renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004.
a. Insisted that GAO “shall be independent of the executive departments
and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the
United States.”  (Emphasis added.) 42 Stat. 23 (1921)
b. Granted authority to the Comptroller General to “investigate, at the
seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt,
disbursement, and application of public funds.”  (Emphasis added.)
42 Stat. 26 (1921)
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3. 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act
a. Mandated House and Senate committees to exercise “continuous
watchfulness” of the administration of laws and programs under their
jurisdiction.  (Emphasis added.) 60 Stat. 832 (1946)
b. Authorized for the first time in history, permanent professional and
clerical staff for committees.  60 Stat. 832 (1946)
c. Authorized and directed the Comptroller General to make
administrative management analyses of each executive branch
agency.  60 Stat. 837 (1946)
d. Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the
Congressional Research Service by the 1970 Legislative
Reorganization Act (see below), as a separate department in the
Library of Congress and called upon the Service “to advise and assist
any committee of either House or joint committee in the analysis,
appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal . . . and
otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination
of measures before the committee.”  (Emphasis added.) 60 Stat. 836
(1946)
4. 1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
a. Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over
grants-in-aid conduct studies of the programs under which grants-in-
aid are made.  82 Stat. 1098 (1968)
b. Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether: (1)
their purposes have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on
without further assistance, (3) they are adequate to meet needs, and
(4) any changes in programs or procedures should be made.  82 Stat.
1098 (1968)
5. 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act
a. Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight
function of House and Senate standing committees: “. . . each
standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the
application, administration, and execution of those laws or parts of
laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that
committee.”  (Emphasis added.) 84 Stat. 1156 (1970)
b. Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial
oversight reports.  84 Stat. 1156 (1970)
c. Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other
authorities and duties of the Government Accountability Office.  84
Stat. 1168-1171 (1970)
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d. Redesignated the Legislative Reference Service as the Congressional
Research Service, strengthening its policy analysis role and
expanding its other responsibilities to Congress.  84 Stat. 1181-1185
(1970)
e. Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether
programs within their jurisdiction could be appropriated for
annually.  84 Stat. 1174-1175 (1970)
f. Required most House and Senate committees to include in their
committee reports on legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying
out the proposed program.  84 Stat. 1173-1174 (1970)
g. Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing
committee, including provision for minority party hirings, and
provided for hiring of consultants by standing committees.  84 Stat.
1175-1179 (1970)
6. 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act
a. Directed House and Senate committees to make a continuing review
of the activities of each advisory committee under its jurisdiction.  86
Stat. 771 (1972)
b. The studies are to determine whether: (1) such committee should be
abolished or merged with any other advisory committee, (2) its
responsibility should be revised, and (3) it performs a necessary
function not already being performed.   86 Stat. 771 (1972) (Advisory
committee charters and reports can generally be obtained from the
agency or government organization being advised.) 
7. 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended
a. Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight.
Permitted committees to appraise and evaluate programs themselves
“or by contract, or (to) require a Government agency to do so and
furnish a report thereon to the Congress.”  88 Stat. 325 (1974)
b. Directed the Comptroller General to “review and evaluate the results
of Government programs and activities,” on his own initiative, or at
the request of either House or any standing or joint committee and to
assist committees in analyzing and assessing program reviews or
evaluation studies. (Emphasis added.)  Authorized GAO to establish
an Office of Program Review and Evaluation to carry out these
responsibilities.  88 Stat. 326 (1974)
c. Strengthened GAO’s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and
program-related information.  88 Stat. 327-329 (1974) 
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d. Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a
public bill or resolution to include an analysis (prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office) providing an estimate and comparison
of costs which would be incurred in carrying out the bill during the
next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective.
88 Stat. 320 (1974)
e. Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the
Congressional Budget Office.  The CBO director is authorized to
“secure information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the
various departments, agencies, and establishments” of the
government.  88 Stat. 302 (1974)
8. Other noteworthy statutory provisions
Separate from expanding its own authority and resources directly,
Congress has strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly, by, for
instance, establishing study commissions to review and evaluate programs,
policies, and operations of the government.  In addition, Congress has
created various mechanisms, structures, and procedures within the
executive that improve the executive’s ability to monitor and control its
own operations and, at the same time, provide additional information and
oversight-related analyses to Congress.  These statutory provisions include
a. Establishing offices of inspector general in all cabinet departments,
larger agencies and numerous boards, commissions, and government
corporations — Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
Appendix 3 
b. Establishing chief financial officers in all cabinet departments and
larger agencies — Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 107 Stat.
2838 (1990)
c. Improving the government’s ability to manage its programs —
Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 814-815
(1982)
d. Improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of
funds between the federal government and state governments — Cash
Management Improvement Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1058 (1990)
e. Increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability within the
government — Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,
107 Stat. 285-296 (1993)
f. Improving the executive’s stewardship of federal resources and
accountability — Government Management and Reform Act of 1994,
108 Stat. 3410 (1994)
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g. Controlling federal paperwork requirements — Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 163 (1995)
h. Establishing the position of chief information officer in federal
agencies to provide relevant advice for purchasing the best and most
cost-effective information technology available — Information
Technology Improvement Act, 110 Stat. 679 (1996)
i. Establishing uniform audit requirements for state and local
governments and nonprofit organizations receiving federal financial
assistance — Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, 98 Stat. 2327
(1984) and 110 Stat. 679 (1996)
j. Creating a mechanism by which Congress can review and disapprove
virtually any federal rule or regulation — Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 857-874 (1996)
C.  Responsibilities in House and Senate Rules
1. House Rules
a. House rules grant the Committee on Government Reform a broad role
in oversight activities  (Rule X, clause 4).  For example, pertinent
review findings and recommendations of this committee are to be
considered by the authorizing committees, if presented to them in a
timely fashion.  In addition, the authorizing committees are to
indicate on the cover of their reports on public measures that they
contain a summary of such findings when that is the case (Rule XIII,
clause 3).
b. The Committee on Government Reform has additional oversight
duties to
(1) review and study on a continuing basis, the operation of
government activities at all levels to determine their economy
and efficiency (Rule X, clause 3);
(2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and
submit recommendations thereon to the House (Rule X, clause
4);
(3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative
and executive branches of the government (Rule X, clause 4); 
(4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States
and states, municipalities, and international organizations of
which the United States is a member (Rule X, clause 4); and
(5) report an oversight agenda, not later than March 31 of the first
session of a Congress, based upon oversight plans submitted by
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each standing committee and after consultation with the Speaker
of the House, the majority leader, and the minority leader.  The
oversight agenda is to include the oversight plans of each
standing committee together with any recommendations that it
or the House leadership group may make to ensure the most
effective coordination of such plans (Rule X, clause 2).
c. House rules mandate or provide authority for other oversight efforts
by standing committees:
(1) Each standing committee (except Appropriations and Budget)
shall review and study on a continuing basis the application,
administration, and execution of all laws within its legislative
jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2).
(2) Committees have the authority to review the impact of tax
policies on matters that fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X,
clause 2).
(3) Each committee (except Appropriations and Budget) has a
responsibility for futures research and forecasting (Rule X,
clause 2).
(4) Specified committees have special oversight authority (i.e., the
right to conduct comprehensive reviews of specific subject areas
that are within the legislative jurisdiction of other committees).
Special oversight is akin to the broad oversight authority granted
the Committee on Government Reform, by the 1946 Legislature
Reorganization Act, except that special oversight is generally
limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3).
(5) Each standing committee is authorized to require its
subcommittees, if any, to conduct oversight in their
jurisdictional areas or to create an oversight subcommittee; a
committee that establishes such a subcommittee may add it as a
sixth subcommittee, beyond the usual limit of five (Rule X,
clauses 2 and 5).
(6) Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings
separately set out and clearly identified (Rule XIII, clause 3).
(7) Costs of stenographic services and transcripts for oversight
hearings are to be paid “from the applicable accounts of the
House” (Rule XI, clause 1).
(8) Each standing committee is to submit its oversight plans for the
duration of a Congress by February 15 of the first session to the
Committee on Government Reform and the Committee on
House Administration.  Not later than March 31, the
Government Reform Committee must report an oversight
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agenda (discussed above).  In developing such plans, each
standing committee must, to the extent feasible (Rule X, clause
2):
(a) consult with other committees of the House that have
jurisdiction over the same or related laws, programs, or
agencies within its jurisdiction, with the objective of
ensuring that such laws, programs, or agencies are
reviewed in the same Congress and that there is a
maximum of coordination between such committees in the
conduct of such reviews; and such plans shall include an
explanation of what steps have been and will be taken to
ensure such coordination and cooperation;
(b) give priority consideration to including in its plans the
review of those laws, programs, or agencies operating
under permanent budget authority or permanent statutory
authority; and
(c) have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws,
programs, or agencies within its jurisdiction are subject to
review at least once every 10 years.
(9) Each committee must submit to the House, not later than
January 2 of each odd-numbered year, a report on the activities
of that committee for the Congress (Rule XI, clause 1):
(a) Such report must include separate sections summarizing
the legislative and oversight activities of that committee
during that Congress.
(b) The oversight section of such report must include a
summary of the oversight plans submitted by the
committee at the beginning of the Congress, a summary of
the actions taken and recommendations made with respect
to each such plan, and a summary of any additional
oversight activities undertaken by that committee, and any
recommendations made or actions taken thereon.
d. The Speaker, with the approval of the House, is given additional
authority to “appoint special ad hoc oversight committees for the
purpose or reviewing specific matters within the jurisdiction of two
or more standing committees.”  (Emphasis added.) (Rule X, clause 2)
2. Senate Rules
a. Each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget)
must review and study on a continuing basis, the application,
administration, and execution of all laws within its legislative
jurisdiction (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
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b. “Comprehensive policy oversight” responsibilities are granted to
specified standing committees.  This duty is similar to special
oversight in the House.  The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry, for example, is authorized to “study and review, on a
comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger,
both in the United States and in foreign countries, and rural affairs,
and report thereon from time to time (Rule XXV, clause 1a).”
c. All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to
prepare regulatory impact evaluations in their committee reports
accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule XXVI, clause
11).  The evaluations are to include:
(1) an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses to be
affected;
(2) a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on
personal privacy; and
(3) a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will
result.
d. The Committee on Governmental Affairs (renamed the Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs in 2004, S.Res. 445),
has the following additional oversight duties (Rule XXV, clause 1k):
(1) review and study on a continuing basis the operation of
government activities at all levels to determine their economy
and efficiency;
(2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and
submit recommendations thereon to the Senate;
(3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative
and executive branches of the government; and
(4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States
and states, municipalities, and international organizations of
which the United States is a member.
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Congressional Participants in Oversight
A.  Members and Committees
1. Members.  Oversight is generally considered a committee activity.
However, both casework and other project work conducted in a Member’s
personal office can result in findings about bureaucratic behavior and
policy implementation; these, in turn, can lead to the adjustment of agency
policies and procedures and to changes in public law.
(a) Casework — responding to constituent requests for assistance on
projects or complaints or grievances about program implementation
provides an opportunity to examine bureaucratic activity and
operations, if only in a selective way.
(b) Sometimes individual Members will conduct their own investigations
or  ad hoc hearings, or direct their staffs to conduct oversight studies.
Individual Members have no authority to issue compulsory process
or conduct official hearings.  The Government Accountability Office
or some other legislative branch agency, a specially created task
force, or private research group might be requested to conduct an
investigation of a matter for a Senator or Representative.
2. Committees.  The most common and effective method of conducting
oversight is through the committee structure.  Throughout their histories,
the House and Senate have used their standing committees as well as select
or special committees to investigate federal activities and agencies along
with other matters.
(a) The House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, which have oversight
jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government, have been
vested with broad investigatory powers over government-wide
activities.
(b) The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have similar
responsibilities when reviewing fiscal activities.
(c) Each standing committee of Congress has oversight responsibilities
to review government activities within their jurisdiction.  These
panels also have authority on their own to establish oversight and
investigative subcommittees.  The establishment of such
subcommittees does not preclude the legislative subcommittees from
conducting oversight.
(d) Certain House and Senate committees have “special oversight” or
“comprehensive policy oversight” of designated subject areas as
explained in the previous subsection.
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B.  Staff of Member Offices and Committees
1. Personal Staff.  Constituent letters, complaints, and requests for projects
and assistance frequently bring problems and deficiencies in federal
programs and administration to the attention of Members and their
personal office staffs.  The casework performed by a Member’s staff for
constituents can be an effective oversight tool.
(a) Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight
and legislative interests of the Member.  The Senator or
Representative and the staff may be attuned to the relationship
between casework and the oversight function.  This is facilitated by
a regular exchange of ideas among the Member, legislative aides, and
caseworkers on problems brought to the office’s attention by
constituents, and of possible legislative initiatives to resolve those
problems.
(b) If casework is to be useful as an oversight technique, effective staffing
and coordination are needed.  Casework and legislative staffs
maximize service to their Member’s constituents when they establish
a relationship with the staff of the subcommittees and committees that
handle the areas of concern to the Member’s constituents.  Through
this interaction, the panel’s staff can be made aware of the problems
with the agency or program in question, assess how widespread and
significant they are, determine their causes, and recommend
corrective action.
(c) Office procedures enable staff in some offices to identify cases that
represent a situation in which formal changes in agency procedure
could be an appropriate remedy.  Prompt congressional inquiry and
follow up enhance this type of oversight.  Telephone inquiries
reinforced with written requests tend to ensure agency attention.
2. Committee Staff.  As issues become more complex and Members’ staffs
more overworked, professional staffs of committees can provide the expert
help required to conduct oversight and investigations.  Committee staff
typically have the experience and expertise to conduct effective oversight
for the committees and subcommittees they serve.  Committees may also
call upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, or
“borrow” staff from federal departments.
Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of
oversight.  The informal contacts with executive officials at all levels
constitute one of Congress’s most effective devices for performing its
“continuous watchfulness” function.
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C.  Congressional Support Agencies and Offices
1. Of the agencies in the legislative branch, three directly assist Congress in
support of its oversight function. (See “Section V” below for further detail
on each):
(a) Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
(b) Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress,
and
(c) Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General
Accounting Office.
2. Additional offices that can assist in oversight are
(a) House General Counsel’s Office,
(b) Senate Legal Counsel’s Office, and
(c) Senate Historian’s Office and Senate Library.
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II.  Oversight Coordination and Processes
A persistent problem for Congress in conducting oversight is coordination
among committees, both within each chamber as well as between the two houses.
As the final report of the House Select Committee on Committees of the 93rd
Congress noted, “Review findings and recommendations developed by one
committee are seldom shared on a timely basis with another committee, and, if they
are made available, then often the findings are transmitted in a form that is difficult
for Members to use.”  Despite the passage of time, this statement remains relevant
today.  Oversight coordination between House and Senate committees is also
uncommon.
Intercommittee cooperation on oversight can prove beneficial for a variety of
reasons.  It should, for example, minimize unnecessary duplication and conflict and
inhibit agencies from playing one committee off against another.  There are formal
and informal ways to achieve oversight coordination among committees.
Oversight Coordination
A.  General Techniques of Ensuring Oversight Coordination
Include
1. The House and Senate can establish select or special committees to probe
issues and agencies, to promote public understanding of national concerns,
and to coordinate oversight of issues that overlap the jurisdiction of several
standing committees.
2. House rules require the findings and recommendations of the Committee
on Government Reform to be considered by the authorizing committees if
presented to them in a timely fashion.  Such findings and recommendations
are to be published in the authorizing committees’ reports on legislation.
House rules also require the oversight plans of committees to include ways
to maximize coordination between and among committees that share
jurisdiction over related laws, programs, or agencies.
B.  Specific Means of Ensuring Oversight Coordination
Include
1. Joint oversight hearings on programs or agencies.
2. Informal agreement among committees to oversee certain agencies and not
others.  For example, the House and Senate Committees on Commerce
agreed to hold oversight hearings on certain regulatory agencies in
alternate years.
3. Consultation between the authorizing and appropriating committees.  The
two Committees on Commerce have worked closely and successfully with
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their corresponding appropriations subcommittees to alert those panels to
the authorizing committees’ intent with respect to regulatory ratemaking
by such agencies as the Federal Communication Commission. 
Oversight Processes
A.  The Budget Process
1. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as
amended, enhanced the legislative branch’s capacity to shape the federal
budget.  The act has major institutional and procedural effects on
Congress:
a. Institutionally, Congress created three new entities:
(1) the Senate Committee on the Budget;
(2) the House Committee on the Budget; and
(3) the Congressional Budget Office.
b. Procedurally, the act established methods that permit Congress to:
(1) determine budget policy as a whole;
(2) relate revenue and spending decisions;
(3) determine priorities among competing national programs; and
(4) ensure that revenue, spending, and debt legislation are consistent
with the overall budget policy.
2. The new budget process coexists with the established authorization and
appropriation procedures and significantly affects each.
a. On the authorization side, the Budget Act requires committees to
submit their budgetary “views and estimates” for matters under their
jurisdiction to their Committee on the Budget within six weeks after
the President submits a budget.
b. On the appropriations side, new contract and borrowing authority
must go through the appropriations process. Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees are assigned a financial allocation that
determines how much may be included in the measures they report,
although less than one-third of federal spending is subject to the
annual appropriations process.  (The tax and appropriations panels of
each house also submit budgetary views and estimates to their
respective Committee on the Budget.)
c. In deciding spending, revenue, credit, and debt issues, Congress is
sensitive to trends in the overall composition of the annual federal
budget (expenditures for defense, entitlements, interest on the debt,
and domestic discretionary programs).
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3. In short, the Budget Act has the potential of strengthening oversight by
enabling Congress better to relate program priorities to financial claims on
the national budget.  Each committee, knowing that it will receive a fixed
amount of the total to be included in a budget resolution, has an incentive
to scrutinize existing programs to make room for new programs or
expanded funding of ongoing projects or to assess whether programs have
outlived their usefulness.
B.  The Authorization Process
1. Through its authorization power, Congress exercises significant control
over any government agency.
2. The entire authorization process may involve a host of oversight tools —
hearings, studies, and reports — but the key to the process is the
authorization statute.
a. An authorization statute creates and shapes government programs and
agencies and it contains the statement of legislative policy for the
agency.
b. Authorization is the first lever in congressional exercise of the power
of the purse; it usually allows an agency to be funded, but it does not
guarantee financing of agencies and programs.  Frequently,
authorizations establish dollar ceilings on the amounts that can be
appropriated.
3. The authorization-reauthorization process is an important oversight tool.
a. Through this process, Members are educated about the work of an
agency and given an opportunity to direct the agency’s effort in light
of experience.
b. Expiration of an agency’s program provides an excellent chance for
in-depth oversight:
(1) In recent decades, there has been a mix of permanent and
periodic (annual or multi-year) authorizations, although some
reformers are now pressing for biennial budgeting (acting on a
two-year cycle for authorizations, appropriations, and budget
resolutions).
(2) Periodic authorizations improve the likelihood that an agency
will be scrutinized systematically.
4. In addition to formal amendment of the agency’s authorizing statute, the
authorization process gives committees an opportunity to exercise
informal, nonstatutory controls over the agency.
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a. Knowledge by an agency that it must come to the legislative
committee for renewed authority increases the influence of the
committee. 
b. This condition helps to account for the appeal of short-term
authorizations.
c. Nonstatutory controls used by committees to exercise direction over
the administration of laws include statements made in:
(1) committee hearings;
(2) committee reports accompanying legislation; 
(3) floor debates; and
(4) committee contacts and correspondence with the agency. 
5. If agencies fail to comply with these informal directives, the authorization
committees can apply sanctions or move to convert the informal directive
to a statutory command.
C.  The Appropriations Process
1. The appropriations process is one of Congress’s most important forms of
oversight.
a. Its strategic position stems from the constitutional requirement that
“no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.”
b. Congress’s power of the purse allows the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations to play a prominent role in oversight.
2. The oversight function of the Committees on Appropriations derives from
their responsibility to examine and pass on the budget requests of the
agencies as contained in the President’s Budget.
a. The decisions of the committees are conditioned on their assessment
of the agencies’ need for their budget request as indicated by past
performance.
b. In practice, the entire record of an agency is fair game for the required
assessment.
c. This comprehensive overview and the “carrot and stick” of the
appropriations recommendations make the committees significant
focal points of congressional oversight and is a key source of their
power in Congress and in the federal government generally.
3. Enacted appropriations legislation frequently contains at least five types of
statutory controls on agencies:
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a. Such legislation specifies the purpose for which funds may be used.
b. It defines the specified funding level for the agency as a whole as well
as for programs and divisions within the agency.
c. It sets time limits on the availability of funds for obligation.
d. Appropriations legislation may contain limitation provisions.  For
example, in appropriating $350 million to the Environmental
Protection Agency for research and development, Congress added this
condition: “Provided, That not more than $55,000,000 of these funds
shall be available for procurement of laboratory equipment, supplies,
and other operating expenses in support of research and
development.” 108 Stat. 2319 (1994).
e. Appropriations measures and committee reports also stipulate how an
agency’s budget can be reprogrammed (shifting funds within an
appropriations account; see box below).
4. Nonstatutory controls are a major form of oversight.  Legislative language
in committee reports and in hearings, letters to agency heads, and other
communications give detailed instructions to agencies regarding committee
expectations and desires.  Agencies are not legally obligated to abide by
non-statutory recommendations, but failure to do so may result in a loss of
funds and flexibility the following year.  Agencies ignore nonstatutory
controls at their peril (see box).
The conference report for the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY
1999 provides guidelines for the reprogramming and transfer of funds for the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1999.  Each request from an agency to the review committee “shall include
a declaration that, as of the date of the request, none of the funds included in the request have been obligated,
and none will be obligated, until the Committees on Appropriations have approved the request.”  H. Rept.
No. 105-825, p. 1472 (1998).
D.  The Investigatory Process
1. Congress’s power of investigation is implied in the Constitution.
a. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have upheld the legislative
branch’s right of inquiry, provided it stays within its legitimate
legislative sphere.
b. The roots of Congress’s authority to conduct investigations extend
back to the British Parliament and colonial assemblies.
c. In addition, the Framers clearly perceived the House of
Representatives to function as a “grand inquest.”  Since the Framers
expected lawmakers to employ the investigatory function, based upon
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parliamentary precedents, it was unnecessary to invest Congress with
an explicit investigatory power.
d. From time to time, legal questions have been raised about the
investigative authority of Congress.  However, numerous Supreme
Court decisions have upheld the legislative branch’s right of inquiry,
provided it serves a legitimate legislative interest.
2. Investigations and related activities may be conducted by:
a. individual Members;
b. committees and subcommittees;
c. staff or outside organizations and personnel under contract; or
d. congressional support agencies.
3. Investigations serve several purposes:
a. they help to ensure honesty and efficiency in the administration of
laws;
b. they secure information that assists Congress in making informed
policy judgments; and
c. they may aid in informing the public about the administration of laws.
[See Section III for greater detail and analysis]
E.  The Confirmation Process
By establishing a public record of the policy views of nominees, congressional
hearings allow lawmakers to call appointed officials to account at a later time.  Since
at least the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which encouraged greater scrutiny of
nominations, Senate committees are setting aside more time to probe the
qualifications, independence, and policy predilections of presidential nominees,
seeking information on everything from physical health to financial assets.
Confirmation can assist in oversight in several ways.
1. The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”
(Emphasis added.)
a. The consideration of appointments to executive branch leadership
positions is a major responsibility of the Senate and especially of
Senate committees.
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b. Panels review the qualifications of nominees for public positions.
2. The confirmation hearing provides a forum for the discussion of the
policies and programs the nominee intends to pursue; this is a classic
opportunity for senatorial oversight and influence.  The confirmation
process as an oversight tool can be used to:
a. provide policy direction to nominees;
b. inform nominees of congressional interests; and
c. extract future commitments.
3. Once a nominee has been confirmed by the Senate, oversight includes
following up to ensure that the nominee fulfills any commitments made
during confirmation hearings.  Subsequent hearings and committee
investigations can explore whether such commitments have been kept.
4. Recess Appointments.  The Constitution provides that the President “shall
have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session.”  When Presidents relied on this power to circumvent Senate
confirmation, Congress responded with legislation that prohibits, with
certain exceptions, the payment of salaries to recess appointees.  54 Stat.
751 (1940); 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2004).  Also, in the annual Treasury-Postal
Service appropriations act, Congress enacts an additional funding
restriction on recess appointees (see box).
No  part  of  any  appropriation  for  the  current  fiscal  year  contained  in  this  or  any  other  Act
shall  be  paid  to  any  person  for  the  filling  of any position for which he or she has been
nominated  after the Senate has voted not to approve the nomination  of  said   person. 114 Stat.
2763A-157, sec. 609 (2000). 
5. Vacancies Act.  In addition to making recess appointments, Presidents
make other temporary or interim appointments.  Since 1795, Congress has
legislated limits on the time a temporary officer may occupy a vacant
advice and consent position.  In 1868, Congress established a procedure
for filling vacancies in advice and consent positions through the Vacancies
Act.  When the head of an executive department dies, resigns, or is sick or
absent, the next in command may perform the duties until a successor is
appointed or the absence ceases.  The President may also direct someone
else (previously appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate) to
perform the duties.  These acting officials, under the Vacancies Act, were
restricted by law to a period of not to exceed 30 days.  That limit was
violated with such frequency that Congress in 1988 increased it to 120
days.  102 Stat. 988, sec. 7 (1988); 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-48 (2004).  
The Justice Department took the position that some executive officials
were not restricted by the Vacancies Act and could serve beyond the 120-
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day period.  Under that interpretation, the Administration selected Bill
Lann Lee to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, and
argued that he could serve longer than had he been a recess appointee.
Congress responded by passing legislation in 1998 to make the Vacancies
Act the exclusive vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent
positions.  The new Vacancies Act, included in the FY1999 Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-
277), rejects the Justice Department position and established procedures
for the appointment of executive officials who temporarily hold an office.
With various exceptions, the 120-day period has been replaced by a 210-
day period.
F.  The Impeachment Process
1. The impeachment power of Congress is a unique oversight tool, reserved
for unusual circumstances and as a technique of last resort when
conventional forms of oversight fail.  Impeachment applies also to the
judiciary, but the focus here is on efforts by Congress to impeach executive
officials.  Impeachment offers Congress:
a. a constitutionally mandated method for obtaining information that
might otherwise not be made available by the executive; and
 
b. an implied threat of punishment for an executive official whose
conduct exceeds acceptable boundaries.
2. Impeachment procedures differ from those of conventional congressional
oversight.
a. The most significant procedural differences center on the roles played
by each house of Congress.
b. The House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach.  A
majority is required to impeach.
c. If the House votes to impeach, the person is tried by the Senate,
which has the sole power to try an impeachment.  A two-thirds
majority is required to convict and remove the individual.  Should the
Senate deem it appropriate in a given case, it may, by majority vote,
impose an additional judgment of disqualification from further
federal offices of honor, trust, or profit.
d. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 226 (1993), the Supreme Court
held nonjusticiable a constitutional challenge to the use by the Senate
in an impeachment proceeding of a 12-member committee appointed
to take testimony and gather evidence.  Such a committee makes no
recommendations as to the ultimate question before the Senate.  Nor
does the committee rule on questions of relevancy, materiality, and
competency.  Rather, it reports a certified copy of the transcript of the
proceedings before the committee and any evidence received by the
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committee to the full Senate for its consideration.  The full Senate
may take further testimony or evidence, or it may hold the entire trial
in open Senate.  In either event, the full Senate determines whether to
convict on one or more of the articles of impeachment involved and,
upon conviction, decides the appropriate judgment to be imposed.
3. The impeachment process is cumbersome and infrequently used.  The
House has voted to impeach in only 17 cases, 16 of which have reached the
Senate, and 15 of which have gone to a vote on one or more articles of
impeachment.  Seven cases, all pertaining to federal judges, have resulted
in conviction and removal; two of these also resulted in disqualification.
The most recent impeachment trial was that of President Clinton in 1998-
99; the most recent judicial impeachment trials were those of Judges
Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon in 1986, 1988 and 1989, respectively.  A
number of issues were addressed in the Clinton impeachment trial and
other past impeachment proceedings, although the answers to some still
remain somewhat ambiguous.  For example:
a. An impeachment may be continued from one Congress to the next,
although the procedural steps vary depending upon the stage in the
process.
b. The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment as “Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  However, the
meaning and scope of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” remains in
dispute and depends on the interpretation of individual legislators.  
c. The Constitution provides for impeachment of the “President, Vice
President, and all civil Officers of the United States.”  While the outer
limits of the “civil Officers” language are not altogether clear, past
precedents suggest that it covers at least federal judges and executive
officers subject to the Appointments Clause. 
d. Members of the House and Senate are not subject to impeachment
because they are not “civil officers.”  William Blount, a U.S. Senator
from Tennessee, was impeached by the House in 1797, but the Senate
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III.  Investigative Oversight
Congressional investigations, often adversarial and confrontational, sustain and
vindicate Congress’s role in our constitutional scheme of separated powers.  The rich
history of congressional investigations, from the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792
through Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Whitewater, has established, in
law and practice, the nature and contours of congressional prerogatives necessary to
maintain the integrity of the legislative role in that constitutional scheme.
This section provides a brief overview of some of the more common legal,
procedural, and practical issues that committees face in the course of an
investigation.  Following a summary of the case law developing the scope and
limitations of the power of inquiry, the essential tools of investigative oversight —
subpoenas, staff interviews and depositions, grants of immunity, and the contempt
power — are described.  Next, some of the special problems of investigating the
executive branch are detailed, with particular emphasis on claims of presidential
executive privilege and agency assertions of common law testimonial privileges.  The
section concludes with a discussion of the role of the minority in the investigatory
process. 
A.  The Legal Basis for Oversight
Numerous Supreme Court precedents recognize a broad and encompassing
power in Congress to engage in oversight and investigation that would reach all
sources of information necessary for carrying out its legislative function.  In the
absence of a countervailing constitutional privilege or a self-imposed statutory
restriction upon its authority, Congress and its committees have plenary power to
compel information needed to discharge its legislative function from executive
agencies, private persons, and organizations.  Within certain constraints, the
information so obtained may be made public.
Although there is no express provision of the Constitution that specifically
authorizes Congress to conduct investigations and take testimony for the purposes
of performing its legitimate functions, numerous decisions of the Supreme Court
have firmly established that the investigatory power of Congress is so essential to the
legislative function as to be implied from the general vesting of legislative power in
Congress.1  Thus, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, the Court
explained that “[t]he scope of its power of inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-
reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”2
In Watkins v. United States, the Court described the breadth of the power of inquiry:
“The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process.  That power is broad.  It encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.”3
The Court went on to emphasize that Congress’s investigative power is at its peak
CRS-33
4 Id.
5 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
6 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 187.
7 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42, 44 (1953); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
at 198.
8 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 174-75.
9 See, e.g., House Committee on Government Reform Rule 18 (d); Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs Rule 5.C.
when the subject is alleged waste, fraud, abuse, or maladministration within a
government department.  The investigative power, it stated, “comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or
waste.”4  
But while the congressional power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited.  The
Supreme Court has admonished that the power to investigate may be exercised only
“in aid of the legislative function”5 and cannot be used to expose for the sake of
exposure alone.  The Watkins Court underlined these limitations: “There is no
general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in
terms of the functions of the Congress . . . nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency.  These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government.  No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance
of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”6  Moreover, an investigating committee has
only the power to inquire into matters within the scope of the authority delegated to
it by its parent body.7  But once having established its jurisdiction and authority and
the pertinence of the matter under inquiry to its area of authority, a committee’s
investigative purview is substantial and wide-ranging.
B.  The Tools of Oversight
1.  The Subpoena Power.
The power of inquiry, with the accompanying process to enforce it, has been
deemed “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”8  A
properly authorized subpoena issued by a committee or subcommittee has the same
force and effect as a subpoena issued by the parent House itself.  To validly issue a
subpoena, individual committees or subcommittees must be delegated this authority.
Senate Rule XXVI(1) and House Rule XI(2)(m)(1) presently empower all standing
committees and subcommittees to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of documents.  Special or select committees must be specifically
delegated that authority by Senate or House resolution.  The rules or practices of
standing committees may restrict the issuance of subpoenas only to full committees
or in certain instances allow issuance by a committee chairman alone, with or without
the concurrence of the ranking minority member.9
Congressional subpoenas are most frequently served by the U.S. marshal’s
office or by committee staff, or less frequently by the Senate or House Sergeants-At-
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Arms.  Service may be effected anywhere in the United States.  The subpoena power
reaches aliens in the United States.  Securing compliance of United States nationals
and aliens living in foreign countries presents more complex problems.
A witness seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of a subpoena has only
limited remedies to raise objections.  The Supreme Court has ruled that courts may
not enjoin the issuance of a congressional subpoena, holding that the Speech or
Debate Clause of the Constitution10 provides “an absolute bar to judicial
interference” with such compulsory process.11  As a consequence, a witness’s sole
remedy generally is to refuse to comply, risk being cited for contempt, and then raise
the objections as a defense in a contempt prosecution.
Challenges to the legal sufficiency of subpoenas must overcome formidable
judicial obstacles.  The standard to be applied in determining whether the
congressional investigating power has been properly asserted was articulated in
Wilkinson v. United States:12  (1)  the committee’s investigation of the broad subject
matter area must be authorized by Congress; (2)  the investigation must be pursuant
to “a valid legislative purpose”; (3) and the specific inquiries must be pertinent to the
broad subject matter areas which have been authorized by the Congress.  As to the
requirement of “valid legislative purpose,” the Supreme Court has made it clear that
Congress does not have to state explicitly what it intends to do as a result of an
investigation.13 (See model subpoena at Appendix A.)
2.  Staff Depositions.
Committees normally rely on informal staff interviews to gather information
preparatory to investigations hearings.  However, with more frequency in recent
years, when specially authorized congressional committees have utilized staff-
conducted depositions as a tool in exercising the investigatory power.  Staff
depositions afford a number of significant advantages for committees engaged in
complex investigations.  Staff depositions may assist committees in obtaining sworn
testimony quickly and confidentially without the necessity of Members devoting time
to lengthy hearings that may be unproductive because witnesses do not have the facts
needed by the committee or refuse to cooperate.  Depositions are conducted in private
and may be more conducive to candid responses than would be the case at a public
hearing.  Statements made by witnesses that might defame or even tend to
incriminate third parties can be verified before they are repeated in an open hearing.
Depositions can prepare a committee for the questioning of witnesses at a hearing or
provide a screening process that can obviate the need to call some witnesses.  The
deposition process also allows questioning of witnesses outside of Washington,
thereby avoiding the inconvenience of conducting field hearings requiring the
presence of Members.
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Moreover, Congress has enhanced the efficacy of the staff deposition process
by re-establishing the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 1001 to false statements made during
congressional proceedings, including the taking of depositions.14
Certain disadvantages may also inhere.  Unrestrained staff may be tempted to
engage in tangential inquiries.  Also, depositions present a “cold record” of a
witness’s testimony and may not be as useful for Members as in-person
presentations.  
At present, neither house of Congress has rules that expressly authorize staff
depositions.  On a number occasions such specific authority has been granted
pursuant to Senate and House resolutions.15  When granted, a committee will
normally adopt procedures for taking depositions, including provisions for notice
(with or without a subpoena), transcription of the deposition, the right to be
accompanied by counsel, and the manner in which objections to questions are to be
resolved.
3.  Congressional Grants of Immunity.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part that “no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .”  The
privilege against self-incrimination is available to a witness in a congressional
investigation.16  When a witness before a committee asserts this testimonial
constitutional privilege, the committee may, upon a two-thirds vote of the full
committee, obtain a court order that compels and grants immunity against the use of
testimony and information derived from that testimony in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.  The witness may still be prosecuted on the basis of other evidence.
Grants of immunity have figured prominently in a number of major congressional
investigations, including Watergate (John Dean and Jeb Magruder) and Iran-Contra
(Oliver North and John Poindexter).  The decision to grant immunity involves a
number of complex issues (see box below), but is ultimately a political decision that
Congress makes.  As observed by Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence E.
Walsh, “The legislative branch has the power to decide whether it is more important
perhaps even to destroy a prosecution than to hold back testimony they need.  They
make that decision.  It is not a judicial decision or a legal decision but a political
decision of the highest importance.”17
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Granting Immunity
In determining whether to grant immunity to a witness, a committee might wish to consider, on the
one hand, its need for the witness’s testimony in order to perform its legislative, oversight, and informing
functions, and on the other, the possibility that the witness’ immunized congressional testimony could
jeopardize a successful criminal prosecution.  If a witness is prosecuted after giving immunized testimony,
the burden is on the prosecutor to establish that the case was not based on the witness’s previous
testimony or evidence derived therefrom.  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
Appellate court decisions reversing the convictions of key Iran-Contra figures Lt. Colonel Oliver
North and Rear Admiral John Poindexter appear to have made the prosecutorial burden substantially more
difficult, if not insurmountable, in high-profile cases.  Despite extraordinary efforts by the independent
counsel and his staff to avoid being exposed to any of North’s or Poindexter’s immunized testimony, and
the submission of sealed packets of evidence to the district court to show that the material was obtained
independently of any immunized testimony to Congress, the appeals court in both cases remanded the
cases for a further determination whether the prosecution had directly or indirectly used immunized
testimony.  Upon remand in both cases, the independent counsel moved to dismiss the prosecutions upon
his determination that he could not meet the strict standards set by the appeals court in its decisions.  See
United States v. North, 910 F. 2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F. 2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert denied,
500 U.S. 941 (1991); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F. 2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   It is unclear whether
a consequence of the ruling was to engender a reluctance on the part of committees to issue immunity
grants.  Since the enactment of the 1970 statute, congressional committees have obtained approximately
345 immunity orders.  Of these, almost half (165) were obtained in connection with the 1978
investigation into the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.  Since 1990,
House committees have obtained 31 immunity orders, and Senate committees have obtained 20.  
C.  Enforcement of the Investigative Power
1. The Contempt Power.
While the threat or actual issuance of a subpoena normally provides sufficient
leverage to ensure compliance, it is through the contempt power, or its threat, that
Congress may act with ultimate force in response to actions that obstruct the
legislative process in order to punish the contemnor and/or to remove the obstruction.
The Supreme Court early recognized the power as an inherent attribute of Congress’s
legislative authority, reasoning that if it did not possess this power, it “would be
exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice or even conspiracy
may mediate against it.”18
There are three different kinds of contempt proceedings.  Both the House and
Senate may cite a witness for contempt under their inherent contempt power or under
a statutory criminal contempt procedure.  The Senate also has a third option,
enforcement by means of a statutory civil contempt procedure.19
(a)  Inherent Contempt
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Under the inherent contempt power, the individual is brought before the House
or Senate by the Sergeant At Arms, tried at the bar of the body, and can be
imprisoned.  The purpose of the imprisonment or other sanction may be either
punitive or coercive.  Thus, the witness can be imprisoned for a specified period of
time as punishment, or for an indefinite period (but not, at least in the case of the
House, beyond the end of the Congress) until he agrees to comply.  The inherent
contempt power has not been exercised by either House in over 60 years because it
has been considered to be too cumbersome and time consuming.
(b)  Statutory Contempt
Recognizing the problems with use of the inherent contempt process, a statutory
criminal contempt procedure was enacted in 1857 that, with only minor amendments,
is codified today as 2 U.S.C. §§192 and 194.  A person who has been subpoenaed to
testify or produce documents before the House or Senate or a committee and who
fails to do so, or who appears but refuses to respond to questions, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to one
year.  A contempt citation must be approved by the subcommittee, the full
committee, and the full House or Senate (or by the presiding officer if Congress is
not in session).  After a contempt has been certified by the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House, it is the “duty” of the U.S. attorney “to bring the matter
before the grand jury for its action.”  
(c)  Civil Contempt
As an alternative to both the inherent contempt power of each house and
criminal contempt, a civil contempt procedure is available in the Senate.  Upon
application of the Senate, the federal district court issues an order to a person
refusing, or threatening to refuse, to comply with a Senate subpoena.  If the
individual still refuses to comply, he may be tried by the court in summary
proceedings for contempt of court, with sanctions imposed to coerce compliance.
Civil contempt can be more expeditious than a criminal proceeding, and it also
provides an element of flexibility, allowing the subpoenaed party to test legal
defenses in court without necessarily risking a criminal prosecution.  Civil contempt
is not authorized for use against executive branch officials refusing to comply with
a subpoena except in certain limited circumstances.20
2.  Perjury and False Statements Prosecutions.
(a)  Testimony Under Oath
A witness under oath before a congressional committee who willfully gives false
testimony is subject to prosecution for perjury under section 1621 of title 18 of the
United States Code.  The false statement must be “willfully” made  before a
“competent tribunal” and involve a “material matter.”  For a legislative committee
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to be competent for perjury purposes a quorum must be present.21  The problem has
been ameliorated in recent years with the adoption of rules establishing less than a
majority of members as a quorum for taking testimony, normally two members for
House committees22 and one member for Senate committees.23  The requisite quorum
must be present at the time the alleged perjurious statement is made, not merely at
the time the session convenes.  No prosecution for perjury will lie for statements
made only in the presence of committee staff unless the committee has deposition
authority and has taken formal action to allow it.
(b) Unsworn Statements
Most statements made before Congress, at both the investigatory and hearing
phases of oversight, are unsworn.  The practice of swearing in all witnesses at
hearings is infrequent.  Prosecutions may be brought to punish congressional
witnesses for giving willfully false testimony not under oath.  Under 18 U.S.C. 1001,
false statements by a person in “any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to
the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House and Senate” are punishable by a fine of
up to $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
D.  Executive Privilege and Common Law Testimonial
Privileges 
When Congress directs its investigatory powers at executive branch departments
and agencies, and at times at the White House itself, such probes have often become
contentious, provoking the executive to assert rights to shield from disclosure
information Congress deems essential to carry out its oversight functions.  The
variety of grounds proffered are often lumped in an undifferentiated manner under
the rubric “executive privilege.” The courts recently have distinguished between
claims of executive privilege based on whether it has been made by the President
(“presidential communications privilege”) or by a department or agency (“agency”
or “executive privilege”). The distinction reflects the judicial recognition of the
differing legal bases of the privileges (i.e., constitutional as opposed to common law)
and the difference that makes in the evaluation of claims.
1. The Presidential Communications Privilege.
 In rare instances the executive response to a congressional demand to produce
information may be an assertion of presidential executive privilege, a doctrine which,
like Congress’ powers to investigate and cite for contempt, has constitutional roots.
No decision of the Supreme Court has yet resolved the question whether there are any
circumstances in which the executive branch can refuse to provide information
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congressional perspective, merely cumulative.”  The unique and confining nature of the
case’s factual and historical context likely makes this an uncertain precedent for limiting a
committee’s investigatory power in the face of a presidential claim of privilege.
sought by the Congress is on the basis of executive privilege.  Indeed, most such
disputes are settled short of litigation through employment of the political process
and negotiations,24 and the few that reach a judicial forum find the courts highly
reluctant to rule on the merits.  However, in United States v. Nixon (1974), involving
a judicial subpoena issued to the President at the request of the Watergate special
prosecutor,25 the Supreme Court found a constitutional basis for the doctrine of
executive privilege in “the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area
of constitutional duties” and in the separation of powers.  Although it considered
presidential communications to be “presumptively privileged,” the Court rejected the
President’s contention that the privilege was absolute, precluding judicial review
whenever it is asserted.  The Court held in that case that the judicial need for the
tapes outweighed the President’s “generalized interest in confidentiality.”   The Court
was careful to limit the scope of its decision, noting that “we are not here concerned
with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality . . .
and congressional demands for information.”26
In In re Sealed Case (Espy), involving a grand jury subpoena for documents to
the White House Counsel’s Office during an independent counsel’s investigation of
allegations of improprieties by the Secretary of Agriculture, an appeals court
elaborated on several important issues left unresolved by U.S. v. Nixon and other
Watergate-related cases: the precise parameters of the presidential executive
privilege; how far down the chain of command the privilege reaches; whether the
President has to have seen or had knowledge of the existence of the documents for
which he claims privilege; and what showing is necessary to overcome a valid claim
of privilege.  The court held that the presidential communications privilege extended
to communications authored by or solicited and received by presidential advisers that
involved information regarding governmental operations that ultimately call for
direct decision making by the President, but he does not have to actually have seen
the documents for which he claims privilege.  However, the privilege was held to be
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confined to White House staff, and not staff in agencies, and then only to White
House staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential decision making.
The claim of privilege may be overcome by a demonstration that each discrete group
of subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence, and that the evidence
was not available with due diligence elsewhere, a showing which the court held the
independent counsel had made.27
Since the Kennedy Administration, executive policy directives establish that
presidential executive privilege may be asserted only by the President personally.
The latest such directive, issued by President Reagan in November 1982, and still in
effect, requires that when agency heads believe that a congressional information
request raises substantial questions of executive privilege they are to notify and
consult with the attorney general and the counsel to the President.  If the matter is
deemed to justify invocation of the privilege, it is reported to the President who
makes his decision (See Reagan memo at Appendix B).
However, a memorandum of September 28, 1994, from White House Counsel
Lloyd Cutler to all department and agency general counsels modified the Reagan
policy by requiring agency heads directly to notify the White House Counsel of any
congressional request for “any document created in the White House . . . or in a
department or agency, that contains deliberations of, or advice to or from, the White
House” that may raise privilege issues.  The White House counsel is to seek an
accommodation and, if that does not succeed, he is to consult the attorney general to
determine whether to recommend invocation of privilege to the President.  The
President then determines whether to claim privilege, which is then communicated
to the Congress by the White House Counsel.  Thus, it would appear that decision
making with respect to claims of presidential privilege is now fully centralized in the
White House, but that the President must still personally assert the claim.  (See
Cutler memo at Appendix C.)  The current Bush Administration has as yet taken no
public position on the Reagan memorandum or the Cutler modification, but President
Bush’s sole assertion of executive privilege in December 2001 was issued over his
signature.
2. Common-Law Testimonial Privileges.
More common are claims by departments and agencies (and at times by the
White House), and by private persons, that common law testimonial privileges, such
as the attorney-client, work-product, and deliberative-process privileges, afford a
shield to congressional investigative inquiries.  Although there has never been a
definitive Supreme Court ruling on the question, the strong constitutional
underpinnings of the legislative investigatory power, long-standing congressional
practice, and recent appellate court rulings casting doubt on the viability of common-
law privilege claims by executive officials in the face of grand jury investigations,
support the position that committees may determine, on a case-by case basis, whether
to accept a claim of privilege. 
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Thus it is well established by congressional practice that acceptance of a claim
of attorney-client, work product or other common law testimonial privilege before
a committee rests in the sound discretion of that committee.  Such common-law
privileges cannot be claimed as a matter of right by a witness, and a committee can
deny them simply because it believes it needs the information sought to be protected
in order to accomplish its legislative functions.28  In actual practice, all committees
that have denied claims of privilege have engaged in a process of weighing
considerations of legislative need, public policy, and the statutory duties of
congressional committees to engage in continuous oversight of the application,
administration, and execution of the laws that fall within its jurisdiction, against any
possible injury to the witness.  Committees, among other factors, have considered
whether a court would have recognized the claim in the judicial forum.29  Moreover,
the conclusion that recognition of nonconstitutionally based privileges is a matter of
congressional discretion is consistent with both traditional British parliamentary and
the Congress’s historical practice.30
The legal basis for Congress’s prerogative in this area is based upon its inherent
constitutional prerogative to investigate, which has been long recognized by the
Supreme Court as extremely broad and encompassing, and which is at its peak when
the subject is fraud, abuse, or maladministration within a government department.31
Common-law privileges are,  on the other hand, judge-made exceptions to the normal
principle of full disclosure in the adversary process, which are to be narrowly
construed and have been confined to the judicial forum.  These privileges have no
constitutional basis.32  Recent appellate court rulings have cast substantial doubt
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whether executive branch officials may claim attorney-client, work product or
deliberative process privileges in the face of investigative demands of a grand jury.33
While no court has as yet recognized the inapplicability of common law
testimonial privileges in congressional proceedings,34 an advisory opinion directly
addressing the issue,35 by Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar in
February 1999 provides substantial support for the longstanding congressional
practice.  The occasion for the ruling arose as a result of an investigation of a
Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee into the circumstances
surrounding the planned relocation of the Federal Communications Commission to
the Portals office complex.36  During the course of the inquiry, the Subcommittee
sought certain documents from the Portals developer, Mr. Franklin L. Haney.  Mr.
Haney’s refusal to comply resulted in subpoenas for those documents to him and the
law firm representing him during the relocation efforts.  Haney and the law firm
asserted attorney-client privilege in their continued refusal to comply.  The law firm
sought an opinion from the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee as to its obligations in the
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face of the subpoena and a possible contempt citation, but the Bar Committee
notified the firm that the question was novel and that no advice could be given until
the matter was considered in a plenary session of the committee.37  The firm
continued its refusal to comply until the Subcommittee cited it for contempt, at which
time the firm proposed to turn over the documents if the contempt citation was
withdrawn.  The subcommittee agreed to the proposal.38
Subsequently, on February 16, 1999, the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee issued
an opinion  vindicating the action taken by the firm.  The Ethics Committee,
interpreting D.C. Rule of Professional conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A),39 held that an attorney
faced with a congressional subpoena that would reveal client confidences or secrets
has a professional responsibility to seek to quash or limit the subpoena on all
available, legitimate grounds to protect confidential documents and client secrets.
If, thereafter, the Congressional subcommittee overrules these objections, orders
production of the documents and threatens to hold the lawyer in contempt absent
compliance with the subpoena, then, in the absence of a judicial order forbidding
the production, the lawyer is permitted, but not required, by the D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct to produce the subpoenaed documents.  A directive of a
Congressional subcommittee accompanied by a threat of fines and imprisonment
pursuant to federal criminal law satisfies the standard of “required by law” as
that phrase is used in D.C. Rule of Professional conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A).
The D.C. Bar opinion urges attorneys to press every appropriate objection to the
subpoena until no further avenues of appeal are available, and even suggests that
clients might be advised to retain other counsel to institute a third-party action to
enjoin compliance,40 but allows the attorney to relent at the earliest point when he is
put in legal jeopardy.  The opinion represents the first (and thus far the only) bar in
the nation to directly and definitively address the merits of the issue.  It is likely to
arouse a controversial and sensitive debate,41 particularly if congressional committees
choose to subpoena client documents from attorneys as a matter of course.
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Assertions of deliberative process privilege by agencies have not been
uncommon in the past.  In essence it is argued that congressional demands for
information as to what occurred during the policy development process of an agency
would unduly interfere, and perhaps “chill,” the frank and open internal
communications necessary to the quality and integrity of the decisional process.  It
may also be grounded on the contentions that it protects against premature disclosure
of proposed policies before they are fully considered or actually adopted by the
agency, and to prevent the public from confusing matters merely considered or
discussed during the deliberative process with those on which the decision was
based.  However, as with claims of attorney-client privilege and work product
immunity discussed previously, congressional practice has been to treat their
acceptance as discretionary with the committee.  Moreover, a recent appellate court
decision underlines the understanding that the deliberative process privilege is a
common law privilege of agencies that is easily overcome by a showing of need by
an investigatory body, and other court rulings and congressional practice have
recognized the overriding necessity of an effective legislative oversight process.
The recent appeals court ruling in In re sealed Case (Espy)42 is of special note.
The case involved, inter alia, White House claims of executive and deliberate
process privileges for documents subpoenaed by an independent counsel.  At the
outset of the appeals court’s unanimous ruling it carefully distinguished between the
“presidential communications privilege” and the “deliberative process privilege.”
Both, the court observed, are executive privileges designed to protect the
confidentiality of executive branch decisionmaking.  But the deliberative process
privilege applies to executive branch officials generally, is a common law privilege
which requires a lower threshold of need to be overcome, and “disappears altogether
when there is any reason to believe government misconduct has occurred.”43  The
court’s recognition of the deliberative process privilege as a common law privilege
which, when claimed by executive department and agency officials, is easily
overcome, and which “disappears” upon the reasonable belief by an investigating
body that government misconduct has occurred, may severely limit the common law
claims of agencies against congressional investigative demands.  A demonstration of
need of a jurisdictional committee would appear to be sufficient, and a plausible
showing of fraud, waste, abuse or maladministration would be conclusive.
E.  Investigative Oversight Hearings
1.  Jurisdiction and Authority.
A congressional committee is a creation of its parent house and only has the
power to inquire into matters within the scope of the authority that has been
delegated to it by that body.  Thus, the  enabling rule or resolution which gives the
committee life is the charter that defines the grant and limitations of the committee’s
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power.  In construing the scope of a committee’s authorizing charter, courts will look
to the words of the rule or resolution itself, and then, if necessary, to the usual
sources of legislative history such as floor debate, legislative reports, past committee
practice, and interpretation.  Jurisdictional authority for “special” investigations may
be given to a standing committee, a joint committee of both houses, or a special
subcommittee of a standing committee, among other vehicles.  In view of the
specificity with which Senate and House rules now confer jurisdiction on standing
committees, as well as the care with which most authorizing resolutions for select
committees have been drafted in recent years, sufficient models exist to avoid a
successful judicial challenge by a witness that his noncompliance was justified by a
committee’s overstepping its delegated scope of authority.
2.  Rules Applicable to Hearings.
House Rule XI(2) and Senate Rule XXVI(2) require that committees adopt
written rules of procedure and publish them in the Congressional Record.  The
failure to publish has resulted in the invalidation of a perjury prosecution.44  Once
properly promulgated, such rules are judicially cognizable and must be strictly
observed.  The House and many individual Senate committees require that all
witnesses be given a copy of a committee’s rules.
Both the House and the Senate have adopted rules permitting a reduced quorum
for taking testimony and receiving evidence.  House hearings may be conducted if
at least two members are present; most Senate committees permit hearings with only
one member in attendance.  Although most committees have adopted the minimum
quorum requirement, some have not, while others require a higher quorum for sworn
rather than unsworn testimony.  For perjury purposes, the quorum requirement must
be met at the time the allegedly perjured testimony is given, not at the beginning of
the session.  Reduced quorum requirement rules do not apply to authorizations for
the issuance of subpoenas.  Senate rules require a one-third quorum of a committee
or subcommittee while the House requires a quorum of a majority of the members,
unless a committee delegates authority for issuance to its chairman.45
Senate and House rules limit the authority of their committees to meet in closed
session.  A House rule provides that testimony “shall” be held in closed session if a
majority of a committee or subcommittee determines it “may tend to defame,
degrade, or incriminate any person.”  Such testimony taken in closed session is
normally releasable only by a majority vote of the committee.  Similarly, confidential
material received in a closed session requires a majority vote for release.
3.  Conducting Hearings.
The chair usually makes an opening statement.  In the case of an investigative
hearing, it is an important means of defining the subject matter of the hearing and
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thereby establishing the pertinence of questions asked the witnesses.  Not all
committees swear in their witnesses; a few committees require that all witnesses be
sworn.  Most committees leave the swearing of witnesses to the discretion of the
chair.  If a committee wishes the potential sanction of perjury to apply, it should
swear its witnesses, though false statements not under oath are subject to criminal
sanctions.
A witness does not have a right to make a statement before being questioned but
that opportunity is usually accorded.  Committee rules may prescribe the length of
such statements and also require written statements be submitted in advance of the
hearing.  Questioning of witnesses may be structured so that members alternate for
specified lengths of time.  Questioning may also be conducted by staff.  Witnesses
may be allowed to review a transcript of their testimony and to make nonsubstantive
corrections.
The right of a witness to be accompanied by counsel is recognized by House
rule and the rules of Senate committees.  The House rule limits the role of counsel
as solely “for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.”
Some committees have adopted rules specifically prohibiting counsel from
“coaching” witnesses during their testimony.46  A committee has complete authority
to control the conduct of counsel.  Indeed, House Rule XI(2)(k)(4) provides that
“[t]he chairman may punish breaches of order and decorum, and of professional
ethics on the part of counsel, by censure or exclusion from the hearings; and the
Committee may cite the offender for contempt.”  Some Senate committees have
adopted similar rules.47  There is no right of cross-examination of adverse witnesses
during an investigative hearing.  Witnesses are entitled to a range of constitutional
protections (see box).
CRS-47
Constitutional Rights of Witnesses
It is well established that the protections of the Bill of Rights extend to witnesses at legislative
inquiry and thus may pose significant limitations on congressional investigations.  The Fifth Amendment
provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  The
privilege protects a witness against being compelled to testify subject to a grant of immunity (see pages
35 and 36) but not against a subpoena for existing documentary evidence.  However, where compliance
with a subpoena duces tecum would constitute an implicit testimonial authentication of the documents
produced, the privilege may apply.  There is no particular formulation of words necessary to invoke the
privilege.  All that is required is that the witness’s objection be stated in a manner that the committee may
reasonably expected to understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege.
Although the First Amendment, by its terms, is expressly applicable only to legislation that
abridges freedom of speech, press, or assembly, the Court has held that the amendment also restricts
Congress in conducting investigations.  In the leading case involving the application of First Amendment
rights in a congressional investigation, Barenblatt v. United States, the Court held that “where first
amendment rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution of the issue always involves
a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances shown.”  360 U.S. 109, 162 (1959).  Thus, unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, the First Amendment does not give a witness an absolute right to refuse to respond
to congressional demands for information.
Dicta in opinions of the Supreme Court indicate that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to congressional committees.  It appears that there must
be probable cause for the issuance of a congressional subpoena.  The Fourth Amendment protects a
congressional witness against a subpoena that is unreasonably broad or burdensome.
F.  Specialized Investigations
Oversight at times occurs through specialized, temporary investigations of a
specific event or development.  These are often dramatic, high profile endeavors,
focusing on scandals, alleged abuses of authority, suspected illegal conduct, or other
unethical behavior.  The stakes are high, possibly even leading to the end of
individual careers of high ranking executive officials.  Indeed, congressional
investigations can induce resignations, firings, and impeachment proceedings, as the
Senate Watergate Committee investigation did in the Nixon Administration and as
occurred as a result of the multiple investigations during the Clinton Administration.
As a consequence, interest — in Congress, the executive, and the public — is
frequently intense and impassioned.
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Prominent Select Investigative Committees
Senate Watergate Committee (1973-74), S.Res. 60, 93rd Congress, 
1st session.
“To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation
and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical
activities were engaged in by any persons, acting individually or in
combination with others, in the presidential election of 1972, or any
campaign, canvass, or other activity related to it.”
House Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair (1987), H.Res. 12,
100th Congress, 1st session.
“The select committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and
complete investigation and study, and to make such findings and
recommendations to the House as the select committee deems appropriate,”
regarding the sale or transfer of arms, technology, or intelligence to Iran or
Iraq; the diversion of funds realized in connection with such sales and
otherwise, to the anti-government forces in Nicaragua; the violation of any
law, agreement, promise, or understanding regarding the reporting to and
informing of Congress; operational activities and the conduct of foreign
and national security policy by the staff of the National Security Council;
authorization and supervision or lack thereof of such matters by the
President and other White House personnel; the role of individuals and
entities outside the government; other inquiries regarding such matters, by
the Attorney General, White House, intelligence community, and
Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; and the impact of such matters
on public and international confidence in the United States Government.
1. These investigative hearings may be televised in the contemporary era, and
often result in extensive news media coverage.
2. Such investigations may be undertaken by different organizational
arrangements.  These include temporary select committees, standing
committees and their subcommittees, specially created subcommittees, or
specially commissioned task forces within an existing standing committee.
3. Specially created investigative committees usually have a short life span:
e.g., six months, one year, or at the longest until the end of a Congress, at
which point the panel would have to be reapproved if the inquiry were to
continue.
4. The investigative panel often has to employ additional and special staff —
including investigators, attorneys, auditors, and researchers — because of
the added work load and need for specialized expertise in conducting such
investigations and in the subject matter.  Such staff can be hired under
contract from the private sector, transferred from existing congressional
offices or committees, transferred from the congressional support agencies,
or loaned by executive agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.  The staff would require appropriate security clearances if
the inquiry looked into matters of national security.
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5. Such special panels have often been vested with investigative authorities
not ordinarily available to standing committees.  Staff deposition authority
is the most commonly given, but given the particular circumstances,
special panels have been vested with the authority to obtain tax
information, to seek international assistance in information gathering
efforts abroad, and to participate in judicial proceedings (see Table 1).
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Note:  More comprehensive compilations of authorities and rules of Senate and House special
investigatory committees may be found in Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, “Authority
and Rules of Senate Special Investigatory Committees and Other Senate Entities, 1973-97,” S.Doc.
105-16, 105th Cong., 1st sess. (1998), and  CRS Report 95-949, Staff Depositions in Congressional
Investigations, by Jay Shampansky., at notes 16 and 18.
a. S.Res. 60 and S.Res. 194, 93rd Cong., (1973).
b. H.Res. 803, 93rd Cong., (1974).
c. 126 Cong. Rec. 19544-46 (1980) (unanimous consent agreement); S.Res. 495, 96th Cong., (1980)
(staff deposition authority); S.Res. 496, 96th Cong., (1980) (tax access authority).
d. H.Res. 222, 95th Cong., (1974).
e. S.Res. 21, 94th Cong., (1974).
f. H.Res. 252 and H.Res. 752, 95th Cong., (1977).
g. H.Res. 67, 97th Cong., (1981).
h. S.Res. 350, 97th Cong., (1982).
i. H.Res. 12, 10th Cong., (1987).
j. S.Res. 23, 100th Cong., (1987).
k. H.Res. 320, 100th Cong., (1987).
l. H.Res. 562, 100th Cong., (1988).
CRS-51
48 House Rule XI 2(j)(1); see, e.g., House Banking Committee Rule IV. 4.
49 Ashland Oil Co., Inc., v. FTC, 548 F. 2d 977, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affirming 409 F.
Supp. 297 (D.D. C. 1976).  See also Exxon v. Federal Trade Commission, 589 F. 2d 582,
592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(acknowledging that the “principle is important that disclosure of
information can only be compelled by members . . .”); and In re Beef Industry Antitrust
Litigation, 589 F. 2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1979)(refusing to permit two Congressmen from
intervening in private litigation because they “failed to obtain a House Resolution or any
similar authority before they sought to intervene.”)
50 Leach v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 860 F. Supp. 868, 874-76 (D.D.C. 1994).
m. H.Res. 258, 102nd Cong., (1991).
n. S.Res. 229, 103rd Cong., (1994).
o. S.Res. 120, 104th Cong., (1995).
p. H.Res. 369, 104th Cong., (1996).
q. H.Res. 167, 105th Cong., (1997).
r. S.Res. 54, 105th Cong., (1997)).
s. H.Res. 463, 105th Cong., (1998).
t. H.Res. 507, 105th Cong., (1998). 
G.  Role of Minority-Party Members In the Investigative
Process
The role of members of the minority in the investigatory oversight process is
governed by the rules of each house and its committees.  While minority members
are specifically accorded some rights (e.g., in the House of Representatives,
whenever a hearing is conducted on any measure or matter, the minority may, upon
the written request of a majority of the minority members to the chairman before the
completion of the hearing, call witnesses selected by the minority, and presumably
request documents48), no House or committee rules authorize either ranking minority
members or individual members on their own to institute official committee
investigations, hold hearings, or issue subpoenas.  Individual members may seek the
voluntary cooperation of agency officials or private persons.  But no judicial
precedent has directly recognized a right in an individual member, other than the
chair of a committee,49 to exercise the authority of a committee in the context of
oversight without the permission of a majority of the committee or its chair.
Moreover, a 1994 federal district court ruling dismissed the attempt of the then-
ranking minority member of the House Banking [now titled Financial Services]
Committee to compel disclosure of documents from two agencies under the Freedom
of Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.  The court held that the
case was one “in which a congressional plaintiff’s dispute is primarily with his or her
fellow legislators” and that the ranking minority member’s “complaint derives solely
from his failure to persuade his colleagues to authorize his request for the documents
in question, and that Plaintiff thus has a clear ‘collegial remedy’ capable of affording
him substantial relief.”50
That court also suggested that the possibility that a “collegial remedy” for the
minority exists already, pointing to 5 U.S.C. 2954, under which small groups of
members of the House Government Reform and Senate Governmental Affairs
Committees can request information from executive agencies without the need of
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51 Id. at 876 note 7.  5 U.S.C. 2954 provides: “An Executive agency, on request of the
Committee on Government [Reform] of the House of Representatives, or of any seven
members thereof, or on request of the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate,
or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any
matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.”
52 45 Stat. 996.
53 H.R. 1757, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3 (1928).  A study of the Bureau of Efficiency had
recommended their elimination.  H.R. 1757, at p. 2; S.Rept. 1320, 70th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1
(1928).
54 S.Rept. 1320, supra, at 4.
55 H.R. 1757, supra, at 6.  For House and Senate floor debates, see 69 Cong. Rec. 9413-17,
10613-16 (1928).
56 In codifying Title 5 in 1966, Congress made it clear that it was effecting no substantive
changes in existing laws: “The legislative purpose in enacting sections 1-6 of this act is to
restate, without substantive change, the laws replaced by those sections on the effective date
of this Act.”  P.L. 89-544, Sec. 7(a).
formal committee action.51  However, the precise scope and efficacy of this provision
is uncertain.
5 U.S.C. 2954 is derived from section 2 of the act of May 29, 1928,52 which
originally referred not to the current committees generally overseeing government
agency operations but their predecessors, the House and Senate Committees on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments.  The principal purpose of the 1928 act,
embodied in its first section, was to repeal legislation that required the submission
to the Congress of some 128 reports, many of which had become obsolete in part, and
which, in any event, were deemed at the time to have no value, serve no useful
purpose, and were not printed by the House of Representatives.53
Section 2 of the 1928 act contains the language that has been codified in 5
U.S.C. 2954.  The legislative history, is somewhat mixed on the purpose of that
language.  The Senate report indicated a limited purpose:  to make “it possible to
require any report discontinued by the language of this bill to be resubmitted to either
House upon its necessity becoming evident to the membership of either body.”54  The
House report agreed on that point, but added:  “If any information is desired by any
Member or Committee upon a particular subject that information can be better
secured by a request made by an individual Member or Committee, so framed as to
bring out the special information desired.”55
It is uncertain, then, on how closely 5 U.S.C. 2954 is tied to the 128 reports
abolished by section 1 of the 1928 legislation.56  Moreover, the provision lacks an
explicit enforcement component.  Agency refusals to comply would not be subject
to existing contempt processes, and the outcome of a civil suit to compel production
on the basis of the provision is problematic despite the Leach court’s suggestion.
Further, the provision applies only to the named committees; thus members of all
other committees would still face the Leach problem.  Finally, even members of the
named committees are still likely to have to persuade a court that their claim is  more
than an intramural dispute, that a court has jurisdiction to hear  the suit, and that
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57 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
58 Waxman, et al. v. Evans, Civ. Action No. 01-14530-LGB (AJWx) (D.C. CD Calif., May
21, 2001).
59 Waxman v. Evans, Case No. CV 01-14530-LGB (AJWx) at 3 (March 25, 2002).
60 Carter v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 307 F. 3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002).
61 Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2002). 
committee members have standing to sue within the narrow parameters set by the
Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd.57  
The first attempt to secure court enforcement of a document demand under
Section 2954 was brought in 2001 in a federal district court.58  That case involved a
request of 16 minority party members of the House Government Reform Committee
for information from the Secretary of Commerce for data concerning the 2000
census.  The congressional plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunction relief, arguing
that the plain language of Section 2954 unambiguously directs agency compliance
with information requests and  that while resort to the legislative history of the
provision is not necessary in such clear language situations, that history is supportive.
They were entitled to judicial relief because of the agency’s direct and particularized
rejection of an entitlement specifically granted to them by law.  The government
argued that because the case had arisen out of a political dispute between the
Congress and the Executive concerning access to information, the court should
refrain from hearing the case in accordance with the doctrine of equitable discretion.
Alternatively, the government argued that Section 2954 should be construed, in light
of its legislative history, and to avoid doubts about its constitutionally, as preserving
Congress’ access to the information formerly contained in the reports abolished by
Section 1 of the 1928 Act, but not as guaranteeing an unqualified right of access to
information possessed by the executive branch.  The district court rejected these
arguments and ordered release of the requested census data.  The government
thereafter moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the questions whether
plaintiffs, as individual legislators, lacked standing under the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Raines v. Byrd to sue for institutional injuries and whether the plaintiffs had a right
of action under Section 2954, the Administrative Procedure Act, or the Mandamus
statute to bring suit against the Executive Branch for access to information.  The
court declined to consider these arguments on the ground that the government could
have presented them in support of its original motion to dismiss but did not do so.59
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the case was argued together with a separate
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit for the same census data brought by two
Washington State legislators.  After oral argument, the appeals court withdrew the
submission of Waxman v. Evans, deferring the case pending its decision in the FOIA
suit.  The appeals court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in the FOIA case on October
8, 2002,60 and on December 6, 2002, declared that the action in Waxman was  mooted
by its FOIA decision and issued an order reversing and vacating the district court’s
decision, and remanding the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss.61
On motion of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals modified this order on January 9,
2003, striking its reversal of the district court’s ruling, but leaving in effect its order
to vacate and dismiss.
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63 See CRS Report RL30850, Minority Rights and Senate Procedures, by Stanley Bach.
64 Senate Rules XIX and XXII.
65 See Bach, supra note 63 at pp. 8-11.
A second attempt to secure judicial enforcement of a Section 2954 document
demand is now pending before the same district court.  That case, Waxman v.
Thompson,62 is a suit by 19 Members of the House Government Reform Committee
to compel release release by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
of cost estimates prepared by its Office of Actuary during congressional
consideration of Medicare reform legislation in 2003.  In addition to asserting a right
of access under Section 2954, the congressional plaintiffs allege a violation of 5
U.S.C. 7211, which provides that “[t]he right of employees . . . to furnish information
to either House of Congress, or to a committee or member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied.”  The government opposes the claims, raising the issues
of standing under Raines v. Byrd, jurisdiction of the court to enforce either statute,
and the doctrine of equitable discretion.  Oral argument is scheduled for early
December 2004.
The rules of the Senate provide substantially more effective means for
individual minority-party members to engage in “self-help” to support oversight
objectives than afforded their House counterparts.  Senate rules emphasize the rights
and prerogatives of individual Senators and, therefore, minority groups of Senators.63
The most important of these rules are those that effectively allow unlimited debate
on a bill or amendment unless an extraordinary majority votes to invoke cloture.64
Senators can use their right to filibuster, or simply the threat of filibuster, to delay or
prevent the Senate from engaging in legislative business.  The Senate’s rules also are
a source of other minority rights that can directly or indirectly aid the minority in
gaining investigatory rights.  For example, the right of extended debate applies in
committee as well as on the floor, with one crucial difference: the Senate’s cloture
rule may not be invoked in committee.  Each Senate committee decides for itself how
it will control debate, and therefore a filibuster opportunity in a committee may be
even greater than on the floor.  Also, Senate Rule XXVI prohibits the reporting of
any measure or matter from a committee unless a majority of the committee is
present, another point of possible tactical leverage.  Even beyond the potent power
to delay, Senators can promote their goals by taking advantage of other parliamentary
rights and opportunities that are provided by the Senate’s formal procedures and
customary practices, such as are afforded by the processes dealing with floor
recognition, committee referrals, and the amending process.65  
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1. In complying with this Subpoena, you are required to produce all responsive
documents that are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you
or your past or present agents, employees, and representatives acting on your
behalf.  You are also required to produce documents that you have a legal right
to obtain, documents that you have a right to copy or have access to, and
documents that you have placed in the temporary possession, custody, or control
of any third party. No records,  documents, data or information called for by this
request shall be destroyed, modified, removed or otherwise made inaccessible
to the Committee.
2. In the event that any entity, organization or individual denoted in this subpoena
has been, or is also known by any other name than that herein denoted, the
subpoena shall be read to also include them under that alternative identification.
3. Each document produced shall be produced in a form that renders the document
susceptible of copying.
4. Documents produced in response to this subpoena shall be produced together
with copies of file labels, dividers or identifying markers with which they were
associated when this subpoena was served. Also identify to which  paragraph
from  the  subpoena that such documents are responsive.
5. It shall not be a basis for refusal to produce documents that any other person or
entity also possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
6. If any of the subpoenaed information is available in machine-readable form
(such as punch cards, paper or magnetic tapes, drums, disks, or core storage),
state the form in which it is available and provide sufficient detail to allow the
information to be copied to a readable format. If the information requested is
stored in a computer, indicate whether you have an existing program that will
print the records in a readable form.
7. If the subpoena cannot be complied with in full, it shall be complied with to the
extent possible, which shall include an explanation of why full compliance is
not possible.
8. In the event that a document is withheld on the basis of privilege, provide the
following information concerning any such document: (a) the privilege asserted;
(b) the type of document; (c) the general subject matter; (d) the date, author and
addressee; and (e) the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.
9. If any document responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your
possession, custody, or control, identify the document (stating its date, author,
subject and recipients) and explain the circumstances by which the document
ceased to be in your possession, or control.
10. If a date set forth in this subpoena referring to a communication, meeting, or
other event is inaccurate, but the actual date is known to you or is otherwise
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apparent from the context of the request, you should produce all documents
which would be responsive as if the date were correct.
11. Other than subpoena questions directed at the activities of specified entities or
persons, to the extent that information contained in documents sought by this
subpoena may require production of donor lists, or information otherwise
enabling the re-creation of donor lists, such identifying information may be
redacted.
12. The time period covered by this subpoena is included in the attached Schedule
A.
13. This request is continuing in nature. Any record, document, compilation of data
or information, not produced because it has not been located or discovered by
the return date,  shall be produced immediately upon location or discovery
subsequent thereto.
14. All documents shall be Bates stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.
15. Two sets of documents shall be delivered, one set for the Majority Staff and one
set for the Minority Staff. When documents are produced to the Subcommittee,
production sets shall be delivered to the Majority Staff in Room B346 Rayburn




1. The term “document” means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any
nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy,
including, but not limited to, the following: memoranda, reports, expense
reports, books, manuals, instructions, financial reports, working papers, records
notes, letters, notices, confirmations, telegrams, receipts, appraisals, pamphlets,
magazines, newspapers, prospectuses, interoffice and intra office
communications, electronic mail (E-mail), contracts, cables, notations of any
type of conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication, bulletins,
printed matter, computer printouts, teletypes, invoices, transcripts, diaries,
analyses, returns, summaries, minutes, bills, accounts, estimates, projections,
comparisons, messages, correspondence, press releases, circulars, financial
statements, reviews, opinions, offers, studies and investigations, questionnaires
and surveys, and work sheets (and all drafts, preliminary versions, alterations,
modifications, revisions, changes, and amendments of any of the foregoing, as
well as any attachments or appendices thereto), and graphic or oral records or
representations of any kind (including without limitation, photographs, charts,
graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotape, recordings and motion pictures), and
electronic, mechanical, and electric records or representations of any kind
(including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, and recordings) and other
written, printed, typed, or other graphic or recorded matter of any kind or nature,
however produced or reproduced, and whether preserved in writing, film, tape,
disc, or videotape.  A documents bearing any notation not a part of the original
text is to be considered a separate document.  A draft or non-identical copy is
a separate document within the meaning of this term.
2. The term “communication” means each manner or means of disclosure or
exchange of information, regardless of means  utilized,  whether  oral,
electronic,  by  document  or otherwise, and whether face to face, in a meeting,
by telephone, mail, telexes, discussions, releases, personal delivery, or
otherwise.
3. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively
or disjunctively to bring within the scope of  this  subpoena  any  information
which  might otherwise be construed to be outside its  scope.  The  singular
includes  plural  number, and vice versa. The masculine includes the feminine
and neuter genders.
4. The term “White House” refers to the Executive Office  of  the  President  and
all  of  its units including, without limitation, the Office of Administration, the
White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of  Science
and  Technology  Policy, the Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  the  United
States  Trade  Representative,  the Office of Public Liaison, the Office of
Correspondence, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Political
Affairs, the Office of the Deputy Chief  of  Staff for White House Operations,
the Domestic Policy Council, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs,  the  Office  of  Legislative Affairs, Media
Affairs, the National Economic Council, the Office of Policy Development, the
Office of Political Affairs, the Office of  Presidential  Personnel,  the Office of
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the Press Secretary, the Office  of  Scheduling  and  Advance,  the  Council  of
Economic  Advisors,  the  Council  on  Environmental  Quality,  the  Executive
Residence, the President’s Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board,  the  National





International Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
SCHEDULE A
1. All organizational charts and personnel rosters for the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (“Teamsters” or “IBT”), including the DRIVE PAC, in effect
during calendar years 1991 through 1997.
2. All IBT operating, finance, and administrative manuals in effect during calendar
years 1991 through 1997, including, but not limited to those that set forth (1)
operating policies, practices, and procedures; (2) internal financial practices and
reporting requirements; and (3) authorization, approval, and review
responsibilities.
3. All annual audit reports of the IBT for the years 1991 through 1996 performed
by the auditing firm of Grant Thornton.
4. All IBT annual reports to its membership and the public for years 1991 through
1997, including copies of IBT annual audited financial statements certified to
by independent public accountants.
5. All books and records showing receipts and expenditures, assets and liabilities,
profits and losses, and all other records used for recording the financial affairs
of the IBT including, journals (or other books of original entry) and ledgers
including cash receipts journals, cash disbursements journals, revenue journals,
general journals, subledgers, and workpapers reflecting accounting entries.
6. All Federal Income Tax returns filed by the IBT for years 1991 through 1997.
7. All minutes of the General Board, Executive Board, Executive Council, and all
Standing Committees, including any internal ethics committees formed to
investigate misconduct and corruption, and all handouts and reports prepared
and produced at each Committee meeting.
8. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any
contribution, donation, expenditure, outlay, in-kind assistance, transfer, loan, or
grant (from DRIVE, DRIVE E&L fund, or IBT general treasury) to any of the
following entities/organizations:
a. Citizen Action
b. Campaign for a Responsible Congress
c. Project Vote
d. National Council of Senior Citizens




h. Democratic National Committee
i. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”)
j. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”)
k. State Democratic Parties
1. Clinton-Gore #96 
m. SEIU
9. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about any of
the following individuals/entities:
a. Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union
b. Teamsters for a Democratic Union
















10. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information on about,
communications between the Teamsters and the White House regarding any of
the following issues:
a. United Parcel Service Strike
b. Diamond Walnut Company Strike
c. Pony Express Company organizing efforts
d. Davis Bacon Act
e. NAFTA Border Crossings
f.  Ron Carey reelection campaign
g.  IBT support to 1996 federal election campaigns.
i. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about,
communications between the Teamsters and the Federal Election
Commission.
12. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about,
communications between the Teamsters and the Democratic National
Committee, DSCC, or DCCC.
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13. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about,
communications between the Teamsters and the Clinton-Gore #96 Campaign
Committee.
14. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, policies
and procedures in effect during 1996 regarding the approval of expenditures
from the IBT general treasury, DRIVE E&L fund, and DRIVE PAC.
15. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the
retention by the IBT of the law firm Covington & Burling and/or Charles Ruff.
16. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work
for  the IBT performed by the firm Palladino & Sutherland and/or Jack
Palladino.
17. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work for
the IBT performed by Ace Investigations and/or Guerrieri, Edmund, and James.
18. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about IBT
involvement in the  1995-1996  Oregon  Senate  race  (Ron  Wyden  vs.  Gordon
Smith).
19. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, Ron
Carey’s campaign for reelection as general president of the Teamsters.
20. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about
organization, planning, and operation of the 1996 IBT Convention.
21. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the
following:
a.  Trish Hoppey
b.  John Latz
c.  any individual with the last name of “Golovner”.
d.  Convention Management Group.
22. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the
Household Finance Corporation.
23. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any
“affinity credit card” program or other credit card program sponsored by or
participated in by the IBT.
24. A list of all bank accounts held by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
including the name of the bank, account number, and bank address.
25. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about,
payments made by the IBT to any official or employee of the Independent
Review Board.
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26. Unless otherwise indicated, the time period covered by this subpoena is between





MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
SUBJECT:    Procedures Governing Responses to  
            Congressional Request for Information
The policy of this administration is to comply with Congressional Requests for information to the fullest extent
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch. While this Administration, like
its predecessors, has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of some communications, executive privilege will be
asserted only in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the
privilege is necessary. Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the executive branch has minimized
the need for invoking executive privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means
of resolving conflicts between the Branches. To ensure that every reasonable accommodation is made to the needs of
Congress, executive privilege shall not be invoked without specific Presidential authorization. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Executive Branch may occasionally find it necessary and proper to preserve the
confidentiality of national security secrets, deliberative communications that form a part of the decision-making
process, or other information important to the discharge of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibilities.
Legitimate and appropriate claims of privilege should not thoughtlessly be waived.  However, to ensure that this
Administration acts responsibly and consistently in the exercise of its duties, with due regard for the responsibilities
and prerogatives of Congress, the following procedures shall be followed whenever Congressional requests for
information raise concerns regarding the confidentiality of the information sought:
1. Congressional requests for information shall be complied with as promptly and as fully as possible, unless it is
determined that compliance raises a substantial question of executive privilege. A “substantial question of
executive privilege” exists if disclosure of the information requested might significantly impair the national
security (including the conduct of foreign relations), the deliberative processes of the Executive Branch or other
aspects of the performance of the Executive Branch’s constitutional duties.
2. If the head of an executive department or agency (“Department Head”) believes, after consultation with
department counsel, that compliance with a Congressional request for information raises a substantial question
of executive privilege, he shall promptly notify and consult with the Attorney General through the Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and shall also promptly notify and consult with the Counsel
to the President. If the information requested of a department or agency derives in whole or in part or from
information received from another department or agency, the latter entity shall also be consulted as to whether
disclosure of the information raises a substantial question of executive privilege.
3. Every effort shall be made to comply with the Congressional request in a manner consistent with the legitimate
needs of the Executive Branch.  The Department Head, the Attorney “General and the Counsel to the President
may, in the exercise of their discretion in the circumstances, determine that executive privilege shall not be
invoked and release the requested information.
4. If the Department Head, the Attorney General or the Counsel to the President believes, after
consultation, that the circumstances justify invocation of executive privilege, the issue shall be presented
to the President by the Counsel to the President, who will advise the Department Head and the Attorney
General of the President’s decision.
5. Pending a final Presidential decision on the matter, the Department Head shall request the
Congressional body to hod its request for the information in abeyance. The Department Head shall
expressly indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect the privilege pending a Presidential
decision, claim of privilege.
6. If the President decides to invoke executive privilege, the Department Head shall advise the requesting
Congressional body that the claim of executive privilege is being made with the specific approval of the
President.
Any questions concerning these procedures or related matters should be addressed to the Attorney General, through







MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY GENERAL COUNSELS
FROM: LLOYD N. CUTLER, SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies for Documents Protected by Executive Privilege
The policy of this Administration is to comply with congressional requests for information to the fullest extent
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.  While this Administration, like
its predecessors, has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of core communications, executive privilege will be
asserted only after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege is necessary to protect Executive Branch
prerogatives.
The doctrine of executive privilege protects the confidentiality of deliberations within the White House, including its
policy councils, as well as communications between the White House and executive departments and agencies.
Executive privilege applies to written and oral communications between and among the White House, its policy councils
and Executive Branch agencies, as well as to documents that describe or prepares for such communications (e.g.
“talking points”). This has been the view expressed by all recent White House Counsels. In circumstances involving
communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to
assert executive privilege, either, in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings. Executive
privilege must always be weighed against other competing governmental interests, including the judicial need to obtain
relevant evidence, especially in criminal proceedings, and the congressional need to make factual findings for legislative
and oversight purposes.
In the last resort, this balancing is usually conducted by the courts. However, when executive privilege is asserted
against a congressional request for documents, the courts usually decline to intervene until after the other two branches
have exhausted the possibility of working out a satisfactory accommodation. It is our policy to work out such an
accommodation whenever we can, without unduly interfering with the President’s need to conduct frank exchange of
views with his principal advisors.  
Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have minimized the need for invoking
executive privilege.
Executive privilege belongs to the President, not individual departments or agencies. It is essential that all requests to
departments and agencies for information of the type described above be referred to the White House Counsel before
any information is furnished. Departments and agencies receiving such request should therefore follow the procedures
set forth below, designed to ensure that this Administration acts responsibly and consistently with respect to executive
privilege issues, with due regard for the responsibilities and prerogatives of Congress:
First, any document created in the White House, including a White House policy council, or in a department or
agency, that contains the deliberations of, or advice to or from, the White House, should be presumptively treated
as protected by executive privilege. This is so regardless of the document’s location at the time of the request or
whether it originated in the White House or in a department or agency.
Second, a department or agency receiving a request for any such document should promptly notify the White House
Counsel’s Office, and direct any inquiries regarding such a document to the White House Counsel’s Office.
Third, the White House Counsel’s Office, working together with the department or agency (and, where appropriate,
the Department of Justice), will discuss the request with appropriate congressional representatives to determine
whether a mutually satisfactory recommendation is available.
Fourth, if efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory accommodation are unsuccessful, and if release of the document
would pass a substantial question of executive privilege, the Counsel to the President will consult with the Department
of Justice and other affected agencies to determine whether to recommend that the President invoke the privilege.
We believe this policy will facilitate the resolution of issues relating to disclosures to Congress and maximize the
opportunity for reaching mutually satisfactory accommodations with Congress.  We will of course try to cooperate
with reasonable congressional requests for information in ways that preserve the President’s ability to exchange frank
advice with his immediate staff and the heads of the executive departments and agencies.
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IV.  Selected Oversight Techniques
Many oversight techniques are self-explanatory.  There are several techniques,
however, for which explanation or elaboration may prove helpful for a better
understanding of their utility.
A.  Determine Laws, Programs, Activities, Functions,
Advisory Committees, Agencies, and Departments Within
Each Committee’s Jurisdiction
A basic step in oversight preparation is to determine the laws, programs, activities,
functions, advisory committees, agencies, and departments within a committee’s
jurisdiction.  This is essential if a committee is to know the full range of its oversight
responsibilities.  To accomplish this general goal, House and Senate committees
might:
1. Prepare a document, as needed, which outlines for each subcommittee of
a standing committee the agencies, laws, programs activities, functions,
advisory committees, and required agency reports that fall within its
jurisdictional purview.
2. Publish, as needed, a compilation of the all the basic statutes in force
within the jurisdiction of each subcommittee or for the committee itself if
it has no subcommittees.
3. Request the assistance of the various legislative support agencies (the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, or the
Government Accountability Office) in identifying the full range of federal
programs and activities under a committee’s jurisdiction.
B.  Orientation and Periodic Review Hearings With Agencies
1. Oversight hearings (or even “pre-hearings”) may be held for the purposes
of briefing Members and staff on the organization, operations, and
programs of an agency, and determining how an agency intends to
implement any new legislation.  The hearings can also be used as a way to
obtain information on the administration, effectiveness, and economy of
agency operations and programs.
2. Agency officials can be noticeably influenced by the knowledge and
expectation that they will be called before a congressional committee
regularly to account for the activities of their agencies.
3. Such hearings benefit the committee by, for example:
a. helping committee members keep up-to-date on important
administrative developments;
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b. serving as a forum for exchanging and communicating views on
pertinent problems and other relevant matters; 
c. providing background information which could assist members in
making sound legislative and fiscal judgments;
d. identifying program areas within each committee’s jurisdiction that
may be vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement; and
e. determining whether new laws are needed or whether changes in the
administration of existing laws will be sufficient to resolve problems.
4. The ability of committee members during oversight hearings to focus
on meaningful issues and to ask penetrating questions will be enhanced if
staff have accumulated, organized, and evaluated relevant data,
information, and analyses about administrative performance.
a. Ideally, each standing committee should regularly monitor the
application of laws and implementation of programs within its
jurisdiction.  A prime objective of the “continuous watchfulness”
mandate (Section 136) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
is to encourage committees to take an active and ongoing role in
administrative review and not wait for public revelations of agency
and program inadequacies before conducting oversight.  As Section
136 states in part: “each standing committee of the Senate and House
of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the
execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the
subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee.”
b. Committee personnel could be assigned to maintain active liaison
with appropriate agencies and to record their pertinent findings
routinely.
c. Information compiled in this fashion will be useful not only for
regular oversight hearings, but also for oversight hearings called
unexpectedly with little opportunity to conduct an extensive
background study.
5. It is important that specific letters be directed by the committee to the
agency witnesses so that they will be on notice about what they will have
to answer.  In this way witnesses will be responsive in providing
worthwhile testimony at hearings; testify “to the point” and avoid rambling
and/or evasive statements; and restrict their use of this kind of answer to
questions: “I didn’t know you wanted that information. . .”
C.  Casework
An important check against bureaucratic indifference or inefficiency is
“casework,” as noted in Section I.  Typically, Members of Congress hear from
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66 Lee H. Hamilton, “Constituent Service and Representation,” The Public Manager,
summer 1992, p. 12.
67 John R. Johannes, “Constituency Service,” in Donald Bacon, et. al., eds., The
Encyclopedia of the United States Congress (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 544.
individual constituents and communities about problems they are having with various
federal agencies and departments.  As a House member once said:
Last year, one of my constituents, a 63-year old man who requires kidney
dialysis, discovered that he would no longer be receiving Medicare
because the Social Security Administration thought he was dead.  Like
many residents who have problems dealing with the federal bureaucracy,
this man contacted my district office and asked for help.  Without
difficulty, he convinced my staff that he was indeed alive, and we in turn
convinced the Social Security Administration to resume sending him
benefits.66
Casework is important not only in resolving problems that constituents are
having with bureaucrats but also in identifying limitations in the law.  As a scholar
of constituency service explained: “Casework allows ad hoc correction of
bureaucratic error, impropriety, and laxity, and can lead a senator or representative
to consider changes in laws because of particularly flagrant or persistent problems
that casework staff discovered.”67
D.  Audits
1. Periodic auditing of executive departments is among the strongest
techniques of legislative oversight.  Properly utilized, the audit enables
Congress to hold executive officers to a strict accounting for their use of
public funds and the conduct of their administration.
2. Government auditing encompasses more than checking and verifying
accounts, transactions, and financial statements.  Many federal, state, and
some foreign audit agencies are moving in the direction pioneered by GAO
(the chief audit agency of Congress) of including an evaluation of:
a. whether claimed achievements are supported by adequate and reliable
evidence and data and are in compliance with legislatively established
objectives; and
b. whether resources are being used efficiently, effectively, and
economically.
3. In reviewing the agencies’ own evaluations, or in undertaking an initial
evaluation, auditors are advised by GAO to ask questions such as the
following:
a. How successful is the program in accomplishing the intended results?
Could program objectives be achieved at less cost?
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b. Has agency management clearly defined and promulgated the
objectives and goals of the program or activity?
c. Have performance standards been developed?
d. Are program objectives sufficiently clear to permit agency
management to accomplish effectively the desired program results?
Are the objectives of the component parts of the program consistent
with overall program objectives?
e. Are program costs reasonably commensurate with the benefits
achieved?
f. Have alternative programs or approaches been examined, or should
they be examined to determine whether objectives can be achieved
more economically?
g. Were all studies, such as cost-benefit studies, appropriate for
analyzing costs and benefits of alternative approaches?
h. Is the program producing benefits or detriments that were not
contemplated by Congress when it authorized the program?
i. Is the information furnished to Congress by the agency adequate and
sufficiently accurate to permit Congress to monitor program
achievements effectively?
j. Does top management have the essential and reliable information
necessary for exercising supervision and control and for ascertaining
directions or trends?
k. Does management have internal review or audit facilities adequate
for monitoring program operations, identifying program and
management problems and weaknesses, and insuring fiscal integrity?
4. In addition to GAO and other governmental audits, Congress may have
access to the internal audit reports of agency audit teams.
a. Internal audit reports are designed to meet the needs of executive
officials.
b. This information is useful in conducting oversight; executive
agencies are sometimes reluctant to provide internal audit reports to
Congress.
c. A large number of governmental and private organizations conduct
audits of expenditures.  Every major federal agency, for example, has
its own statutory Inspector General and each of the 50 states plus
hundreds of local governments have their own audit offices.  Many
government agencies also contract with public accounting firms to
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perform financial audits.  For assistance in finding audit reports or in
learning how to commission audit reports, congressional staff might
consult with officials at the GAO, which is the auditing arm of the
Congress.
E.  Monitoring the Federal Register
1. The Federal Register is published daily, Monday through Friday, except
official holidays by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives
and Records Administration.  It provides a uniform system for making
available to the public regulations and legal notices issued by Federal
agencies.  These include presidential proclamations and executive orders,
federal agency documents having general applicability and legal effect,
documents required to be published by act of Congress, and other Federal
agency documents of public interest.  Final regulations are codified by
subject in the Code of Federal Regulations.
2. Documents are on file for public inspection in the Office of the Federal
Register the day before they are published, unless the issuing agency
requests earlier filing.  The list of documents on file for public inspection
can be accessed via [http://www.nara.gov/fedreg]. 
3. Regular scrutiny of the Federal Register by committees and staff may help
them to identify proposed rules and regulations in their subject areas that
merit congressional review as to need and likely effect.
4. The Federal Register is now available and searchable online (see
[http://www.acess.gpo.gov/nara]).  The Regulatory Information Service
Center of the General Services Administration annually issues two
publications — the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions in April and The Regulatory Plan and the Unified
Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions in October —
that provide a wealth of information about proposed and completed
regulatory actions of federal agencies.  Both documents are available
online at [http://reginfo.gov].  Further information about these two
publications can be obtained from the center.  The center’s telephone
number is (202) 482-7350 and its e-mail address is RIS@gsa.gov. 
F.  Special Studies and Investigations by Staff, Support
Agencies, Outside Contractors, and Others
1. Staff Investigations.  The staffs of committees and individual Members
play a vital role in the legislative process.
a. Committee staffs, through field investigations or on-site visits for
example, can help a committee develop its own independent
evaluation of the effectiveness of laws.
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2. Support Agencies.  The legislative support agencies, directly or indirectly,
can assist committees and Members in conducting investigations and
reviewing agency performance. (See “Section V” for a discussion of CRS,
GAO, and CBO capabilities.)
a. The Government Accountability Office is the agency most involved
in investigations, audits, and program evaluations.  It has a large,
professional investigative staff and produces numerous reports useful
in oversight.  
3. Outside Contractors.  The 1974 Budget Act, as amended, and the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 authorize House and Senate
committees to enlist the services of individual consultants or organizations
to assist them in their work.
a. A committee might contract with an independent research
organization or employ professional investigators for short-term
studies.
b. Committees may also utilize, subject to appropriate approvals, federal
and support agency employees to aid them in their oversight
activities.
c. Committees might also establish a voluntary advisory panel to assist
them in their work.
G.  Communicating with the Media
1. Public exposure of a problem is an effective oversight technique, and will
often help bring about a solution to that problem.  Public officials often
seem much more responsive to correcting deficiencies after the issue has
been described in widely circulated news stories.
2. Effective communication with the media is based on knowledge and
understanding of each of the media forms and the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
a. Wire Services.
(1) Timeliness, brevity, and accuracy are the main criteria for dealing
with the wire service.
(2) Personal contact with wire service reporters gets the best results.
b. Daily Newspapers.
(1) Obtain information on the operational procedures and deadlines of
daily newspapers, and how they are affected by time.
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(2) Since regular news for Monday is usually low, it may be useful to
issue statements and releases for “Monday a.m.” use.
(3) Saturday usually has the lowest circulation and Sunday has the
widest.
(4) Stories for weekend publication should be given to reporters during
the middle of the week or earlier.
c. Magazines.
(1) Magazines and other periodicals are generally wider ranging and
focus on why something happens, not what happened.
(2) Weeklies do not ordinarily respond to Member press conferences and
releases in the same manner as the other media; personal meetings
and telephone conversations are usually more effective.
(3) Deadlines Vary
(a) Obtain information on operational procedures.
(b) Weekends are generally production periods for most magazines.
d. Trade Periodicals.
Many of these topically oriented magazines and newsletters are produced
by publishing firms which utilize the services of the periodical press
galleries in the Capitol.
e. Television.
(1) House and Senate rules identify procedures for radio and television
broadcasting of committee hearings. (See House Rule XI and Senate
Rule XXVI).
(2) News of a committee’s oversight activities may appear in diverse
forms on television.  For example, it could appear on the networks as
a brief report on the morning or evening news, air on a cable news
channel, or arise in the course of live House or Senate floor debate
telecast over C-SPAN (the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network).
Washington-based news organizations may also provide daily
television coverage of Congress to independent television stations.
Public television and cable news organizations occasionally broadcast
live coverage of committee oversight hearings.
(3) To encourage television coverage of a committee’s oversight
activities, the following checklist might be helpful to staff.
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(a) Alert correspondents and Washington bureau chiefs of
upcoming hearings several days in advance via press releases;
follow up with personal or telephone notification of certain
“must-contact” correspondents.
(b) Notify the Associated Press, Reuters, and other news services of
a scheduled hearing or meeting at least a day in advance.  Allow
enough lead time to permit inclusion of the committee activity
in the wire services’ calendar of daily events for the next day. 
(c) If widespread media interest is anticipated, reserve at least a
week in advance a hearing room large enough to accommodate
television cameras.
(d) Alert interested correspondents or assignment editors when
House or Senate floor action is likely on a matter related to the
committee’s oversight function.
(e) Provide or have available for the media background information
on oversight issues awaiting committee action or consideration
by the House or Senate.
(f) Consider making committee members readily available for
television cameras either before or after any executive sessions
(e.g., allowing television crews in briefly at the start to take
video footage of the committee, or arranging for a press
conference after the committee session).
(g) Videotape, where appropriate committee members discussing
topical oversight issues for distribution to interested television
stations.
(h) Keep the contact person of each of the network news interview
programs (“Meet the Press,” etc.) apprized of a committee’s
oversight activities, and their relevance to topical national
issues.  Suggest the appearance of committee members on
interview programs when a committee oversight issue becomes
especially newsworthy.
(i) Be alert to live television interview possibilities for committee
members that can be arranged on relatively short notice, e.g.,
newsmaker interviews on cable news channels.
f. Radio.
(1) Time is of the essence.  Radio newsmen want congressional reaction
immediately, not hours later when the story breaks in the newspaper
or on television.
CRS-78
(2) Members who are readily available for quick interviews are
frequently broadcast within minutes or the next morning coast-to-
coast on hundreds of radio stations.  In most cases an interview will
be aired repeatedly over a period of several hours.
(3) Congressional offices should contact radio reporters directly through
the House and Senate press galleries.
g. Press Conferences.
(1) Time
(a) The periods between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. are often preferable.
(b) Early morning press conferences usually have low attendance
because reporters on daily papers do not start work until mid-
morning.
(c) Late afternoon press conferences are often unattended because
reporters begin to lose news time for that particular day.
(d) Check with the press galleries.  They keep a running log of most
scheduled news events and can provide information on possible
competition at any time on any day.
(2) Place
(a) Committee rooms are good, but they are frequently in use at the
best time for a conference.
(b) A Member’s office or the press galleries can be adequate, but
keep in mind that the reporters and cameramen need room to
operate.
(c) It might be wise to go to the radio-TV galleries after the
conference and do a repeat to get electronic coverage.
(3) Notification
(a) Notify the press galleries in writing as far in advance as
possible.
(b) Also notify the wire services and television networks directly at
their downtown offices.
(4) Form
(a) A press conference should be viewed as an open house with
everybody invited and everybody welcome.
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(b) A brief opening statement should be read or summarized.  After
copies of it have been distributed, the questioning should begin.
(1) Leave plenty of time for questions.
(2) Do not restrict the areas of questioning.
(3) Anticipate the questions and have answers prepared.
(c) The normal time for a routine press conference is about one-half
hour.
h. News Releases.
(1) A good news release answers in one page or less the questions where,
when, who, what, how, why, and, for some topics, how much (e.g.,
cost) or how many (e.g., beneficiaries).
(2) A good news release should:
(a) contain the name, telephone number, and e-mail of your press
contact;
(b) be for immediate release (better than embargo);
(c) quote the Member directly;
(d) avoid excessive use of the Member’s name;
(e) avoid needless big words, long sentences, and long paragraphs;
and
(f) make the point quickly, clearly, directly, and then end.
i. The Internet and the Media.
(1) Members and committees can use the Internet to communicate with
media representatives and constituents to explain their views and
positions with respect to oversight activities.  The Internet permits
lawmakers and committees to rely less on traditional journalistic
sources for coverage and more on direct communication with the
citizenry.  
(2) The Internet can be employed in a variety of ways to mobilize public
interest in congressional oversight.  For example, lawmakers can
conduct on-line discussions with interested citizens or committees
can establish their own World Wide Web sites to solicit input from
individuals and organizations about executive branch departments
and programs.
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68 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3, which covers all but three statutory OIGs.  These three operate
under similar but not identical guidelines: in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq; and the Government Printing Office (GPO),
a legislative branch entity.  For further information, see the inspector general website at
[http://www.ignet.gov]; CRS Report 98-141, Statutory Offices of Inspector General: A 20th
Anniversary Review, by Diane T. Duffy and Frederick M. Kaiser; Frederick M. Kaiser, “The
Watchers’ Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General,” International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence, vol. 3, 1989, pp. 55-75; Paul C. Light, Monitoring Government:
Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability (Washington: Brookings Institution,
1993); U.S. General Accounting Office, Inspectors General: Office Consolidation and
Related Issues, GAO Report GAO-02-575 (August 2002); and numerous congressional
hearings, including U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 25th
Anniversary of the Inspector General Act, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington:
GPO, 2003); House Subcommittee on Government Management, The Inspector General Act
of 1978: Twenty Years After Passage, Are The Inspectors General Fulfilling Their Mission?,
hearings, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1999); and Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, The Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later, hearings, 105th Cong.,
2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1998).
H.  Statutory Offices of Inspector General:  Establishment
and Evolution
Statutory offices of inspector general (OIGs) consolidate responsibility for
audits and investigations within a federal department, agency, or other organization.
Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, independent offices, they now
exist in nearly 60 federal establishments and entities, including all departments and
the largest agencies as well as numerous boards and commissions.  Under two major
enactments — the Inspector General Act of 1978 and amendments of 1988 —
inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and authority
to carry out their basic mandate to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.68  Recent statutes,
moreover, have added three OIGs:  for Tax Administration in Treasury, in Homeland
Security, and in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq.  Other laws have
codified Justice IG jurisdiction over the entire department and granted law
enforcement powers to OIGs in establishments. 
Responsibilities.
Inspectors general have three principal responsibilities under the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended:
! conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the establishment;
! providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies
for activities designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of such programs and operations, and preventing and
detecting fraud and abuse in such programs and operations; and
! providing a means for keeping the establishment head and Congress
fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and
the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
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Authority and Duties.
To carry out the purposes of the Inspector General Act, IGs have been granted
broad authority to conduct audits and investigations; access directly all records and
information of the agency; request assistance from other federal, state, and local
government agencies; subpoena information and documents; administer oaths when
taking testimony; hire staff and manage their own resources; and receive and respond
to complaints from agency employees, whose confidentiality is to be protected.  In
addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave law enforcement powers to
criminal investigators in offices headed by presidential appointees.  Following the
terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,
moreover, some IG staff were redeployed to assist in airline security and in terrorist
investigations by the FBI and other agencies. 
Notwithstanding these powers and duties, IGs are not authorized to take
corrective action or make any reforms themselves.  Indeed, the Inspector General
Act, as amended, prohibits the transfer of “program operating responsibilities” to an
IG (5 U.S.C. Appendix 3, Section 9(a)(2)).  The rationale for this prohibition is that
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for IGs to audit or investigate programs and
operations impartially and objectively if they were directly involved in carrying them
out.
Reporting Requirements.
IGs also have important obligations concerning their findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective action.  These include reporting (1) suspected
violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the Attorney General;
(2) semiannually to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (along with his
or her comments) to Congress within 30 days; and (3) “particularly serious or flagrant
problems” immediately to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (along
with comments) to Congress within seven days.  The IG for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), operating under a different statute, must also report to the House and
Senate Select Committees on Intelligence if the Director (or Acting Director) of
Central Intelligence is the focus of an investigation, audit, or inspection. 
By means of these reports and “otherwise,” IGs are to keep the agency head and
Congress fully and currently informed.  Other means of communication include
testifying at congressional hearings; meeting with legislators, officials, and staff; and
responding to congressional requests for information and reports.
Independence.
In addition to having their own powers (e.g., to hire staff and issue subpoenas),
the IGs’ independent status is reinforced in a number of other ways: protection of
their budgets, qualifications on their appointment and removal, prohibitions on
interference with their activities and operations, and a proscription on operating
responsibilities.
Appropriations.  Presidentially appointed IGs in the larger federal agencies
have a separate appropriations account (a separate budget account in the case of the
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CIA) for their offices.  This situation prevents agency administrators from limiting,
transferring, or otherwise reducing IG funding once it has been specified in law.
Appointment and Removal.  Under the Inspector General Act, as amended,
IGs are to be selected without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of
integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial and management
analysis, law, public administration, or investigations.  The CIA IG, who operates
under a different statute, is to be selected under these criteria as well as prior
experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in compliance with the security
standards of the agency.
Presidentially appointed IGs in the larger federal establishments who are
confirmed by the Senate can be removed only by the President.  When so doing, the
President must communicate the reasons to Congress.  However, IGs in the (usually)
smaller, designated federal entities are appointed by the agency head and can be
removed by this officer, who must notify Congress in writing when exercising the
power.  In the U.S. Postal Service, by comparison, the governors appoint the
inspector general — the only statutory IG with a set term (7 years).  This IG can be
removed with the written concurrence of at least seven of the nine governors, but
only for cause — again, the only statutory IG having such a qualification governing
removal.
Supervision.  IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head,
reporting exclusively to the head or to the officer next in rank if such authority is
delegated.  With only a few specified exceptions, neither the agency head nor the
officer next in line “shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating,
carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena
during the course of any audit or investigation.”
Under the IG Act, as amended, the heads of only five agencies — the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S.
Postal Service — may prevent the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an
audit or investigation, or issuing a subpoena, in order to preserve national security
interests or to protect on-going criminal investigations, among other specified
reasons.  When exercising this power, the department head must transmit an
explanatory statement for such action to the House Government Reform  Committee,
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and other appropriate congressional
panels within 30 days.  Under the CIA IG Act, the Director of Central Intelligence
may similarly prohibit the CIA IG from conducting investigations, audits, or
inspections and then must notify the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of
the reasons for such action within seven days.
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Coordination and Controls.
Several presidential orders have been issued to improve coordination among the
IGs and provide a means for investigating charges of wrongdoing by the IGs
themselves and other top echelon officers.  In early 1981, President Ronald Reagan
established the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) to coordinate
and enhance efforts at promoting integrity and efficiency in government programs
and to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse (E.O. 12301).  Chaired by the
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the PCIE is composed of
the existing statutory IGs plus other officials from relevant agencies, now including
the Departments of Defense and Justice as well as the Office of Personnel
Management, the Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management, the
Director of the Office of Government Ethics, and the Special Counsel.  In 1992,
following the establishment of new IG offices in designated federal entities, a parallel
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) was created for these new IGs
and other appropriate officials.  Both the PCIE and the ECIE currently operate under
E.O. 12805, issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1992.  A separate Intelligence
Community Inspectors General Forum — a coordinative body of the inspectors
general from the IC agencies along with observers from the FBI and several Defense
units — has been established in the meantime.  Co-chaired by the IGs from DoD and
CIA, it meets quarterly to promote information sharing and enhance coordination.
Investigations of alleged wrongdoing by IGs themselves or other high-ranking
officials in an office of inspector general (under the IG act) are conducted by a
special Integrity Committee, composed of PCIE and ECIE members and chaired by
the FBI representative (E.O. 12993, issued by President Clinton in 1966).  If deemed
warranted, the panel refers complaints to be investigated to an executive agency with
appropriate jurisdiction, usually the FBI, or a special investigative unit composed of
council members.
Establishment.
Statutory offices of inspector general currently exist in 59 federal establishments
and entities, including all 15 cabinet departments; major executive branch agencies;
independent regulatory commissions; various government corporations and
foundations; and one legislative branch agency: the Government Printing Office
(GPO).  All but three of the OIGs — in the CIA, CPA, and GPO — are directly and
explicitly under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
Each office is headed by an inspector general, who is appointed in one of two
ways:
(1) 30 are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in the
federal establishments:  all cabinet departments and the larger agencies.
(See Table 2.)
(2) 29 are appointed by the head of the entity in the 27 designated federal
entities — usually smaller foundations, boards, and commissions — and
in two other agencies, where the IGs operate under separate but parallel
authority:  CPA, whose IG is appointed by the Secretary of Defense after
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consultation with the Secretary of State; and GPO, a legislative branch
office, whose IG is appointed by the Public Printer.  (See Table 3.)
Table 2.  Statutes Establishing Inspectors General Nominated by
the President and Confirmed by the Senate, 1976-Present
(current offices are in italic)a
Year Statute Establishment
1976 P.L. 94-505 Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services)
1977 P.L. 95-91 Energy
1978 P.L. 95-452 Agriculture, Commerce, Community Services Administration,b
Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, Transportation,
Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Small Business
Administration, Veterans Administration (now the Veterans Affairs
Department)
1979 P.L. 96-88 Education
1980 P.L. 96-294 U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporationb
1980 P.L. 96-465 Statec
1981 P.L. 97-113 Agency for International Developmentd
1982 P.L. 97-252 Defense
1983 P.L. 98-76 Railroad Retirement Board
1986 P.L. 99-399 U.S. Information Agencyb,c
1987 P.L. 100-213 Arms Control and Disarmament Agencyb,c
1988 P.L. 100-504 Justice,e Treasury, Federal Emergency Management Administration,b,f
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management
1989 P.L. 101-73 Resolution Trust Corporationb
1989 P.L. 101-193 Central Intelligence Agencya
1993 P.L. 103-82 Corporation for National and Community Service
1993 P.L. 103-204 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1994 P.L. 103-296 Social Security Administration
1994 P.L. 103-325 Community Development Financial Institutions Fundb
1998 P.L. 105-206 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administrationg
2000 P.L. 106-422 Tennessee Valley Authorityh
2002 P.L. 107-189 Export-Import Bank
2002 P.L. 107-296 Homeland Securityf
a. All except the CIA IG are directly under the 1978 Inspector General Act, as amended.
b. CSA, Synfuels Corporation, USIA, ACDA, RTC, CDFIF, and FEMA have been abolished or transferred.
c. The State Department IG had also served as the IG for ACDA.  In 1998, P.L. 105-277 abolished ACDA
and USIA and transferred their functions to the State Department.  The act also brought the
Broadcasting Board of Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau under the jurisdiction
of the State Department Inspector General.
d. The Inspector General in AID may also conduct reviews, investigations, and inspections of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (22 U.S.C. 2199(e)).
e. In 2002, P.L. 107-273 expanded the jurisdiction of the Justice OIG to cover all department components,
including DEA and the FBI.
f. P.L. 107-296, which established the Homeland Security Department, transferred FEMA’s functions to
it and also granted law enforcement powers to OIG criminal investigators in establishments.
g. The OIG for Tax Administration in Treasury now is the only case where a separate statutory OIG exists
within an establishment or entity that is otherwise covered by its own statutory office.
h. P.L. 106-422, which redesignated TVA as an establishment, also created, in the Treasury Department,
a Criminal Investigator Academy to train IG staff and an Inspector General Forensic Laboratory.
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Table 3.  Designated Federal Entities and Other Agencies with 
Statutory IGs Appointed by the Head of the Entity or Agency
(current offices are in italic)a
ACTIONb Federal Trade Commission
Amtrak Government Printing Officea
Appalachian Regional Commission Interstate Commerce Commissionf
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Legal Services Corporation
Board for International Broadcastingc National Archives and Records Administration
Coalition Provisional Authority (in Iraq)a National Credit Union Administration
Commodity Futures Trading Commission National Endowment for the Arts
Consumer Product Safety Commission National Endowment for the Humanities
Corporation for Public Broadcasting National Labor Relations Board
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission National Science Foundation
Farm Credit Administration Panama Canal Commissiong
Federal Communications Commission Peace Corps
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationd Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Federal Election Commission Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Home Loan Bank Boarde Smithsonian Institution
Federal Housing Finance Boarde Tennessee Valley Authorityh
Federal Labor Relations Authority United States International Trade Commission
Federal Maritime Commission United States Postal Servicei
a. All agencies — except CPA (P.L. 108-106) and GPO (P.L. 100-504) — are considered “designated federal entities”
and placed directly under the 1978 IG Act by the 1988 Amendments (P.L. 100-504) or subsequent enactments.
The CPA Office is authorized to remain in effect for six months after the dissolution of the full CPA, which
occurred on June 28, 2004.
b. In 1993, P.L. 103-82 merged ACTION into the new Corporation for National and Community Service.
c. The BIB was abolished by P.L. 103-236 and its functions transferred to the  International Broadcasting Bureau
within USIA, which was later abolished and its functions transferred to the State Department.
d. In 1993, P.L. 103-204 made the IG in FDIC a presidential appointee, subject to Senate confirmation.
e. In 1989, P.L. 101-73 abolished the FHLBB and placed the new FHFB the 1988 IG Act Amendments.
f. The ICC was abolished in 1995 by P.L. 104-88.
g. The Panama Canal Commission, replaced by the Panama Canal Commission Transition Authority, was phased out,
when United States responsibility for the Canal was transferred to the Republic of Panama (22 U.S.C. 3611).
h. P.L. 106-422 redesignated TVA as a federal establishment.
i. In 1996, the U.S. Postal Service Inspector General was separated from the Chief Postal Inspector and now exists as
an independent position.  The IG is appointed by, and can be removed by, the governors.
Table 4. Tabulation of Existing Federal Establishments, 
Entities, or Agencies with Statutory IGs
Controlling Statute IGs Nominated by Presidentand Confirmed by Senate
IGs Appointed by Head
of Entity or Agency Total
1978 IG Act,
as amended 29 27 56
Other statutes 1a 2b  3
Total 30 29 59
a. CIA IG, P.L. 101-193.
b. CPA IG, P.L. 108-106, and GPO IG, P.L. 100-504. 
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I.  Reporting, Consultation, and Other Sources of Information
Congressional oversight of the executive is dependent to a large degree upon
information supplied by the agencies being overseen.  In the contemporary era,
reporting and prior consultation provisions have increased in an attempt to ensure
congressional access to information, statistics, and other data on the workings of the
executive.  The result is that approximately 4,000 reports arrive annually on Capitol
Hill.  Concerns about unnecessary, duplicative, and wasteful reports, however, have
prompted efforts to eliminate these.  One such initiative, in part stimulated by earlier
recommendations from the Vice President’s National Performance Review and from
the GAO,  resulted in the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Acts of 1995 and
1998.  Nonetheless, reductions in the number of required reports have not kept pace
with new or continuing requirements, such as those identified in the 2001 act to
Prevent the Elimination of Certain Reports (P.L. 107-74).
1.  Reporting Requirements.  
Reporting requirements affect executive and administrative agencies and
officers, including the President; independent boards and commissions; and federally
chartered corporations (as well as the judiciary).  These statutory provisions vary in
terms of the specificity, detail, and type of information that Congress demands.
Reports may be required at periodic intervals, such as semiannually or at the end of
a fiscal year, or submitted only if and when a specific event, activity, or set of
conditions exists.   The reports may also call upon an agency, commission, or officer
to
a. make a study and recommendations about a particular problem or concern;
b. alert Congress or particular committees and subcommittees in advance
about a proposed or planned activity or operation;
c. provide information about specific on-going or just-completed operations,
projects, or programs; or
d. summarize an agency’s activities for the year or the prior six months.
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Examples of Reporting Requirements in Law
Initial Requirement in the 1789 Treasury Department Act:
“That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury . . . to make report,
and give information to either branch of the legislature, in person or in
writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to him by the
Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office
. . . .”  1 Stat. 65-66 (1789)
Reporting on Covert Action in the 1991 Intelligence Oversight Act:
“The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully
and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States,
including any significant anticipated intelligence activity . . .
(1) The President shall ensure that any finding [authorizing a covert
action] shall be reported to the intelligence committees as soon as possible
after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2) and paragraph (3).
(2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to
the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests
of the United States, the finding may be reported to the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate, and such other members of the congressional
leadership as may be included by the President.
(3) Whenever a finding is not reported [in advance to the
committees], the President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in
a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving
prior notice.” 105 Stat. 441-443 (1991)
2.  Prior Consultation.
In the past, explicit prior consultation provisions were rarely incorporated into
law.  However, there appears to be an increase in statutory provisions as well as
in committee reports that accompany legislation specifying conditions for such
discussion (see box).
A provision in the Conference Committee report on the 1978 Ethics in Government Act illustrates this
development: “The conferees expect the Attorney General to consult with the Judiciary Committees of both
Houses of Congress before substantially expanding the scope of authority or mandate of the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division.”
3.  Other Significant Sources of Information.
A number of general management laws provide for additional sources of
information, data, and material that can aid congressional oversight endeavors.
a. Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 2838).  The
CFO act is designed to improve financial management throughout the
federal government, through various procedures and mechanisms.
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1. The act created two new posts within OMB, along with a new
position of chief financial officer in 23 major federal agencies,
including all Cabinet departments; a 24th agency has since been
added.  Sixteen of these posts are filled by presidential
appointees subject to Senate confirmation; these are in the 14
Cabinet departments plus the Environmental Protection Agency
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.  The
remaining eight CFO positions are in:  the Agency for
International Development, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, General Services Administration, National Science
Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, and the
Social Security Administration.
2. The CFO act also provides for improvements in agency systems
of accounting, financial management, and internal controls to
assure the issuance of reliable financial information and to deter
fraud, as well as waste and abuse of government resources.
3. The enactment, furthermore, calls for the production of
complete, reliable, timely, and consistent financial information
for use by both the executive and the legislature in the financing,
management, and evaluation of federal programs.
b. Government Performance and Results Act (107 Stat. 285).
This act — commonly known by the acronym GPRA or the Results
Act — requires federal agencies to submit long-range strategic plans
and follow-up annual performance plans.
1. Strategic Plans.  The strategic plans specify five-year goals and
objectives for agencies, based on their basic missions and
underlying statutory or other authority of the agency.  These
plans, initially required in 1997, were to be developed in
consultation with relevant congressional offices and with
information from “stakeholders” and then submitted to
Congress.
2. Annual Performance Plans and Goals.  Based on these long-term
plans, which may be modified if conditions and agency
responsibilities change, the agencies are directed to set annual
performance goals and to measure the results of their programs
in achieving these goals.  The objective of GPRA is to focus on
outcomes — i.e., the results and accomplishments of a program,
such as a decline in the use of illegal drugs for an anti-drug
abuse program — rather than outputs, i.e. other measures of
agency activity and operations, such as the number of anti-drug
agents in the field.  The annual plans, which are also available
to Congress, began with FY1999; the follow-up reports, which
began in 2000, are required six months after the end of the fiscal
year.
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c. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 (110 Stat. 857-874).  Subtitle E of this act established, for the
first time, a mechanism by which Congress can review and
disapprove virtually any federal rule or regulation.  It requires that:
1. All agencies promulgating a covered rule must submit a report
to each house of Congress and the Comptroller General,
containing specific information about the rule before it can go
into effect. 
2. Rules designated by the Office of Management and Budget as
“major” may normally not go into effect until 60 days after
submission, while non-major rules may become effective “as
otherwise allowed in law,” usually 30 days after publication in
the Federal Register.
3. All covered rules are subject to fast-track disapproval by
passage of a joint resolution, even if they have already gone into
effect, for a period of at least 60 days.  Upon enactment of such
a joint resolution, no new rule that is “substantially the same” as
the disapproved rule may  be issued until it is specifically
authorized by a law enacted subsequent to the disapproval of the
original rule.
4. There can be no judicial review of actions taken (or not taken)
by Congress, the Comptroller General, or OMB; but the failure
of an agency to submit a covered rule for congressional review
may be subject to sanction by a federal court.
d. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 163).  This most
recent version of paperwork reduction legislation builds on a heritage
of statutory controls over government paperwork that dates to 1940.
1. Among other things, the current act and its 1980 predecessor
more clearly defined the oversight responsibilities of OMB’s
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); it is
authorized to develop and administer uniform information
policies in order to ensure the availability and accuracy of
agency data collection.
2. Congressional oversight has been strengthened through its
subsequent reauthorizations and the requirement for Senate
confirmation of OIRA’s administrator.
e. Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982
(96 Stat. 814).  FMFIA is designed to improve the government’s
ability to manage its programs by strengthening internal management
and financial controls, accounting systems, and financial reports.
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1. The internal accounting systems are to be consistent with
standards that the Comptroller General prescribes, including a
requirement that all assets be safeguarded against waste, fraud,
loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation.
2. FMFIA also provides for ongoing evaluations of the internal
control and accounting systems that protect federal programs
against waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
3. The enactment further mandates that the head of each agency
report annually to the President and Congress on the condition
of these systems and on agency actions to correct any material
weakness which the reports identify.
4. FMFIA is also connected to the Chief Financial Officers Act of
1990, which calls upon the director of OMB to submit a
financial management status report to appropriate congressional
committees; part of this report is to be a summary of reports on
internal accounting and administrative control systems as
required by FMFIA.
f. Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (104 Stat.
1058).  This enactment is intended to improve efficiency,
effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of funds between the federal
government and state governments.  Its fundamental objective is to
prevent either level of government from engaging in cash
management practices that allow it to earn interest on cash reserves
at the expense of the other.
g. Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996
(110 Stat. 679).  This act requires that agencies buy the best and
most cost-effective information technology available.  To do so, the
act gave more responsibility to individual agencies, revoking the
primary role that the General Services Administration had played
previously, and established the position of chief information officer
(CIO) in federal agencies to provide relevant advice to agency heads.
h. Federal Advisory Committee Act.  Congress formally
acknowledged the merits of using advisory committees to obtain
expert views drawn from business, academic, government, and other
interests when it enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) in 1972 (5 U.S.C. Appendix; 86 Stat. 700).  Congressional
enactment of FACA established the first requirements for the
management and oversight of federal advisory committees to ensure
impartial and relevant expertise. As required by FACA, the General
Services Administration (GSA) administers and provides
management guidelines for advisory committees.  GSA also submits
an annual report to the President and Congress, based on the
information provided by the federal agencies concerning the
meetings, costs, and membership of advisory committees. During
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FY2003, GSA reported a total of 953 advisory committees, with
31,385 individuals serving as members during the year.  On March
14, 2000, GSA announced the elimination of its annual report on
advisory committees, relying instead on its website to make available
the detailed reports covering each committee’s activities during the
fiscal year [http://fido.gov/facadatabase].  GSA also issues an annual
summary report for Congress pertaining to advisory committee
management and performance.  
 
i. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.  The
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
replaced what has been commonly referred to as the Government
Information Security Reform Act (GISRA),which expired at the end
of the 107th Congress.  Both GISRA and FISMA represent an effort
by Congress to improve federal agency compliance with information
security standards and guidelines.  Congress put into statute certain
requirements, including a directive that federal agencies submit their
information security programs to an annual independent review, along
with a requirement that the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget report the results of these reviews to Congress.  
j. Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002.  The Accountability
of Tax Dollars Act (ATDA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-289; 116 Stat. 2049)
was intended “to expand the types of Federal agencies that are
required to prepare audited financial statements to all executive
branch agencies in the federal government.”  In fact, ATDA brings
almost all executive branch agencies under the requirement for
preparation of annual audited financial statements that previously
applied only to the 24 major departments and agencies covered by the
Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act.  Specifically, Section 2(a)
changes the list of agencies covered by the audited annual financial
statements requirement in 31 U.S.C. § 3515 by deleting the
cross-reference to CFO Act agencies and inserting “each covered
executive agency.”  
k. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.
The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
(FFMIA) (110 Stat. 3009-389; 31 U.S.C. § 3512 note) incorporates
in statute certain financial management system requirements already
established as executive branch policy.  The law also requires
auditors to report on agency compliance with these requirements, and
agency heads and management to correct deficiencies within certain
time periods.  (FFMIA) reflects an ongoing effort to reform financial
management in the federal government.  The 1996 law builds upon
prior legislation, including the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990,
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and the
Government Management Reform Act of 1994.  
l. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.  After considerable
debate, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4; 109 Stat.
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48-71; 2  U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571) was enacted early in the 104th
Congress.  Generally, unfunded intergovernmental mandates include
responsibilities or duties that federal programs, standards, or
requirements impose on governments at other levels without
providing for the payment of the costs of carrying out these
responsibilities or duties.  The intent of the mandate legislation was
to limit the ability of the federal government to impose costs on state
and local governments through unfunded mandates.  The enactment
has three components: revised congressional procedures regarding
future mandates; new requirements for federal agency regulatory
actions; and authorization for a study of existing mandates to evaluate
their current usefulness. The primary objective was to create
procedures that would retard and spotlight, if not stop, congressional
authorization of new unfunded mandates on state and local
governments.  
J.  Resolutions of Inquiry
The House of Representatives can call upon the executive for factual
information through resolutions of inquiry.
1. This is a simple resolution, approved by only the House.  
2. Resolutions of inquiry are addressed to either the President or heads of
departments and agencies to supply specific factual information to the
chamber.  The resolutions usually “request” the President or “direct”
administrative heads to supply such information.  In calling upon the
President for information, especially about foreign affairs, the qualifying
phrase — “if not incompatible with the public interest” — is often added.
3. Such resolutions are to ask for facts, documents, or specific information;
these devices are not to request an opinion or require an investigation (see
box).
4. Even when a committee of jurisdiction reports a resolution of inquiry
adversely, or succeeds in tabling the resolution on the House floor, it is
often the case that the Administration has substantially complied with the
resolution.  
5. Resolutions of inquiry can be instrumental in triggering other
congressional methods of obtaining information, such as through
supplemental hearings or the regular legislative process.  
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Resolutions of Inquiry in Practice
The initial resolution of inquiry was approved on March 24, 1796, when the House
sought documents in connection with the Jay Treaty negotiations:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be
requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions
to the minister of the United States, who negotiated the
treaty with the King of Great Britain . . . together with the
correspondence and other documents relative to the said
treaty; excepting such of the said papers as any existing
negotiation may render improper to be delivered.  (Journal
of the House of Representatives, 4th Cong., 1st sess., March
24, 1796.  p. 480.)
A contemporary illustration occurred on March 1, 1995, when the House adopted H.
Res. 80, as amended (104th Cong., 1st sess.), 407-21.  The resolution sought information
about the Mexican peso crisis at the time and an Administration plan to use up to $20
billion in resources from the Exchange Stabilization Fund to help stabilize the Mexican
currency and financial system.  The resolution read:
“Resolved, That the President, is hereby requested to provide
the House of Representatives (consistent with the rules of the
House), not later than 14 days after the adoption of this
resolution, the following documents in the possession of the
executive branch, if not inconsistent with he public interest
. . .” The House request then specified the matters that the
documents were to cover: The condition of the Mexican
economy; consultations between the Government of Mexico,
on the one hand, and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
and/or the International Monetary fund, on the other; market
policies and tax policies of the Mexican Government; and
repayment agreements between Mexico and the United
States; among other things.
K.  Limitations and Riders on Appropriations 
Congress uses a two-step legislative procedure: authorization of programs in
bills reported by legislative committees followed by the financing of those programs
in bills reported by the Committees on Appropriations.  Congressional rules generally
keep the two stages distinct and sequential.  Authorizations should not be in general
appropriation bills, nor appropriations in authorization measures.  However, there are
various exceptions to the general principle that Congress should not make policy
through the appropriations process.  One exception is the practice of permitting
“limitations” in an appropriations bill.  “Riders” (language extraneous to the subject
of the bill) are also added to control agency actions.
1. Limitations.  Although House rules forbid in any general appropriations
bill a provision “changing existing law,” certain “limitations” may be
admitted.  “Just as the House under its rules may decline to appropriate for
a purpose authorized by law, so it may by limitation prohibit the use of the
money for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it.”
Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of
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Representatives, H. Doc. No. 106-320, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. §1053
(2001).  Limitations can be an effective device in oversight by
strengthening Congress’s ability to exercise control over federal spending
and to reduce unnecessary or undesired expenditures.  Under House Rule
XXI, no provision changing existing law can be reported in any general
appropriation bill “except germane provisions that retrench expenditures
by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill” (the Holman
rule).  Rule XXI was amended in 1983 in an effort to restrict the number
of limitations on appropriations bills.  The rule was changed again in 1995
by granting the majority leader a central role in determining consideration
of limitation amendments.  The procedures for limitation in the House are
set forth in the Congressional Record for January 6, 1999, p. H29.  A well-
known limitation is the Hyde amendment, which since the 1970s has
restricted the use of Medicaid funds to fund abortions for indigent women
(see box).
“None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall  be  expended  for  any abortion ... [except] (1) if  the
pregnancy  is  the  result of  an  act of  rape or  incest; or  (2) in  the case where a woman suffers  from  a
physical  disorder,  physical  injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical  condition
caused by  or  arising  from  the pregnancy itself, that would, as certified by a physician, place the woman in
danger of death unless an abortion is performed.”  Labor-HHS Appropriations  Act  for fiscal 1998, 111 Stat.
1516, sec. 509 & 510 (1997).
2. Riders.  Unlike limitations, legislative riders are extraneous to the subject
matter of the bill to which they are added.  Riders appear in both
authorization bills and appropriations bills.  In the latter, they may be
subject to a point of order in the House on the ground that they are
attempts to place legislation in an appropriations bill.  In the Senate, Rule
XVI prohibits on a point of order the addition to general appropriations
bills of amendments that are legislative or nongermane.  Both chambers
have procedures to waive these prohibitions.
L.  Legislative Veto and Advance Notice
Many acts of Congress have delegated authority to the executive branch on the
condition that proposed executive actions be submitted to Congress for review and
possible disapproval before they can be put into effect.  This way of ensuring
continuing oversight of policy areas follows two paths: the legislative veto and
advance notification.
1. Legislative Veto 
Beginning in 1932, Congress delegated authority to the executive branch
with the condition that proposed executive actions would be first
submitted to Congress and subjected to disapproval by either house or
disapproval by both houses acting through a concurrent resolution.  Over
the years, other types of legislative veto were added, allowing Congress to
control executive branch actions without having to enact a law.  In 1983,
the Supreme Court ruled that the legislative veto was unconstitutional on
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the ground that all exercises of legislative power that affect the rights,
duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must satisfy
the constitutional requirements of  bicameralism and presentment of a bill
or resolution to the President for his signature or veto.  INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983).  Despite this ruling, Congress has continued to enact
proscribed legislative vetoes and it has also relied on informal
arrangements to provide comparable controls.
a. Legislative Vetoes in Statute
Congress responded to Chadha by converting some of the one-house
and two-house legislative vetoes to joint resolutions of approval or
disapproval, thus satisfying the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.  However, Congress continues to rely on legislative
vetoes.  Since the Chadha decision, more than 400 legislative vetoes
have been enacted into public law, usually in appropriations acts.
These legislative vetoes are exercised by the Appropriations
Committees.  Typically, funds may not be used or an executive action
may not begin until the Appropriations Committees have approved or,
at least, not disapproved the planned action, often within a specified
time limit (see box).
For the appropriation account “Transportation Administrative Service Center,” no assessments may be levied
against any program, budget activity, subactivity or project funded by this statute “unless notice of such
assessments and the basis therefore are presented to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and
are approved by such Committees.”  Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
2001, 114 Stat. 1356A-2 (2000).
b. Informal Legislative Vetoes
Unlike a formal legislative veto, where the arrangement is spelled out
in the law, the informal legislative veto occurs where an executive
official pledges not to proceed with an activity until Congress or
certain committees agree to it.  An example of this appeared during
the 101st Congress; in the “bipartisan accord” on funding the contras
in Nicaragua, the Administration pledged that no funds would be
obligated beyond November 30, 1989, unless affirmed by letter from
the relevant authorization and appropriations committees and the
bipartisan leadership of Congress.
2. Advance Notification or Report-and-Wait
Statutory provisions may stipulate that before a particular activity can  be
undertaken by the executive branch or funds obligated, Congress must first
be advised or informed, ordinarily through a full written statement, of what
is being proposed.  These statutory provisions usually provide for a period
of time during which action by the executive must be deferred, giving
Congress an opportunity to pass legislation prohibiting the pending action
or using political pressure to cause executive officials to retract or modify
CRS-96
the proposed action.  This type of “report and wait” provision has been
upheld by the Supreme Court.  The Court noted: “The value of the
reservation of the power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations
before they become effective is well understood by Congress.  It is
frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the
delegation squares with the Congressional purpose.”  Sibbach v. Wilson,
312 U.S. 1 (1941).  An example appeared in the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, which was directed toward South Africa’s political
persecution  of Nelson Mandela and other dissidents (see box).
“The President may suspend or modify any of the measures required by this title or section 501(c) or section
504(b) thirty days after he determines, and so reports to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that the Government of South Africa has
[taken certain actions] unless the Congress enacts within such 30-day period, in accordance with section 602
of this Act, a joint resolution disapproving the determination of the President under this subsection.”  100
Stat. 103, sec. 311 (1986).
M.  Independent Counsel
The statutory provisions for the appointment of an independent counsel
(formerly called “special prosecutor”) were originally enacted as Title VI of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, and codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.  The
independent counsel was reauthorized in 1983, 1987, and 1994.  It expired on June
30, 1999.  The mechanisms of the independent counsel law were triggered by the
receipt of information by the Attorney General that alleged a violation of any federal
criminal law (other than certain misdemeanors or “infractions”) by a person covered
by the act.  Certain high-level federal officials, including the President, Vice
President, and heads of departments, were automatically covered by the law.  In
addition, the Attorney General had discretion to seek an independent counsel for any
person for whom there may exist a personal, financial or political conflict of interest
for Justice Department personnel to investigate; and the Attorney General could seek
an independent counsel for any Member of Congress when the Attorney General
deemed it to be in the “public interest.”
After conducting a limited review of the matter (a 30-day threshold review of
the credibility and specificity of the charges, and a subsequent 90-day preliminary
investigation, with a possible 60-day extension), the Attorney General, if he or she
believed that “further investigation is warranted”, would apply to a special “division
of the court,” a federal three-judge panel appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, requesting that the division appoint an independent counsel.  The
Attorney General of the United States was the only officer in the government
authorized to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel.  The special
division of the court selected and appointed the independent counsel, and designated
his or her prosecutorial jurisdiction, based on the information provided the court by
the Attorney General.  The independent counsel had the full range of investigatory
and prosecutorial powers and functions of the Attorney General or other Department
of Justice employees.  
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Collisions between Congress and Independent Counsels
      “The  Congress’  role  here  is  terribly  important.   It  is  for  them  to  present to  the  public  as  soon
as possible  a  picture  of the actual facts as to the Iran/Contra matter.  This is  so because there has  been
so  much  exposed  without sufficient  clarity   to  clear up  the questions.  There is a general
apprehension  that this  is  damaging.  Congress properly   wants  to  bring  this  to  an end  soon  and that
gives them  a  real feeling  of   urgency  for  their  investigation.
      “[The  House  and  Senate  Iran-Contra  Committees]  are  trying  to  provide  a factual  predicate
which  will  enable  Congress to  decide  intelligently  whether there  is  a  need  for  a  statutory
amendment  or  for  a  closer  oversight  over covert  activities  and  other  matters . . . As they  quite
properly  point  out,  they cannot   wait   for   Independent   Counsel  to  satisfy  himself   as  to   whether
 a crime  may   or   may   not   have   been   committed.  They  have  a  problem  of their  own.
     “. . . We   are  proceeding  with  much  greater  detail  than  Congress  would think  necessary  for their
purposes.   We  come  into  collision  when  the  question of  immunity   arises. 
      “. . . There  is  a greater  pressure  on  Congress to grant immunity  to  central figures than  there is
for   Independent Counsel.  Over  the  last  three  months,  we have  had  long  negotiations  over  this
question  of  immunity . . .
      “If  the  Congress decides to grant immunity, there is no way that it can  be avoided.  They  have  the
last  word  and  that is  a  proper  distribution  of    power. . . .
      “. . .The  reason  why  Congress  must have this power to  confer  immunity  is because  of  the
importance  of  their  role.  The legislative branch has the power  to decide  whether  it  is  more
important  perhaps  even  to  destroy  a  prosecution than  to  hold  back  testimony  they   need.”
Lawrence  E.  Walsh,  “The  Independent  Counsel  and  the  Separation of Powers,”  Houston  Law
Review, v.  25  (1988):1.
There was no specific term of appointment for independent counsels.  They
could serve for as long as it took to complete their duties concerning that specific
matter within their defined and limited jurisdiction.  Once a matter was completed,
the independent counsel filed a final report.  The special division of the court could
also find that the independent counsel’s work was completed and terminate the
office.  A periodic review of an independent counsel for such determination was to
be made by the special division of the court.  An independent counsel, prior to the
completion of his or her duties, could be removed from office (other than by
impeachment and conviction) only by the Attorney General of the United States for
good cause, physical or mental disability, or other impairing condition, and such
removal could be appealed to the court.  The procedures for appointing and removing
the independent counsel were upheld by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Investigation by the independent counsel could compete with parallel efforts by
congressional committees to examine the same issue.  Congress could decide to
accommodate the needs of the independent counsel, such as delaying a legislative
investigation until the independent counsel completed certain phases of an inquiry
(see box on previous page).
Although Congress could call on the Attorney General to apply for an
independent counsel by a written request from the House or Senate Judiciary
Committee, or a majority of members of either party of those committees, the
Attorney General is not required to begin a preliminary investigation or to apply for
an independent counsel in response to such a request. However, in such cases the
Justice Department was required to provide certain information to the requesting
committee. 
CRS-98
The independent counsel was directed by statutory language to submit to
Congress an annual report on the activities of such independent counsel, including
the progress of investigations and any prosecutions.  Although it was recognized that
certain information would have to be kept confidential, the statute stated that
“information adequate to justify the expenditures that the office of the independent
counsel has made” should be provided.  28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2).
The conduct of an independent counsel was subject to congressional oversight
and an independent counsel was required to cooperate with that oversight.  28 U.S.C.
§ 595(a)(1).  In addition, the independent counsel was required to report to the House
of Representatives any “substantial and credible” information that may constitute
grounds for any impeachment.  28 U.S.C. § 595(c).  On September 11, 1998,
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr forwarded to the House a report concluding
that President Clinton may have committed impeachable offenses.  The House passed
two articles of impeachment (perjury and obstruction of justice), but the Senate voted
only 45 to 55 on the perjury charge and 50 to 50 on the obstruction of justice charge,
both votes short of the two-thirds majority required under the Constitution.
The independent counsel statute expired in 1992, partly because of criticism
directed at Lawrence Walsh’s investigation of Iran-Contra.  The statute was
reauthorized in 1994, but objections to the investigations conducted by Kenneth Starr
into Whitewater, Monica Lewinsky, and other matters, put Congress under pressure
to let the statute lapse on June 30, 1999.
Unless Congress in the future reauthorizes the independent counsel, the only
available option for an independent counsel is to have the Attorney General invoke
existing authority to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate a particular matter.
For example, when the independent counsel statute expired in 1992 and was not
reauthorized until 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed Robert Fiske in 1993
to investigate the Clintons’ involvement in Whitewater and the death of White House
aide Vincent Foster.  On July 9, 1999 Attorney General Reno promulgated
regulations concerning the appointment of outside, temporary counsels, to be called
“Special Counsels,” in certain circumstances to conduct investigations and possible
prosecutions of certain sensitive matters, or matters which may raise a conflict for the
Justice Department (28 C.F.R. Part 600).  Such special counsels will have
substantially less independence than the statutory independent General, including
removal for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for
other good cause, including violation of Department policies.”
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V.  Oversight Information Sources
and Consultant Services
Congress calls upon a variety of sources for information and analysis to support
its oversight activities.  Most of this assistance is provided by legislative support
agencies:  Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the
Government Accountability Office.  In addition, the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel
and House General Counsel are valuable oversight resources.  A range of outside
interest groups and research organizations also provide rich sources of information.
A.  Congressional Research Service (CRS)
1. CRS Mission Statement
“The Congressional Research Service provides the Congress, throughout
the legislative process, comprehensive and reliable legislative research,
analysis, and information services that are timely, objective, nonpartisan,
and confidential, thereby contributing to an informed national legislature.”
2.  Organization
CRS is organized into six research divisions and five specialized offices.
The research divisions are American Law; Domestic Social Policy; Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade; Government and Finance; Information
Research; and Resources, Science, and Industry.
3.  Staff of CRS
CRS has 700 authorized full-time equivalents (FTEs) on its permanent
staff.  The professional staff are diverse, including, among others, attorneys,
economists, engineers, social science analysts, information scientists,
librarians, defense and foreign affairs analysts, political scientists, public
administrators, and physical and biological scientists. 
4. CRS Work for Congress
CRS provides the following services:
Analytical and Research Services.
a. Policy analysis and research
CRS staff anticipates and responds to congressional needs for policy analysis,
research and information in an interdisciplinary, integrated manner.  CRS provides
timely and objective responses to congressional inquiries for policy analysis, research
and information at every stage of the legislative process.
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Legislative attorneys and paralegal staff respond to congressional needs for legal
information and analysis to support the legislative, oversight, and representational
functions of Congress.
b. Information research
Expert information research specialists and resource specialists are available to
provide information research and reference assistance.  The staff also provides copies
of articles in newspapers, journals, legal and legislative documents and offers
assistance with a wide variety of electronic files.
c. Briefings, seminars, and workshops
CRS conducts briefings, seminars, and workshops for Members of Congress and
their staffs.  On these occasions CRS analysts and other experts discuss public policy
issues, international concerns, and the legislative process.
Briefings.  CRS analysts and specialists are available to give one-on-one
briefings to Members and staff on public policy issues, the legislative process,
congressional office operations, committee matters, or general orientation to
CRS.
Issue seminars and workshops.  In anticipation of congressional interest or at
the request of a Member or committee, CRS organizes and conducts seminars
and workshops on issues of current interest to Members and staff of Congress.
CRS and outside experts participate in these events with Members and staff.
Federal Law Update.  This series, offered twice yearly by the American Law
Division, focuses on developments in federal law and issues before the Supreme
Court.  The series can meet continuing legal education (CLE) requirements in
some states.
CRS Legislative Institutes.  This three-part series provides training in the work
of Congress and the legislative process.  Topics include the federal budget
process, committee system and procedures, floor procedures, amendments, and
resolutions.  In the Graduate Legislative Institute, participants simulate
congressional proceedings as “members of the CRS Congress” and gain
experience in procedures by moving bills through the legislative process.
Public Policy Issues Institute.  Held at the beginning of each session of the
Congress, this program provides introductory briefings and discussions by CRS
staff on issues of legislative significance to the Congress.
District and Staff Institutes.  These institutes provide orientation for staff of
district offices that include discussions of CRS services, the legislative and
budget processes, casework, Member allowances, ethics, and franking.  The
program is supported by the House and Senate.
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New Member Seminar.  Every two years CRS offers new Members an
orientation seminar on public policy issues.  These sessions are held in January
at the beginning of each new Congress.
For additional information about CRS seminars and events, call 7-7904.
CRS Products.
a. Customized Memoranda
Confidential memoranda prepared for a specific office are a major form of CRS
written communication.  These memoranda are solely for the use of the requesting
office and are not distributed further unless permission has been given by that  office.
Memoranda are often used by CRS attorneys and analysts to respond to inquiries
focused on legislative and policy matters of individual Member interest.
b. CRS Reports and Issue Briefs
Reports for Congress on specific issues take many forms: policy analyses,
statistical reviews, economic studies, legal analyses, historical studies, chronological
reviews, and bibliographies.  Issue Briefs are concise briefing papers on legislative
issues before Congress and are updated to reflect legislative action.  Issue briefs and
reports are available on the CRS website at [http://www.crs.gov]; by telephone at
202-707-7132; and in-person at the Product Distribution Center (Madison Building
LM-206).
CRS prepares concise briefing papers on issues before the Congress.  Updated
regularly, Issue Briefs are available both in printed form and on the CRS website.
c. Congressional Distribution Memoranda
Matters that are not suitable for treatment in a CRS report or issue brief, but that
may be of interest to more than one congressional office, can be the subject of
general distribution memoranda provided to a congressional office upon request.  The
memoranda differ from Reports because they are tailored, or written for a single
requester; are directed to a specific question or concern; or are more technical or
focused in nature.
d. The La Follette Congressional Reading Room, the CRS Research
Centers and the Jefferson Congressional Reading Room
Staff in the congressional reading rooms and research centers provide telephone
reference assistance and in-person consultation on resources and research for
congressional staff.  A selected research collection, newspapers and journals, and
assistance with online searching is available.
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La Follette Congressional Reading Room
Rayburn Research Center
Russell Senate Research Center
Hours: Monday-Friday, 9:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.
  (Hours may change when Congress is not in session.)
The Jefferson Congressional Reading Room is a Members only facility staffed by
CRS research librarians providing in-person service.
e. Electronically Accessible Products and Services
CRS website [http://www.crs.gov].  The CRS website provides 24-hour access
to an array of CRS services including full text of issue briefs and reports, a weekly
“Legislative Alert,” updates and analyses of the annual appropriations legislation, an
interactive guide to the legislative process, online registration for CRS seminars, and
complete information on other CRS services.  In operation since the 104th Congress,
the CRS website is accessible only to House and Senate offices and other legislative
branch agencies.  A linked format allows the user to move easily within a CRS online
document and link to the text and summary of relevant legislation and other CRS
products on the topic.
Legislative Information System [http://www.congress.gov].  The Legislative
Information System (LIS) was available for the first time on Capnet at the beginning
of the 105th Congress.  The system provides Members of Congress and their staff
with access to the most current and comprehensive legislative information available.
It can be accessed only by the House and Senate and the legislative support agencies.
The LIS has been developed under the policy direction of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration and the House Committee on House Administration.  It has
been a collaborative project of the offices and agencies of the legislative branch,
including the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House; House Information
Resources and the Senate Sergeant at Arms; the Government Printing Office; the
Government Accountability Office; the Congressional Budget Office; the
Congressional Research Service; and the Library of Congress.  CRS has
responsibility for the overall coordination of the retrieval system; the Library of
Congress is responsible for its technical development and operation.
Floor Agenda.  The “Floor Agenda: CRS Products” page, a weekly
compendium of CRS products relevant to scheduled or expected floor action in the
House and Senate, was available on the CRS website and through e-mail subscription
to all Members, committees, subcommittees, and congressional staff.  All CRS
products listed on the Floor Agenda were linked for electronic delivery to subscriber
desktops.
CRS Programs Listserv.  Launched in fiscal 2001, this e-mail notification
system provides subscribers with descriptions of current CRS programs and links to
online registration forms.
Current Legislative Issues.  The Current Legislative Issues (CLI) system,
accessible to the Congress from the CRS Home Page, reflects policy areas identified
by CRS research staff as active and of current importance to the Congress.  All
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products presented as CLIs are maintained to address significant policy
developments.  On occasion the system is used to facilitate the contribution of CRS
expertise in situations requring immediate attention of the Congress on an
unanticipated basis.  In FY2003 CRS developed and maintained 160 CLIs
Appropriations.  The CRS appropriations Web page continued to provide
comprehensive legislative tracking and access to legislative analysis of each of the
13 annual appropriations bills.  The appropriations status table included an online
guide to the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7), which offered
access and short cuts to notable sections from the end-of-session measure that
combined 11 appropriations acts into one bill.
f. Audiovisual Products and Services
Audiovisual Products and Services.  CRS provides a variety of audiovisual
products and technical assistance in support of its service to the Congress.  These
include producing video or audio copies of CRS institutes and seminars that
congressional staff can request for viewing in tape format or at their desktops from
the Web.  The Web versions are broken out into subtopics so that individual viewers
can go directly to the portions that are of greatest interest to them.  Working with the
Library’s Office of Information Technology Services the Section also provides live
Webcasts of selected CRS seminars.  In addition, CRS provides two hours of
television programming each weekday for the house and Senate closed-circuit
systems.
Language Support.  The Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division provides
limited translation services for Members and committees.  Languages covered in-
house include French, German, Greek, Italian, Latin, and Portuguese.  For
translations pertaining to legislative business into or from other languages, the
division can make arrangements to contract the work to outside vendors.
5. CRS Divisional Responsibilities
CRS has adopted an interdisciplinary and integrative approach as it responds to
requests from the Congress.  The Service seeks to define complex issues in clear and
understandable ways, identify basic causes of the problems under consideration, and
highlight available policy choices and potential effects of action.  CRS is organized
into the following divisions and offices to support the analysis, research, and
information needs of the Congress.
Divisions.
American Law Division
The American Law Division provides the Congress with legal analysis and
information on the range of legal questions that emerge from the congressional
agenda.  Division lawyers and paralegals work with federal, state, and international
legal resources in support of the legislative, oversight, and representational needs of
Members and committees of Congress. The division’s work involves the
constitutional framework of separation of powers, congressional-executive relations
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and federalism; the legal aspects of congressional practices and procedures; and the
myriad questions of administrative law, constitutional law, criminal law, civil rights,
environmental law, business and tax law, and international law that are implicated
by the legislative process.  In addition, the division prepares The Constitution of the
United States of America — Analysis and Interpretation (popularly known as the
Constitution Annotated).
Domestic Social Policy Division
The Domestic Social Policy Division offers the Congress research and analysis
in the broad area of domestic social policies and programs.  Analysts use multiple
disciplines in their research, including program and legislative expertise, quantitative
methodologies, and economic analysis.  Issue and legislative areas include education
and training, health care and medicine, public health, social security, public and
private pensions, welfare, nutrition, housing, immigration, civil rights, drug control,
crime and criminal justice, border security and domestic intelligence, labor and
occupational safety, unemployment and workers compensation, and issues related to
the aging of the U.S. population, to children, persons with disabilities, the poor,
veterans, and minorities.
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
The Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division is organized into seven
regional and functional sections. Analysts follow worldwide political and economic
and security developments for the Congress, including U.S. relations with individual
countries and transnational issues such as terrorism, narcotics, refugees, international
health, global economic problems, and global institutions such as the United Nations,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.  They
also address U.S. foreign aid programs, strategies, and resource allocations; State
Department budget and functions; international debt; public diplomacy; and
legislation on foreign relations. Other work includes national security policy, military
strategy, weapons systems, military compensation, the defense budget, and U.S.
military bases.  Trade-related legislation, policies, and programs and U.S. trade
performance and investment flows are covered, as are trade negotiations and
agreements, export promotion, import regulations, tariffs, and trade policy functions.
Government and Finance Division
The Government and Finance division is responsible for meeting the analytic
and research needs of Congress on matters relating to government operations and
oversight, intergovernmental relations, congressional organization and procedures,
public finance, financial regulation, and macroeconomic policy.  Issue areas related
to government include the operations and history of Congress; the legislative process;
the congressional budget and appropriations processes; federal executive and judicial
branch organization and management; government personnel; government
information policy; statehood, territories and the District of Columbia; disaster
assistance and homeland security; census and reapportionment; elections and political
parties; lobbying; and constitutional amendments and history.  Issue areas related to
finance and economics include financial institutions and market structure; financial
markets and securities regulation; insurance; consumer finance, including banking,
CRS-110
credit  reporting, and financial privacy; government-sponsored enterprises and
housing finance; debt and taxation; economic development; international finance,
including foreign exchange and financial flows; monetary and fiscal policy; and
macroeconomic conditions and indicators, such as gross domestic product, price
indexes, and saving.
Information Research Division
The Information Research Division responds to requests for information
research and reference assistance.  The division serves the Congress by extending
research techniques beyond the limitations of traditional library tools and drawing on
automated files, the wide range of the Internet, local and state governments, private
organizations and institutions, as well as the resources of the Library of Congress.
Responses are tailored and may include preparing written reports, selecting
authoritative materials, creating electronic files, as well as Web pages designed to
meet the needs of Congress for continuous access to information and research.  The
staff in the congressional reading room and research centers provides telephone
reference service and in-person consultation on resources and research strategies for
congressional staff.  The Product Distribution Center provides document delivery
service for CRS products.
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
The Resources, Science, and Industry Division covers an array of legislative
issues for the Congress involving natural resources and environmental management,
science and technology, and industry and infrastructure. Resources work includes
policy analysis on public lands and other natural resources issues; environment;
agriculture, food, and fisheries; and energy and minerals.  Science coverage includes
policy analysis on civilian and military research and development issues, information
and telecommunications, space, earth sciences, and general science and technology.
Support on industry issues includes policy analysis on transportation and
transportation infrastructure issues, industrial market structure and regulation, and
sector-specific industry analysis.
Offices.
Office of Finance and Administration 
The Office of Finance and Administration maintains oversight of the Service’s
planning, management controls, financial management, and administrative activities.
This includes coordinating development of the Service’s strategic planning goals and
annual program plans and conducting quarterly performance reviews.  This office
directs a full range of fiscal operations to achieve the Director’s program objectives,
including development of long-range budgetary requirements and associated
appropriations requests, budget execution, contracting, and fund-raising.  The office
also performs facilities management and asset control activities and co-chairs the
Services Contract Review Board, conducts a business analysis of all proposals for
external research capacity, and makes recommendations to the Director.
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Office of Information Resources Management
The Office of Information Resources Management develops and maintains
information services that support both the Congress and CRS staff.  The office
provides information support to CRS staff through its management of three
Information Resource Centers, reference services, procurement of electronic and
print resources, training in the use of electronic resources, and Intranet resource
development.
Office of the Congressional Affairs and Counselor to the Director
The Office of Congressional Affairs and Counselor to the Director provides
counsel to the Director and Deputy Director on matters of law and policy —
planning, developing, and coordinating matters relating to internal CRS policies,
particularly as they affect the Service’s relationships with congressional clients and
other legislative support agencies.  The office provides final CRS review and
clearance of all CRS products; ensures that the Service complies with applicable
guidelines and directives contained in the Reorganization Act, in statements by
appropriations and oversight committees, and in Library regulations and CRS policy
statements.  This office receives, assigns to the research divisions, and tracks
congressional inquiries; works with the divisions to plan and carry out institutes,
seminars, and briefings for Members, committees, and their staffs, and takes the lead
in developing, strengthening, and implementing outreach to congressional offices;
records, tracks, and reports data on congressional inquiries and CRS responses; and
develops and refines systems designed to provide managers with statistical
information needed to analyze subject coverage, client service, and the use of
resources.  The office also provides a co-chair of the External Research Review
Board, which reviews contract proposals and makes recommendations to the
Director, and provides the CRS representative to the Interagency Liaison Group of
legislative support agencies.
Office of Legislative Information
The Office of Legislative Information develops and maintains information
services that support both the Congress and CRS staff, including the CRS website
and the congressional legislative information retrieval system (LIS); provides
summaries and status information for all bills introduced each Congress; builds and
maintains the technology infrastructure of the Service as a whole; develops and
applies new technologies to enhance CRS research capability and productivity;
develops and implements information technology to enhance communication of CRS
research to its clients; edits, produces, and distributes CRS products in both print and
electronic format; and represents the Director in dealing with other organizations and
agencies on issues regarding legislative information technology.
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The Office of Workforce Development
The Office of Workforce Development administers the Service’s human
resources programs and activities to include the following: staffing, recruitment,
position classification, diversity, upward mobility, performance management,
mentoring, special recognition, and training and professional development. This
office represents the Director on issues involving the Service’s status, role, activities,
and interaction with other Library entities in relevant areas of human resources
administration, management, and development.  Overall the goal of the office is to
enhance the Service’s ability to attract and retain the human resources talent it needs
to respond to the dynamic research, analysis, and information needs of the Congress.
6. Interdisciplinary Teams
a. Identification of Major Issues
As part of Service-wide planning efforts, CRS managers attempt to anticipate
major congressional issues.  The program identifies and defines major issues,
structures them for more effective scrutiny by the Congress, and provides effective,
timely, and comprehensive products and services to the Congress, that usually require
multi-disciplinary and interdivisional contributions.  The issues chosen are national
in scope, receive widespread public attention, have significant effects on the federal
budget, economy, or social fabric of the Nation, and are virtually certain to be the
subject of congressional hearings and legislative action.
7. Limitations
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and specific provisions in various
other acts direct and authorize CRS to provide a great range of products and services
to the Congress.  However, pursuant to these statutory authorities and understandings
reached over time in consultation with the relevant oversight committees, the Service
has developed the following policies limiting or barring certain types of assistance.
When it appears that a congressional request should be declined on these policy
grounds, that decision and notification to the requestor is to be made only  after
consultation with the appropriate division chief or the Associate Director for Policy
Compliance.
a. CRS cannot prepare reports, issue briefs, seminars or undisclaimed
products which are of a partisan nature or advocate bills or policies.  But
CRS will respond to requests for “directed writing” — statement drafts,
casemaking or other disclaimed products clearly identified as prepared at
the direction of the client and not for attribution as CRS analysis or
opinion.  In no case is excessive partisanship, incorrect factual data, moral
denigration of opponents, or personal research damaging to Members
permissible.
b. CRS cannot provide researched information focusing on individual
Members or living former Members of Congress (other than holders of, or
nominees to, federal appointive office), except at the specific request or
with permission of the Member concerned.
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c. Members of the CRS staff shall not appear as witnesses before committees
of Congress in their capacity as CRS employees or on matters relating to
their official duties without the express consent of the Director.
d. CRS does not draft bills (a function of the office of the legislative
counsels), but will assist with the preparation of legislative proposals.
e. CRS cannot meet deadlines or demands that could only be met by dropping
or jeopardizing the quality of responses to urgent legislative requests
related to the public policy work of the Congress, but the Service will
respond to all requests as rapidly as is feasible under prevailing workload
conditions.
f. CRS cannot accept “rush” or priority deadlines on constituent inquiries but
will respond as expeditiously as is possible without compromising the
quality of responses relating to current legislative business.
g. CRS cannot undertake casework or provide translating services or briefings
for constituents, but can lend assistance in responding to constituent
matters, including identification of the appropriate agency or private entity
to contact for further pursuit of the matter.
h. CRS cannot give personal legal or medical advice, but will assist in the
provision of background information, the identification of relevant issues
for further scrutiny, and advice on sources of additional assistance.
i. CRS cannot undertake scholastic or personal research for office staff, but
can, on a nonpriority basis, help with bibliographic and reference services.
j. CRS assistance for former Members of Congress should be limited to use
of the La Follette Reading Room and reference centers, the hotline service,
the provision of readily available information and previously prepared CRS
congressional distribution products.  CRS cannot undertake original
research for former Members, but on a nonpriority basis responds to
requests for reference services and research guidance.
k. CRS is not authorized to provide congressional offices with clerical
assistance (e.g., typing, duplication, maintenance of mailing lists,
continuing clipping services, etc.).
l. CRS must not use its staff to index hearings or congressional documents
other than those prepared by the Service itself.
m. The Library of Congress is not authorized to subscribe to or lend on a
regular basis current issues of periodicals and newspapers for the purpose
of furnishing them regularly to individual congressional offices.
n. CRS must not use its staff to support executive or other commissions that
are not funded through the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act.  In those
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instances where Members of Congress are official members of a
commission not served by CRS, the Service may supply customary
assistance to the Members, but queries should be placed through the
Members’ offices by their official staffs, and the replies should be sent to
the Members’ offices, not to the office of the commission.
o. CRS does not conduct audits or field investigations.
p. CRS is not authorized to provide its services in support of political
campaign organizations.
q. While CRS reference and research specialists serve all Members and
committees of Congress, the director has the authority to assign staff to
work temporarily for particular committees on request.  In current
circumstances, however, no full time assignments may be approved, and
staff assigned to close support of a committee must be available to serve
other clients.  When staff is adequate to permit the loan of subject
specialists for short periods, the director may approve formal requests
without reimbursement; staff loans for periods of over 60 days must be
reimbursed.  No full-time assignment of staff is approved if the assignment
leaves the Service unable to adequately serve the Congress.
r. As a general rule, the services of CRS are provided exclusively to the
Congress and, to the extent provided by law, to other congressional  support
agencies.  Because of the benefits derived from the exchange of
information with other governmental bodies (including elected and
appointed officials of foreign governments), the Service may also at the
discretion of the Director exchange courtesies and services of a limited
nature with such organizations, so long as such assistance benefits CRS
services to Congress.
s. CRS does not provide its services to congressional member organizations
and informal caucuses not funded by legislative branch appropriations but
will provide its normal services to the offices of Members who belong to
such entities and to formal congressional party organizations.  Current lists
of organizations that may place requests directly are available from the
Inquiry Unit.
t. Offer services to former Members of Congress, other than providing copies
of current CRS publications or limited brief reference assistance.
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Fast Access to all CRS services





-mail lists select Services
Navigation assistance 7-7100
CRS Experts
Phone 7-5700 (press 1-5 to request an expert)
Dial by name 7-5700 (press 1-4 and spell last name then first name)
CRS Products
Website (retrieve full text or order) [http://www.crs.gov]
Product Line (order by product number) 7-7132
Product Distribution Center Madison 206
(pick-up products)
In-Person Services and CRS Products
(Note: Hours may change when Congress is not in session.)
Hotline (quick facts, statistics and Web assistance) 7-7100
La Follette Congressional Reading Room Madison 204  7-7100
Monday - Thursday  8:30 a.m. - 8:00 p.m.
Friday  8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Saturday  8:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
(Closed Saturdays when Congress is not in session.)
Longworth Research Center B2215-2030
Monday - Friday  9:00 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Rayburn Research Center B3355-6958
Monday - Friday  9:00 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Senate Research Center Russell B074-3550
Monday - Friday  9:00 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Product Distribution Center LM 206  7-7132
Monday - Friday  8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m.
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Jefferson Congressional Reading Room  Jefferson 159
Members of Congress Only
Monday - Friday  8:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
Programs and Training
Information 7-7904 or [http://www.crs.gov] (select
Events)
To borrow books from the Library of Congress Collection
Fax 7-5986
E-mail loanref@loc.gov
Phone (also to open a loan account) 7-5441
To request book pick-up 7-5717
Mailing Address 
Daniel P. Mulhollan, Director
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress, LM 213
Washington, DC 20540-7210
(Note: Hill offices may use Inside Mail)
For questions, comments or problems about CRS services, please call Robert
Newlen, Legislative Relations Office, 7-3915.
B. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was created by the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.  It began operating on February 24,
1975, with the appointment of its first director, Alice M.  Rivlin.  CBO’s mission is
to provide Congress with objective, timely, nonpartisan analyses needed for
economic and budget decisions and with the information and estimates required for
the congressional budget process.  Compared with the missions of the Congress’s
other support agencies — the Congressional Research Service and the Government
Accountability Office — CBO’s mandate is relatively narrow.  But its subject matter
gives it a broad reach, reflecting the wide array of activities that the federal budget
covers and the major role the budget plays in the U.S. economy.
A substantial part of what CBO does is to support the work of the House and
Senate Committees on the Budget, which were also created by the 1974 act.  Those
committees are in charge of the process, spelled out in the act, by which the Congress
sets its own targets for the federal budget, including the overall levels of revenues
and spending, the surplus or deficit that results, and the distribution of federal
spending by broad functional categories.  Each spring Congress adopts the end result
of that process, the congressional budget plan, in the form of a concurrent resolution.
The resolution imposes an overall framework and discipline on the consideration of
appropriations, other spending measures, and tax legislation.
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The policies and principles that have shaped CBO since its inception are a key
factor in its effectiveness.  CBO is a professional, nonpartisan staff office, it does not
make recommendations on policy.  That nonpartisan stance has been instrumental in
preserving the agency’s reputation for professionalism and has enhanced the
credibility of its products.  CBO prepares independent analyses and estimates relating
to the budget and the economy and presents options and alternatives for Congress to
consider.  It routinely discloses the assumptions and methods it uses, which enhances
the general perception of its products as objective and impartial.
Some of CBO’s activities are statutory tasks; others are carried out at the request
of congressional committees or individual Members.  According to the Budget Act,
CBO must give priority first to requests for services from the House and Senate
Budget Committees; second, to requests from the two Appropriations Committees,
the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the Senate Committee on Finance;
and finally, to requests from all other congressional committees.  CBO prepares
various type of analyses for Congress, including cost estimates for bills that
individual Members have introduced or plan to introduce.  But, committee requests
always take priority.  CBO handles requests from individual Members only to the
extent that its resources permit.
CBO’s services can be grouped in four categories: helping Congress formulate
a budget plan, helping it stay within that plan; helping it assess the impact of federal
mandates, and helping it consider issues related to the budget and to economic policy.
1. Helping Congress Develop a Plan for the Budget.
The House and Senate Budget Committees prepare the annual congressional
budget plan, drawing on the “views and estimates” of the other committees.  A major
part of CBO’s role in that process is to prepare an annual report, which provides
economic and budget projections for the next 10 years.  Typically, it also includes a
discussion of some current economic or budget policy issues, such as the effects of
the federal deficit on economic growth or recent changes in the budget process.  CBO
customarily updates its economic and budget projections in midyear.
Economic Forecasts and Projections
CBO is the only part of the legislative branch whose mandate includes making
economic forecasts and projections.  Its forecasts cover 18 to 24 months and involve
the major economic variables — gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment,
inflation, and interest rates.  CBO does not attempt to forecast cyclical fluctuations
in the economy more than two years ahead; instead, its longer-term projections are
based on trends in the labor force, productivity, and savings.
CBO draws the information for its forecasts from the major econometric models
and commercial economic forecasting services.  It also relies on the advice of a
distinguished panel of advisers that meets twice a year.  Usually, CBO’s forecasts are
fairly close to the consensus of private forecasters.  CBO regularly publishes an
evaluation of its economic forecasting record.
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Baseline Budget Projections
The purpose of CBO’s budget projections is to give Congress a baseline for
measuring the effects of proposed changes in tax and spending laws.  The projections
show what would happen to the federal budget if current spending or revenue policies
were unchanged over the projection period.  The Budget Committees use the
projections to develop their annual budget resolutions and directives to other
committees.  CBO uses them to produce cost estimates for proposed legislation and
in scorekeeping tabulations.
For revenues and entitlement programs, such as Social Security or Medicare, the
baseline projections generally assume that current laws will continue without change.
For discretionary spending, which is controlled by annual appropriation bills, CBO
bases its projections on the most recent appropriations, adjusted for the projected rate
of inflation.
Analysis of the President’s Budget and Other Assistance
Each year, at the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, CBO
analyses the President’s budget to see how its revenue and spending proposals would
affect CBO’s baseline budget projections.  In the analysis, CBO uses its own
economic assumptions and estimating techniques to recast the budget the President
has proposed and submitted to the Congress.  In addition, as Congress moves towards
its annual budget resolution, CBO helps the budget and other committees estimate
the effects of alternative budget plans.  Frequently, CBO officials are asked to testify
before congressional committees about the outlook for the economy and the budget
and about other matters related to developing the annual budget plan.
Long-Term Budgetary Pressures and Policy Options
The 10-year time frame CBO uses for preparing budget projections is not
sufficient to show the dramatic effects that the projected demographic changes in the
U.S. population over the next three decades will have on the federal budget.  The
upcoming retirement of the large baby-boom generation and the continuing growth
of per-enrollee health care costs will place growing pressure on the budget, largely
because they will increase spending on Social Security, Medicare, and other
programs that serve the elderly.  Since 1996, CBO has periodically prepared a report
on the long-term budgetary outlook and on some of the policy options for controlling
the growth of spending in those programs.
2. Helping Congress Stay Within Its Budget Plan.
Once Congress adopts the annual budget resolution, the Budget Committees take
the lead in enforcing its provisions.  To help them, CBO supplies estimates of the
budgetary impact of bills reported by the different committees and up-to-date
tabulations (referred to as scorekeeping) of the status of congressional actions on
legislation that affects the budget.
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Cost Estimate for Bills
CBO is required to develop a cost estimate for virtually every bill reported by
congressional committees to show how it would affect spending or revenues over the
next five years or more.  For most tax legislation, CBO uses estimates provided by
the Joint Committee on Taxation, a separate congressional analytic group that works
closely with the two tax-writing committees.  CBO also prepares cost estimates for
use in drafting bills (especially in the early stages), formulating floor amendments,
and working out the final form of legislation in conference committees.  To the
extent that its resources permit, CBO estimates the cost of bills at the request of
individual Members.  In the past, where appropriate, CBO estimates contained the
projected costs to state and local governments of carrying out the proposed
legislation.  In March 1995, enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
greatly expanded CBO’s responsibilities in that area (see below).
CBO’s cost estimates have become an integral part of the legislative process and
committees increasingly refer to them at every stage of drafting bills.  The estimates
may also have an impact on the final outcome of legislation because they are used to
determine whether committees are complying with the annual budget resolutions and
reconciliation instructions.
Another CBO responsibility is providing estimates to the Appropriations
Committees of the Congress.  The numbers contained in appropriation bills usually
represent budget authority, and the resulting outlays must be estimated.  (Outlays are
generally checks issued by the Treasury or cash-equivalent transactions that, when
subtracted from receipts, are used to calculate the budget surplus or deficit.)  CBO’s
estimates may be critical in determining whether a bill complies with allocations in
the annual budget resolution.
Scorekeeping
One of CBO’s most important functions is to keep track of all spending and
revenue legislation considered each year so Congress can know whether it is acting
within the limits set by the annual budget resolution.  CBO provides the Budget and
Appropriations Committees with frequent tabulations of congressional action on both
spending and revenue bills — although the bulk of CBO’s scorekeeping involves
spending legislation.  The scorekeeping systems keep track of all bills that affect the
budget from the time they are reported out of committee to the time they are enacted
into law.
3. Helping Congress Assess Federal Mandates.
To assess better the impact of its laws on state, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
The act amends the Congressional Budget Act to require CBO to give authorizing
committees a statement about whether reported bills contain federal mandates.  If the
direct costs of an intergovernmental or private-sector mandate exceed specified
thresholds in any of the first five years after the mandate takes effect, CBO must
provide an estimate of those costs (if feasible) and the basis of the estimate.
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CBO’s statement must also include an assessment of what funding is authorized
in the bill to cover the costs of the mandates and, for intergovernmental mandates,
an estimate of the appropriations needed to fund such authorizations for up to 10
years after the mandate is effective.  When requested, CBO is also required to assist
committees by preparing studies of legislative proposals containing federal mandates.
The law took effective January 1, 1996.
4. Helping Congress Consider Budget and Economic Policy
Issues.
CBO’s responsibilities also entail analyzing specific program and policy issues
that affect the federal budget and the economy.  For the most part, requests for those
analyses come from the chairman or ranking minority member of a full committee
or subcommittee.  The leadership of either party in the House or Senate may also
request CBO analysis.
The analysis cover a variety of federal activities, examining current policies,
suggesting other approaches, and projecting how the alternatives would affect current
programs, the federal budget, and the economy.  In keeping with its nonpartisan
mandate, CBO does not offer recommendations on policy in those reports.
Some of the analyses take nine to 12 months, or sometimes longer, to complete.
Other analyses may be conducted in a much shorter time frame, usually appearing as
papers or memorandums.  Many CBO reports have helped shape public discussion
of the issues they address, not only on Capitol Hill but in the nation at large.  A list
of CBO’s recent publications shows the broad range of their subject matter.
Employing Staff and Budgetary Resources
CBO’s annual appropriation limits the number of staff the agency may employ.
The appropriation for FY1976 authorized 193 positions.  Since 1977, the agency’s
staffing limit has grown to the present level of 235 full-time equivalent positions.  Of
those, 215 are designated professional and 20 are support positions.
CBO is an agency dominated by economists and policy analysts.  All of its
directors have held Ph.D.’s, most in economics, and about 60 percent of its
professional staff hold advanced degrees in either economics, public policy, or a
related field.  Nearly all of CBO’s professional staff have completed four or more
years of college; three out of four have graduate degrees.
CBO’s FY2004 appropriation was $33.6 million.  Of its total expenditures, the
largest share — 88 percent — is allotted to personnel.  The second largest component
is computer costs.  Today, those expenditures make up about six percent of total
spending.
Services and offices are conveniently located on the fourth floor of the Ford
House Office Building (formerly House Annex II) at Second and D Streets, SW, in
Washington, DC.  The building is served by the Blue and Orange Lines of the
Washington Metrorail system; the Federal Center SW station is across from the Third
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Street side of the building.  A shuttle bus service operated on Capitol Hill by the
Architect of the Capitol serves the Ford Building.
How to Contact CBO
For general information, call 202-226-2600.  The fax number is (202) 226-2714.
CBO is open weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
How to Obtain CBO Products
Congressional Distribution.  Members of Congress receive copies of all CBO
reports and studies.  The fax number is (202) 226-3040.  CBO is open weekdays from
9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
Public Distribution.  Single copies of CBO’s reports, studies, papers, and
memorandums are available to the public at no charge.  Those documents are also
available on CBO’s website (www.cbo.gov).  To request a list of publications or a
specific document, call the Publications Office at (202) 226-2809 weekdays between
9:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. or write to the following:
CBO Publications Office
Management, Business, and Information Services Division
Ford House Office Building
Second and D Streets, SW
Washington, DC 20515
To obtain multiple copies, contact the U.S. Government Printing Office, which
sells many of CBO’s reports and studies.  For information about availability, exact
costs, and ordering, call (202) 275-3030 or write to the following:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
CBO cost estimates are available to the public on the website and are generally
included in Senate and House committee reports that accompany reported legislation.
The Publications Office does not distribute copies of cost estimates. 
C.  Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House 
General Counsel
For over two decades the offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General
Counsel have developed parallel yet distinctly unique and independent roles as
institutional legal “voices” of the two bodies they represent.  Familiarity with the
structure and operation of these offices and the nature of the support they may
provide committees in the context of an investigative oversight proceeding is
essential.
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69 A full description of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel and its work may be found in
Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, S.Doc. 28, 101st  Cong.,
2nd sess. 1236 (1992).  For a more recent discussion of the history, development and work
of both the Senate and House counsels’ offices, see Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House
Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client,
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 61: no. 2, spring 1998:48-63. 
70 P.L. 95-520, secs. 701 et seq., 92 Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978), codified principally in 2 U.S.C.
§§ 288, et seq.
71 S.Rept. 95-170, 95th  Cong., 2nd sess. 84 (1978).
72 2 U.S.C. 288(a) and (b), 288a.
73 In addition, the office is called upon to defend the Senate, its committees, officers and
employees in civil litigation relating to their official responsibilities or when they have been
subpoenaed to testify or to produce Senate records; and to appear for the Senate when it
intervenes or appears as amicus curiae in a lawsuit to protect the powers or responsibilities
of Congress.
A.  Senate Legal Counsel.
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel69 was created by Title VII of the Ethics in
Government Act of 197870 “to serve the institution of Congress rather than the
partisan interests of one party or another.”71  The counsel and deputy counsel are
appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of
the majority and minority leaders.  The appointment of each is made effective by a
resolution of the Senate, and each may be removed from office by a resolution of the
Senate.  The term of appointment of the counsel and deputy counsel is two
Congresses.  The appointment of the counsel and deputy counsel and the counsel’s
appointment of assistant Senate Legal Counsel are required to be made without
regard to political affiliation.  The office is responsible to a bipartisan Joint
Leadership Group, which is comprised of the majority and minority leaders, the
president pro tempore, and the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committees on the Judiciary and on Rules and Administration.72
The act specifies the activities of the office, two of which are of immediate
interest to committee oversight concerns:  representing committees of the Senate in
proceedings to aid them in investigations, and advising committees and officers of
the Senate.73
(1)  Proceedings to Aid Investigations by Senate Committees 
The Senate Legal Counsel may represent committees in proceedings to obtain
evidence for Senate investigations.  Two specific proceedings are authorized.
The first proceeding is under the law providing committees the authority to grant
witness immunity (18 U.S.C. § 6005).  It provides that a committee or subcommittee
of either house of Congress may request an immunity order from a U.S. district court
when the request has been approved by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members of the full committee.  By the same vote, a committee may direct the Senate
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74 2 U.S.C. 288b(d)(2), 288f.
75 28 U.S.C. 1365.
76 See S.Rept. 98, 101st  Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
77 See, Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F.Supp 17 (D.D.C. 1994),
petition for stay pending appeal denied, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).
78 2 U.S.C. 288d and 28 U.S.C. 1365.
79 2 U.S.C. 288 d(c).
80 See 28 U.S.C. 1365 (a).
81 Id.
Legal Counsel to represent it or any of its subcommittees in an application for an
immunity order.74
The second proceeding involves authority under the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978 which permits the Senate Legal Counsel to represent a committee or
subcommittee of the Senate in a civil action to enforce a subpoena.  Prior to the
Ethics Act, subpoenas of the Senate could be enforced only through the cumbersome
method of a contempt proceeding before the bar of the Senate or by a certification to
the U.S. attorney and a prosecution for criminal contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C.
§§ 192, 194.  The Ethics Act authorizes the Senate to enforce its subpoenas through
a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.75  The House
chose not to avail itself of this procedure and this enforcement method applies only
to Senate subpoenas.  Senate subpoenas have been enforced in several civil actions.
See, for example proceedings to hold in contempt a recalcitrant witness in the
impeachment proceedings against Judge Alcee L. Hastings76 and proceedings to
enforce a subpoena duces tecum for the production of diaries of Senator Bob
Packwood.77
The statute details the procedure for directing the Senate Legal Counsel to bring
a civil action to enforce a subpoena.  In contrast to an application for an immunity
order, which may be authorized by a committee, only the full Senate by resolution
may authorize an action to enforce a subpoena.78 The Senate may not consider a
resolution to direct the counsel to bring an action unless the investigating committee
reports the resolution by a majority vote.  The statute specifies the required contents
of the committee report; among other matters, the committee must report on the
extent to which the subpoenaed party has complied with the subpoena, the objections
or privileges asserted by the witness, and the comparative effectiveness of a criminal
and civil proceeding.79 A significant limitation on the civil enforcement remedy is
that it excludes from its coverage actions against officers or employees of the federal
government acting within their official capacities, except where the refusal to comply
is based on the assertion of a personal privilege or objection and not on a
governmental privilege or objection that has been authorized by the executive
branch.80  Its reach is limited to natural persons and to entities acting or purporting
to act under the color of state law.81
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82 2 U.S.C. 288g(a)(5) and (6).
83 2 U.S. 288g(c).
84 See S.Rept. 1015, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (1980).
85 See S.Rept. 682, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982).
86 See S.Rept. 812, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (1986).
87 See S.Rept. 164, 101st  Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
88 See S.Rept. 156, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
(2)  Advice to committees and officers of the Senate and other duties
The Ethics act details a number of advisory functions of the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel.  Principal among these are the responsibility of advising Members,
committees, and officers of the Senate with respect to subpoenas or requests for the
withdrawal of Senate documents, and the responsibility of advising committees about
their promulgation and implementation of rules and procedures for congressional
investigations.  The office also provides advice about legal questions that arise during
the course of investigations.82
The act also provides that the counsel shall perform such other duties consistent
with the nonpartisan purposes and limitations of Title VII as the Senate may direct.83
Thus, in 1980,  the office was used in the investigation relating to President Carter’s
brother, Billy, and his connection to Libya.  The office worked under the direction
of the chairman and vice-chairman of the subcommittee charged with the conduct of
that investigation.84 Members of the office have also undertaken special assignments
such as the Senate’s investigation of “Abscam” and other undercover activities,85 the
impeachment proceedings of Judge Harry Claiborne,86 Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr.,87
and Judge Alcee L. Hastings Jr., 88 and the confirmation hearings of Justice Clarence
E. Thomas.  The office was called upon to assist in the Senate’s conduct of the
impeachment trial of President Clinton.
In addition, the counsel’s office provides information and advice to Members,
officers, and employees on a wide range of legal and administrative matters relating
to Senate business.  Unlike the House practice, the Senate Legal Counsel plays no
formal role in the review and issuance of subpoenas.  However, since it may become
involved in civil enforcement proceedings, it has welcomed the opportunity to review
proposed subpoenas for form and substance prior to their issuance by committees.
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel can be reached at 224-4435.
B.  House General Counsel.
The House Office of General Counsel has evolved since the mid-1970s, from
its original role as a legal advisor to the Clerk of the House on a range of matters that
fell within the jurisdiction of the Clerk’s office, to that of counsel for the institution.
At the beginning of the 103rd Congress, it was made a separate House office,
reporting directly to the Speaker, charged with the responsibility “of providing legal
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89 See H. Res. 5, Sec. 11, 139 Cong. Rec. H5 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993).
90 House Rule II(8) of the Rules of the 108th Congress.
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183 (3d Cir.
1999); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994); Cano v. Davis, No. 01-8477
(C.D. Cal. March 28, 2002) (unpublished order granting motions to quash subpoenas to
Members).
93 See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)
(litigation in which the General Counsel was authorized by statute, P.L. 105-119, § 209(b)
(1997), to represent the House in a challenge to the legality of the Department of
Commerce’s plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000 census).
94 See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, aff’d sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531
U.S. 940, 941 (2000); Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2001); Skaggs v. Carle,
110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Newdow v. Eagen, No. 02-01704 (D.D.C. filed March 24,
2004).
95 See, e.g., H.Rep. 105-797, In the Matter of Representative Jay Kim, Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. 84-85 (Oct. 8, 1998)
assistance and representation to the House.”89  While the function and role of the
House Office of General Counsel and Senate Legal Counsel with respect to oversight
assistance to committees and protection of institutional prerogatives are similar, there
are some differences that will be noted below.
The General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel, and other attorneys of the office
are appointed by the Speaker and serve at his pleasure.90  The office “function[s]
pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group,” which consists of the Speaker himself, the Majority Leader,
Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip.91  The office has statutory
authority to appear before state or federal courts in the course of performing its
functions.  2 U.S.C. § 130f.  The office may appear as amicus curiae on behalf of the
Speaker and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in litigation involving the
institutional interests of the House.92  Where authorized by statute or resolution, the
office may represent the House itself in judicial proceedings.93  The office also
represents House officers in litigation affecting the institutional interests and
prerogatives of the House.94  Finally, the office defends the House, its committees,
officers, and employees in civil litigation relating to their official responsibilities, or
when they have been subpoenaed to testify or to produce House records (see House
Rule VIII).
Unlike Senate committees, House committees may only issue subpoenas under
the seal of the Clerk of the House.  In practice, committees often work closely with
the Office of General Counsel in drafting subpoenas and every subpoena issued by
a committee is reviewed by the office for substance and form.  Committees
frequently seek the advice and assistance of the Office of General Counsel in dealing
with various asserted constitutional, statutory, and common-law privileges,95 in
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96 See, e.g., Hearing, “The Attorney General’s Refusal to Provide Congressional Access to
‘Privileged’ Inslaw Documents,” before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial
Law, Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd sess. 77-104 (Dec. 5, 1990).
97 See, e.g., 132 Cong Rec. 3036-38 (1986) (floor consideration of contempt citation against
two witnesses who refused to testify concerning alleged assistance provided to former
Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his wife).
98 See, e.g., Dornan v. Sanchez, 978 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
99 See, e.g., Harris v. Board of Governors, 938 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
United States House of Representatives, 556 F. Sup.. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
100 See, e.g., Pentagen Technologies Int’l, Ltd. v. Committee on Appropriations of the United
States House of Representatives, 20 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d 194 F.3d 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); United States v. McDade, No. 96-1508 (3d Cir. July 12, 1996) (unpublished
order quashing subpoena to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. 02-121 (S.D. Tex. filed May 15, 2002) (unpublished order
quashing subpoena to the Committee on Energy and Commerce).
101 See, e.g., In re Harrisburg Grand Jury, 638 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Pa. 1986).  Cf. United
States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1990900 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2002) (order
denying the “Expedited Motion of the United States for Clarification Regarding the
Applicability of the Protective Order for Unclassified But Sensitive Material and Local Rule
57 to Information That May Be Made Public in Congressional Proceedings”)
responding to executive agencies and officials that resist congressional oversight,96
and in navigating the statutory process for obtaining a contempt citation with respect
to a recalcitrant witness.97
The Office of General Counsel represents the interests of House committees in
judicial proceedings in a variety of circumstances.  The office represents committees
in federal court on applications for immunity orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6005;
appears as amicus curiae in cases affecting House committee investigations;98
defends against attempts to obtain direct or indirect judicial interference with
congressional subpoenas or other investigatory authority;99 represents committees
seeking to prevent compelled disclosure of non-public information relating to their
investigatory or other legislative activities;100 and appears in court on behalf of
committees seeking judicial assistance in obtaining access to documents or
information such as documents that are under seal or materials which may be
protected by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.101
Like the Senate Legal Counsel’s office, the House General Counsel’s office also
devotes a large portion of its time to rendering informal advice to individual
Members and committees.  The office can be reached at (202) 225-9700.  Its website
address is [http://generalcounsel.house.gov/], which is available only to House
offices.
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D.  Government Accountability Office (GAO)
The Government Accountability Office, formerly called the General Accounting
Office (GAO), was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31
U.S.C. § 702) as an independent auditor of government agencies.  Over the years,
Congress has expanded GAO’s audit authority, added new responsibilities and duties,
and strengthened GAO’s ability to perform independently of the executive branch.
GAO is under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United
States, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
for a term of 15 years.
GAO’s core values define the organization and its people.  These core values are
accountability, integrity, and reliability. 
1. Accountability.
Most GAO reviews are made in response to specific congressional requests.
GAO is required to do work requested by committee chairmen and, as a
matter of policy, assigns equal status to requests from ranking minority
members.  To the extent possible, GAO also responds to individual
member requests.  Other assignments are initiated pursuant to standing
commitments to congressional committees, and some reviews are
specifically required by law.  Finally, some assignments are undertaken in
accordance with GAO’s basic legislative responsibilities.  GAO staff are
located in Washington and in offices across the United States.
Types of Questions GAO Answers
Is a federal program achieving the desired results, or are changes needed in
government policies or management?
Are there better ways of accomplishing the objectives of a federal program
at lower costs?
Is a government program being carried out in compliance with applicable
laws and regulations, and are data furnished to Congress on the program
accurate?
Do opportunities exist to eliminate waste and inefficient use of public
funds?
Are funds being spent legally, and is accounting for them accurate?
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2. Integrity.
Integrity describes the high standards that GAO sets for itself in the
conduct of its work.  GAO seeks to take a professional, objective, fact-
based, fair and balanced approach to all of its activities.  Integrity is the
foundation of its reputation and GAO’s approach to its work.
Products
GAO provides oral briefings, testimony, and written reports.  Written
reports vary in format and content depending on the complexity of the
assignment.  If agreements reached during early discussions differ
substantially from the original request, GAO often confirms changes in
writing to ensure a mutual understanding about the assignment.
Sometimes, agreements need to be altered as an assignment progresses.
For example, a requester’s needs may change, the required data may be
unavailable or unobtainable in the time allowed, or the methodology may
need to be changed.  In these cases, GAO works with the requester to
revise the assignment.  Again, substantial changes from previous
agreements are often confirmed in writing.
Early communication with the requester also is important because:
Similar or duplicate requests may be received.  GAO tries to
consolidate assignments and provide copies of a report to each
requester.
An ongoing review may address (or may be revised to address) a
requester’s needs.  GAO works with the requester to ensure a
satisfactory and prompt response.
A recently completed review may adequately address a requester’s
concerns and make starting a new assignment unnecessary.
GAO may not be the most appropriate agency to perform the
assignment.  In those cases, GAO will suggest referring the
assignment to the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional
Research Service, the inspector general of a particular agency, or the
agency itself.  GAO remains available to help a requester if the
information provided does not meet the requester’s needs.
GAO strives to use its budget and staff resources effectively.  On occasion,
the resources required by congressional requests exceed the supply of
talent available within GAO.  Also, in some cases, the GAO staff most
knowledgeable of a request’s subject matter are engaged on other
assignments and are not immediately available.  In either case, GAO will
do everything possible to respond to a new congressional request.
However, it may be necessary to delay starting some requests.  In those
cases, GAO seeks the requesters’ help in setting priorities.
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3. Reliability.
Reliability describes GAO’s goal for how its work is viewed by Congress
and the American public.  GAO’s objective is to produce high quality
reports, testimony, briefings, legal opinions, and other products and
services that are timely, accurate, useful, clear, and candid.
The effectiveness of GAO products derives from their quality and the way
requesters and agency officials use them to improve government
operations.  GAO offers a range of products to communicate the results of
its work.  The type of product resulting from a particular assignment
depends on the assignment’s objectives and/or a requester’s needs.  In
selecting a type of product, tradeoffs may be necessary in scope, detail, or
time.  GAO’s products include written reports to Congress, committees, or
individual members; testimony; and oral briefings.
4. Additional Services.
In addition to its audits and evaluations, GAO offers a number of other
services.  
a. Office of Special Investigations.  
The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) conducts investigations for
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  OSI’s
primary mission is to support the Congress by investigating
allegations of illegal and improper conduct relating to federal funds,
programs, and activities.  OSI typically investigates allegations of
fraud, corruption, abuse, ethics violations and conflicts of interest.
Additionally, OSI performs security tests and reviews to determine
whether security vulnerabilities exist in federal systems and facilities.
OSI conducts it work in accordance with the standards established by
the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE).
b. Legal Services
GAO provides various legal services.  For example, upon request,
GAO may render a legal decision or opinion on questions involving
the use of, and accountability for, public funds or on other legal issues
of interest to congressional committees.  In addition, under a variety
of statutes, GAO (1) oversees executive branch compliance with the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and reviews and reports to
Congress on proposed rescissions and deferrals of federal funds; (2)
reviews all major rules proposed by federal agencies and provides
reports to Congress; and (3) receives agency reports about vacancies
in Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed positions and issues
legal opinions under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998.
GAO publishes Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (known as
the Red Book) and teaches a class that provides an orientation to
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federal fiscal laws.  GAO attorneys are available for informal
technical assistance.  Also, GAO, under the Competition in
Contracting Act, provides an objective, independent, and impartial
forum for the resolution of bid protests of awards of federal contracts.
c. Accounting and Financial Management Policy
GAO prescribes accounting principles and standards for the executive
branch.  It also advises federal agencies on fiscal and other policies
and procedures and prescribe standards for auditing government
programs.
d. Audit/Evaluation Community Support
GAO also provides other services to help the audit and evaluation
community improve and keep abreast of current developments.  For
example, it publishes and distributes papers on current audit and
evaluation methodologies and approaches; assists in various training
programs sponsored by these organizations; and sponsors an
international auditor fellowship program to help other nations achieve
an effective audit/evaluation organization.
e. Committee Support
Occasionally, GAO assigns staff to work directly for congressional
committees.  In these cases, the staff assigned represent a committee
and not GAO.
5. Obtaining GAO Services.
Congressional requesters are encouraged to contact GAO on an informal
basis prior to submitting a written request.  GAO staff are pleased to
consult with requesters or their staffs and help them frame questions and
issues and formulate strategies and approaches even before a request letter
is written.
GAO encourages the continuation of close working relationships between
requesters or their staffs and GAO.  GAO’s Office of Congressional
Relations (512-4400) can help requesters identify an appropriate GAO
point for contact.  To request formally GAO assistance, write to:
The Honorable David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
441 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20548
Information about GAO and the materials it produces can be obtained from its
website at [http://www.gao.gov].
CRS-131
E.  Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
The Office of Management and Budget, [http://www.omb.gov], came into
existence in 1970; its predecessor agency, the Bureau of the Budget, dated back to
1921. Initially established as a unit in the Treasury Department, since 1939 the
budget agency has been a part of the Executive Office of the President. 
1.  Capabilities.
a. OMB is the President’s agent for the management and
implementation of policy, including the federal budget.
b. OMB’s major responsibilities include:
1. Assisting the President in the preparation of the budget and
development of a fiscal program.
2. Supervising and controlling the administration of the budget,
including transmittal to Congress of proposals for deferrals and
rescissions .
3. Keeping the President informed about agencies’ activities
(proposed, initiated, and completed), in order to coordinate
efforts, expend appropriations economically, and minimize
overlap and duplication.
4. Administering the process of review of proposed and final
agency files established by Executive Order 12866.
5. Administering the process of review and approval of collections
of information by federal agencies and reducing the burden of
agency information collection on the public under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
6. Overseeing the manner in which agencies disseminate
information to the public (including electronic dissemination);
how agencies collect, maintain, and use statistics; how agencies
archives are maintained; how agencies develop systems for
insuring privacy, confidentiality, security, and the sharing of
information collected by the government; and how the
government acquires and uses information technology, pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
7. Studying and promoting better governmental management,
including making recommendations to agencies regarding their
administrative organization and operations.
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8. Helping the President by clearing and coordinating the advice of
agencies regarding legislative proposals and making
recommendations about presidential action on legislation.
9. Assisting in the preparation, consideration, and clearance of
executive orders and proclamations.
10. Planning and developing information systems that provide the
President with program performance data.
11. Establishing and overseeing implementation of financial
management policies and requirements for the federal
government as required by the Chief Financial Officers Act of
1990.
12. Assisting in development of regulatory reform proposals and
programs for paperwork reduction, and then the implementation
of these initiatives.
13. Improving the economy and efficiency of the federal
procurement process by providing overall direction for
procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and forms.
14. Establishing policies and methods that reduce fraud, waste, and
abuse, and coordinating the work of the inspectors general
through the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency and
the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
2. Limitations.
OMB is inevitably drawn into institutional and partisan struggles between
the President and Congress.  Difficulties for Congress notwithstanding,
OMB is the central clearinghouse for executive agencies and is, therefore,
a rich source of information for investigative and oversight committees.
F.  Budget Information
Since enactment of the 1974 Budget Act, as amended, Congress has more
budgetary information than ever before.  Extensive budgetary materials are also
available from the executive branch.  Some of the major sources of budgetary
information are available on and off Capitol Hill.  They include (1) the President and
executive agencies (recall that under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the
President presents annually a national budget to Congress); (2) the Congressional
Budget Office; (3) the House and Senate Budget Committees; (4) the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees; and (5) the House and Senate legislative
committees.  In addition, the Government Accountability Office and the
Congressional Research Service prepare fiscal and other relevant  reports for  the
legislative branch.
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Worth mention is that discretionary spending, the component of the budget that
the Appropriations Committees oversee through the appropriations process, accounts
for about one-third of federal spending.  Other House and Senate committees,
particularly Ways and Means and Finance, oversee more than $1 trillion in spending
through reauthorizations, direct spending measures, and reconciliation legislation.
In addition, Ways and Means and Finance oversee a diverse set of programs,
including tax collection, tax expenditures, and some user fees, through the revenue
process.  The oversight activities of all of these committees is enhanced through the
use of the diverse range of budgetary information that is available to them.
 
1.  Executive Branch Budget Products
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 contains the Budget
Message of the President and information on the President’s 2005 budget proposals
by budget function. 
 
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2005 contains analyses that are designed to highlight specified subject areas or
provide other significant presentations of budget data that place the budget in
perspective.
The Analytical Perspectives volume includes economic and accounting
analyses; information on Federal receipts and collections; analyses of federal
spending; detailed information on Federal borrowing and debt; the Budget
Enforcement Act preview report; current services estimates; and other technical
presentations.  It also includes information on the budget system and concepts and
a listing of the federal programs by agency and account.
Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005
provides data on budget receipts, outlays, surpluses or deficits, federal debt, and
federal employment covering an extended time period — in most cases beginning in
FY1940 or earlier and ending in FY2009.  These are much longer time periods than
those covered by similar tables in other budget documents.  As much as possible, the
data in this volume and all other historical data in the budget documents have been
made consistent with the concept and presentation used in the 2001 budget, so the
data series are comparable over time.
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 — Appendix
contains detailed information on the various appropriations and funds that constitute
the budget and is designed primarily for the use of the Appropriations Committee.
The Appendix contains more detailed financial information on individual programs
and appropriation accounts than any of the other budget documents.  It includes for
each agency: the proposed text of appropriations language, budget schedules for each
account, new legislative proposals, explanations of the work to be performed and the
funds needed, and proposed general provisions applicable to the appropriations of
entire agencies or groups of agencies.  Information is also provided on certain
activities whose outlays are not part of the budget totals.  The Appendix is perhaps
the most useful product in the President’s initial budget submission for obtaining
programmatic detail.
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Automated Sources of Budget Information. The information contained in the
above-listed documents is available in electronic format from the following sources:
(1) CD-ROM.  The CD-ROM contains all of the budget documents and software to
support reading, printing, and searching for documents.  The CD-ROM also has
many of the tables in the budget in spreadsheet format.  (2) Internet.  All budget
documents, including documents that are released at a future date, will be available
for downloading in several formats from the Internet.  To access documents through
the website, use the following address: [http://www.gpo.gov/usbudget].
Several other points about the President’s budget and executive agency budget
products are worth noting.  First, the President’s budgetary communications to
Congress continue after the January/February submission and usually include a series
of budget amendments and supplementals, the Mid-Session Review, Statements of
Administration Policy (SAPs) on legislation, and even revised budgets on occasion.
Second, most of these additional communications are issued as House documents and
are available on the Web from GPO Access or the OMB homepage (in the case of
SAPs).  Third, the initial budget products often do not provide sufficient information
on the President’s budgetary recommendations to enable committees to begin
developing legislation, and that further budgetary information is provided in the
“justification” materials (see below) and the later submission of legislative proposals.
Finally, the internal executive papers (such as agency budget submissions to OMB)
often are not made available to Congress.
2.  Some Other Sources of Useful Budgetary Information
a. Committees on Appropriations.  The subcommittees of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees hold extensive hearings on the fiscal year appropriations
requests of federal departments and agencies.  The Appropriations Subcommittees
typically print agency justification material with the hearing record of the federal
officials concerning these requests.
Each federal department or agency submits justification material to the
Committees on Appropriations.  Their submissions can run from several hundreds
of pages to over two thousand pages.  
b.  Budget Committees.  House and Senate Budget Committees, in preparing to
report the annual concurrent budget resolution, conduct hearings on overall federal
budget policy.  These hearings and other fiscal analyses made by these panels address
various aspects of federal programs and funding levels which can be useful sources
of information.  
c.  Other Committees.  To assist the Budget Committees in developing the
concurrent budget resolution, other committees are required to prepare “views and
estimates” of programs in their jurisdiction.  Committee views and estimates, usually
packaged together and issued as a committee print, also may be a useful source of
detailed budget data.  
d.  Internal Agency Studies and Budget Reviews.  These agency studies and
reviews are often conducted in support of budget formulation and can yield useful
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information about individual programs.  The budgeting documents, evaluations, and
priority rankings of individual agency programs can provide insights into executive
branch views of the importance of individual programs.
G.  Beneficiaries, Private Organizations, and Interest Groups
Committees and Members can acquire useful information about executive
branch programs and performance from the beneficiaries of those programs, private
organizations, and interest groups.  An effective oversight device, for example, is to
ask beneficiaries how well federal programs and services are working.  A variety of
methods might be employed to solicit the views of those on the receiving end of
federal programs and services, including investigations and hearings, field and on-
site meetings, surveys and opinion polls, and websites.  The results of such efforts
can assist committees in obtaining policy-relevant information about program
performance and  in evaluating the problems people might be having with federal
administrators and agencies.
There are numerous think tanks, universities, or associations, for instance, that
periodically conduct studies of public policy issues and advise Members and others
on how well federal agencies and programs are working.  Similarly, numerous
interest groups are active in monitoring areas such as civil rights, education, or health
and they are not reluctant to point out alleged bureaucratic failings to committees and
Members.  Some of these groups may also assist committees and Members in
bringing about improvements in agencies and programs.
There are also scores of social, political, scientific, environmental, and
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) located around the world.
Working with governments, corporations, foundations, and other entities are such
NGOs as Greeenpeace, Amnesty International, the World Resources Institute, the
Red Cross, and the Save the Children Fund.  Many NGOs might provide valuable
assistance to congressional overseers because they “do legal, scientific, technical, and
policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, monitor, and enforce national
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Appendix D
Congressional Oversight Video Series
Oversight: A Key Congressional Function.  Former Representative Lee Hamilton
delivered the keynote address to a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various
aspects of congressional oversight.  In this program, Mr. Hamilton emphasizes the
importance of traditional oversight and reviews factors that contribute to successful
oversight.
Program Length: 60 minutes.  Product No.:  MM70003.
The Constitutional Context of Oversight.  Michael Stern, senior counsel with the
House General Counsel’s Office, and Michael Davidson, former Senate Legal
Counsel, discuss the constitutional context of oversight.  In addition, the two
attorneys address a variety of oversight topics, including congressional investigations.
Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various aspects of
congressional oversight.
Program Length: 60 minutes.  Product No.: MM70004.
The “Rules & Tools” of Oversight.  This program focuses on the formal
institutional rules that committees must follow to insure the legitimacy and fairness
of oversight proceedings.  The nature of the formidable powers of inquiry available
to congressional committees and the practicalities of their effective utilization are
also explored.  Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various
aspects of congressional oversight.
Program Length: 60 minutes.  Product No.: MM70005.
Sources of Oversight Assistance.  This session focuses on where congressional
committees can obtain assistance in conducting oversight.  Especially relevant are
inspectors general, chief financial officers,  and Congress’s own support agencies, the
Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and General
Accounting Office.  Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining
various aspect of congressional oversight.
Program Length: 46 minutes.  Product No.:  MM70006.
Fiscal Oversight: “Follow the Money.”  This seminar examines congressional
oversight of fiscal and budgetary activities, focusing on the role of the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees in the annual budget cycle and key support
activities of the Congressional Budget Office to Congress on budgetary matters
generally.  Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various
aspects of congressional oversight.
Program Length: 45 minutes.  Product No.: MM70007.
Outside Actors in the Oversight Process.  This program addresses how non-
congressional individuals can assist in the investigative process and in monitoring
executive branch performance.  The panel includes a journalist, members of public
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and private interest groups, and a former counsel with the House Commerce
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.  Taped as part of a 1999
series of CRS programs examining various aspects of congressional oversight.
Program Length: 50 minutes.  Product No.: MM70008.
Preparing for an Oversight Investigation.  This program probes the “ins and outs”
of how to prepare for Congressional Investigations from the perspective of both the
investigator and those being investigated Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS
programs examining various aspects of congressional oversight.
Program Length: 59:50.  Product No.: MM70009. 
VHS copies of CRS video programs are available on loan to congressional offices.
The soundtracks of many television programs are also available on audio cassettes.
For the schedule of CRS Programs on Channel 6 of the House and Channel 5 of the
Senate, call 7-7009.  For further information about any of these programs, please call
7-7547.
